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Abstract
The availability of high density FPGAs has made the use of soft-core processors an at-
tractive proposition for the low volume space market. Soft-core processors combine
the power of programmable logic with the ease of use of a conventional processor to
provide a highly customisable solution. However, the SRAM FPGAs used as imple-
mentation platform are especially susceptable to radiation induced single event upsets,
due to the sensitivity of their configuration memory. To safely use these processors in
a space environment requires the modification of the processor to safely mitigate these
effects.
This thesis presents the process followed to develop and test a fault tolerant implemen-
tation of an 8-bit PicoBlaze soft-core processor on a Xilinx Spartan-3 SRAM FPGA.
A thorough investigation was made into the available methods that can be used to
mitigate single event upsets, in order to identify the most suitable ones. Guidelines
for the application of SEU mitigation techniques to SRAM FPGAs were proposed. A
single event upset simulator was designed and constructed to compare the different
techniques. It mimics SEUs by injecting errors into the configuration memory of an
FPGA.
The results of error injection were used to develop a PicoBlaze implementation with
limited overhead, while it still offers a high degree of error mitigation.
Three different designs were tested by proton irradiation to verify the protection af-
forded by the mitigation techniques. It was found that protected designs were more
robust. The cross-section of the FPGA was also determined, which can be used with
the SEU simulator to predict the dynamic cross-section of designs.
The work contained in this thesis demonstrates the use of open-source intellectual
property with commercial-off-the-shelf components to develop a robust component for
use in the miniature spacecraft market.
iii
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Uittreksel
Die beskikbaarheid van hoë digtheid FPGAs maak programmeerbare logika verwer-
kers baie aantreklik vir gebruik in ruimtetoepassings. Programmeerbare logika ver-
werkers kombineer die krag van programmeerbare logika met die gebruiksgemak van
tradisionele verwerkers om ’n hoogs aangepaste oplossing te bied. SRAM FPGAs, wat
as die implementeringsplatform benut word, is egter sensitief vir korrupsie van geheu-
ebisse deur bestraling. Die verwerker moet aangepas word om hierdie effekte veilig te
kan hanteer.
Hierdie tesis beskryf die proses wat gevolg is om ’n fouttolerante weergawe van ’n 8-
bis programmeerbare hardeware verwerker, die PicoBlaze, te ontwerp en te toets. Die
verwerker is op ’n Spartan-3 FPGA van Xilinx implimenteer.
’n Deeglike studie van die metodes wat gebruik word om teen foute te beskerm is
gemaak, om die mees geskiktes te identifiseer. ’n Stel riglyne vir die toepassing van
fouttoleransie-tegnieke op SRAMFPGAs is voorgestel. Hardeware is spesifiek ontwerp
om die effekte van bestraling in die konfigurasie geheue van FPGAs na te maak. Dit is
benut om verskillende fouttoleransie-tegnieke te vergelyk.
Die resultate van die simulator is gebruik om ’n fouttolerante PicoBlaze implementasie
te ontwikkel wat ’n beperkte hoeveelheid logika benodig.
Drie verskillende PicoBlaze ontwerpe is met protone bestraal om die verharding teen
foute te bevestig. Die verharde ontwerpe was minder sensitief as die verwysingsont-
werp. Die kruisdeursnit van die FPGA is ook gemeet. Dit kan gebruik word om die
dinamiese kruisdeursnit van ontwerpe uit simulasie to bepaal.
Hierdie tesis illustreer hoe oopbron intellektuele eiendom en kommersiële komponente
kombineer kan word om ’n robuuste produk vir die miniatuursatelliet-mark te ontwik-
kel.
iv
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background
The production of miniature spacecraft has become an increasingly important segment
in the space market over the last few decades. The more modest on-orbit abilities of
these spacecraft require a much simpler system architecture than conventional prod-
ucts, which lowers the cost of the miniature system significantly. These systems are
characterised by the use of new technologies and commercial devices to improve per-
formance and to keep costs down. Their lower cost makes these satellites much more
accessible to developing countries and academic institutions.[1]
The University of Stellenbosch and South Africa entered this market with the launch of
SUNSAT in 1999. The resulting commercialisation of the satellite technology has been
accompanied by continous research into new technologies.
High-density field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) are one example of a technol-
ogy that holds much potential for application in the miniature satellite market. The
devices allow users to implement custom logic functions at a very low cost. The avail-
ability of devices with millions of gates allows several components to be implemented
on a single device, leading to higher integration and lower device count. FPGAs that
use SRAM technology for their configuration memory (SRAM-based FPGAs) also of-
fer further flexibility and adaptability by allowing on-orbit reconfiguration to take into
account changing mission parameters, environmental effects and component failure.
However, these devices are susceptible to radiation induced bit flips which decreases
the reliability of the design. Radiation induced single event upsets pose a significant
threat to the operation of soft-core processors, but can be mitigated to a large extent
through specific design techniques.
The recent explosion in the popularity of open-source software has provided the means
to quickly develop a high value product, based on existing intellectual property. The
open-source concept has also migrated to the world of programmable logic where it
1
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speeds up development and adds value to the hardware offerings of FPGA vendors.
One interesting phenomenon has been the development of open-source soft-core pro-
cessors: processors that are implemented in programmable logic.
These processors combine the ease of use of a conventional processor with the power
of parallel execution on FPGAs. The use of a soft-core processor allows extensive mod-
ifications to suit specific applications. An additional benefit is that the processor archi-
tecture will not be discontinued by a manufacturer, because it can easily be migrated to
another platform; recompiling is often enough. The use of such a processor also ben-
efits from all the integration and adaptability features of the FPGA it is implemented
on.
The convergence of these three elements forms the background to this study: utilising
the power of open-source soft-core processors on high density FPGAs for space appli-
cations.
1.2 Objectives
The primary objective of this thesis was the development of a single event upset toler-
ant implementation of a soft-core processor.
This was achieved by evaluating various fault tolerance techniques to derive guidelines
for their application to SRAM FPGAs. The protection afforded by the different tech-
niques was measured by using a specially designed SEU simulator that mimics upset
in the configuration memory by error injection. The best techniques were combined to
developed a hardened PicoBlaze design. This design was tested by proton irradiation.
This entailed the following:
• A study of the radiation environment experience by low-earth orbit satellites. The
manner in which the different types of radiation affects electronics had to be un-
derstood before mitigation techniques could be applied.
• An open source soft-core processor was selected. The LEON3 from Gaisler Re-
search and the Xilinx PicoBlaze were investigated. The PicoBlaze was selected
because it allowed easier modification for testing different mitigation strategies,
hardware that supports it could easily be found. A small microcontroller was also
deemed to be more suitable for the space environment than the larger LEON3.
SRAM-based FPGAs were used as implementation platform, because the upset
modes exhibited by flash and anti-fuse technologies can generally be seen as a
subset of what SRAM FPGAs display.
• Viable fault tolerance techniques were identified so that guidelines for imple-
menting error mitigation techniques on SRAM FPGAs could be proposed. A
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
1.3 Development tools 3
description of the static and dynamic cross-sections was developed. This descrip-
tion was used throughout this thesis to compare the effectiveness of mitigation
techniques.
• A configuration controller was designed and built. This allowed the evalua-
tion of the advanced configuration and readback functions of Xilinx FPGAs. A
hardware-based error injection tool-set that mimics the effect of SEUs in the con-
figuration memory was implemented using the configuration controller. This
SEU simulator uses a self-checking routine on the target FPGA to determine if
corruption of the configuration memory influences a design.
• A radiation hardened version of the selected PicoBlaze soft-core processor was
developed. Different error mitigation techniques were evaluated by simulating
several mitigation techniques in the SEU simulator. The best of these techniques
were combined to produce an SEU tolerant design.
• Selected designs were tested by proton radiation. This verified the developed
fault tolerant design and the SEU simulator and provided information on the ra-
diation characteristics of the Spartan-3 SRAM based FPGA.
Extensive programming was required for PC and embedded microcontroller targets.
A large amount of programmable logic was also developed. Hardware was designed
and constructed for the configuration controller. Additional hardware also had to be
designed to make radiation testing possible.
1.3 Development tools
All development was done with Fedora Core 3 Linux as operating system. This envi-
ronment was selected, because it is freely available, offers powerful tools for software
development, and is very similar to Red Hat Enterprise Linux 3, which is officially
supported by most electronic design tools.
Synthesis was performed using Synplify Pro from Synplicity – it is fast, powerful and
delivers good results. The software is also available to universities at a fraction of the
cost of a commercial license, which allowed the use of this industry standard applica-
tion. Xilinx Webpack, a free version of the Xilinx ISE software, was used to place
and route the results from synthesis. It also provided hardware configuration tools.
HDL simulation was done using Modeltech Modelsim.
Altium DXP was used for printed circuit board layout.
Open source software was used where possible. The ATmega128 was programmed
using C and the open source avr-gcc compiler. The device was configured using the
open source avrdude software. Xilinx Spartan-3 programming software, xc3sprog, was
modified to perform readback of the FPGA during radiation testing.
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All other control, testing and data processing was done using the Python and C pro-
gramming languages, with open source interpreters and compilers.
1.4 Outline
This document is structured as follows:
• Chapter 1 introduces the subject of this thesis and outlines the main objectives.
• Chapter 2 provides background on the sources and effects of radiation in the low
earth orbit environment.
• Chapter 3 discusses the considered soft-core processors and the selection of the
Xilinx PicoBlaze.
• Chapter 4 details the application of error mitigation techniques to SRAM FPGAs.
• Chapter 5 documents the design of the configuration controller hardware.
• Chapter 6 provides information about the functioning of the SEU injection tool-
set.
• Chapter 7 discusses the designs that were simulated on the SEU simulator to eval-
uate error mitigation techniques. The best techniques were combined to imple-
ment a fault tolerant PicoBlaze.
• Chapter 8 presents the radiation testing that was performed to verify the fault
tolerant PicoBlaze and the SEU simulator. It also documents the cross-section
measurements made during testing.
• The conclusion is presented in Chapter 9. The results of the various components
of this thesis is summarised.
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Chapter 2
Radiation in the Space Environment
A knowledge of the different forms of radiation and how they affect electronics is a
prerequisite for understanding error mitigation strategies.
2.1 Types of radiation
“Radiation” is generally used to describe the emission of energy as electromagnetic
waves or particles. A qualifier (eg. alpha radiation) is used to distinguish between the
different types and sources.
A satellite will encounter different types of radiation, depending on its orbit. The level
of interaction of the types varies depending on the particles involved, their ionisation
ability and energy levels. Figure 2.1 relates the major radiation zones and typical space-
craft orbits, while 2.2 indications of the relative intensities of radiation typically found
in a low earth orbit (below 1000km).
Radiation can be generally divided into two classes: ionising and non-ionising radiation.
Ionising radiation tends to cause the formation of ions (by stripping electrons from
or adding electrons to the atom). Non-ionising radiation causes structural damage by
changing the crystal lattice.
The following are the main types of radiation in a space environment.[4][5][3]
2.1.1 Alpha (α) radiation
These charged nuclei of Helium atoms (He++) are highly ionising, but do not pose a
major threat, as they rapidly lose energy due to ionisation, which limits their penetra-
tion ability.
When unstable heavy atomic nuclei decay, one of the by-products is α radiation. The
primary source in the low earth orbit (LEO) environment is secondary radiation from
5
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Figure 2.1: Typical orbits and radiation belts. Low earth orbit (LEO) satellites can be seen to
pass through areas of high proton and electron flux. Spacecraft in medium earth orbit (MEO) or
in a geostationary orbit (GEO) will primarily encounter a high electron flux due to the radiation
belts.[2].
Figure 2.2: Dose-depth curves for the Explorer spacecraft, showing the penetration relationship
between the various types of radiation. The graph shows the effect of shielding against the
major radiation components. Even a thin layer of aluminium (<50 mils) causes a dramatic fall-
off in the total ionising dose. The contribution made by proton radiation dominates the total
dose.[3]
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interactions with galactic cosmic rays, although trace amounts of heavy elements in
chip packaging also contribute a small amount.
2.1.2 Beta (β) radiation
The number of protons in a nucleus is changed by one when a particle undergoes β
decay. As a result an electron and antineutrino (ν) or positron and neutrino (ν) are
emitted:
N
ZA → NZ−1 B+ e− + ν (2.1)
or
N
ZA → NZ−1 B+ e+ + ν (2.2)
These high energy electrons are known as β particles. They are relatively easily de-
flected because of their low mass and consequently have a low penetration ability. β
particles pose a negligible threat to electronics.
2.1.3 Gamma (γ) radiation
Aparticle undergoing radioactive decay is often left in an excited state. In order to reach
a lower energy state a high energy electron (a γ particle) is emitted. These particles have
a very high energy (1 MeV to 1 GeV) in comparison to visible light (about 1 eV). The
sun is a major source, with γ rays produced by the fusion of hydrogen and deuterium,
as shown below.
1
1H +
1
1 H → 21H + e+ + ν (2.3)
1
1H +
2
1 H → 32He+ γ (2.4)
Gamma rays primarily contribute to the total ionising dose (TID) accumulated over
months and years in orbit. It results in the degradation in performance and the eventual
failure of electronic components.
2.1.4 Proton (H+) radiation
Proton radiation is simply hydrogen nuclei (H+) moving at high speed. They are the
primary concern in LEO systems due to their highmass, high ionising potential, as well
as their relative abundance close to the earth.
Proton fluence can be predicted using models such as AP8MIN or AP8MAX which
respectively provide the fluence for solar minimum and solar maximum periods. Pro-
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ton densities decrease at solar maximum due to collisions of trapped protons with the
atmosphere. Solar minimum models should therefore be used in mission planning.[1]
Figure 2.3 shows proton flux in the region of LEO satellites.
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Figure 2.3: High energy protons in the inner zone as predicted by the AP8MIN model. The
numbers on the contours represent the log10 of the integral flux in protons cm
−2/s. The hor-
izontal axis is the magnetic equator marked in earth radii. Only protons with energies above
100MeV are considered. The approximate range of low-earth orbit satellites has been shaded.
(Adapted from [1])
The linear energy transfer (LET) of protons is too low to directly induce single event
effects (SEEs), unlike energetic ions. Instead, protons may undergo elastic or inelas-
tic nuclear interactions with the target and transfer energy to the recoil atoms. Their
greater mass raises their LET, causing SEEs. A proton-induced SEE is consequently an
indirect radiation effect.
2.1.5 Neutron radiation
Neutrons are the primary source of non-ionising radiation. They are produced by ra-
dioactive decay and nuclear reactions and cause displacement damage and secondary ra-
diation.
The collision of neutrons with a semiconductor can cause the atoms in the crystal lattice
to be moved; this is referred to as displacement damage. It alters the minority carrier
densities which causes the minority carrier lifetimes to decrease. The effect on the cur-
rent gain of bipolar transistors is significant because they are minority carrier devices.
MOS transistors, beingmajority carrier devices, are relatively unaffected. Therfore neu-
tron radiation is a greater concern in bipolar circuits.
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Although neutrons are non-ionising they can cause ionisation through secondary ra-
diation. This can either be by producing ionising recoil atoms or ions, or by exciting
atomic nuclei which will de-excite by emitting ionising gamma rays. Alternatively, the
neutron can be absorbed by the target nucleus, which, in the case of silicon, decays by
emitting an α particle or a proton.
2.1.6 X-rays
X-rays are photons with a particular energy and wavelength; similar to γ-rays.
Characteristic x-rays are emitted when an electron falls into a vacancy in the n=1 or n=2
levels of an atom. The vacancies themselves are normally created when electrons are
knocked from these levels by high energy electrons. The energy of these particles relate
to the difference in energy between the levels and are therefore discrete.
Bremstralung is caused when a target is bombarded by electrons. The deceleration of
the moving charges causes radiation that has a continuous energy spectrum.
The particles are ionising but the ambient intensity in a LEO environment is low enough
for it not to be considered a major threat. [3]
2.2 Sources
2.2.1 The sun
The sun is the dominant source of radiation in the solar system.
Under normal conditions fusion in the sun produces the solar wind, which is a rela-
tively constant stream of low energy (keV) protons and high energy electrons. During
solar flares a high energy (MeV) flux of electrons is emitted.
Solar flares are the result of periodic variations in the nuclear reactions on the chro-
mosphere of the sun. Large quantities of particles are released, consisting mainly of
protons (> 90%), as well as alpha particles and heavy ions. The flux of heavy ions is
usually far below the nominal galactic background radiation levels but it can be up to
four orders of magnitude larger during some flares.
2.2.2 Galactic cosmic rays (GCRs)
GCRs are high speed, high energy particles primarily created by fusion reactions in
distant stars. Measurements have shown that they consist of approximately 85% proton
radiation, 14% alpha particles and 1% heavy ions. Particle energy can range from 0 to
10GeV. Hydrogen, carbon and oxygen form the bulk of the heavy ions, with energies
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around 1GeV. GCRs can cause direct ionisation, similar to protons. Alternatively, a
direct hit causes a shower of particles and secondary radiation.
GCRs are considered extremely disruptive and difficult to effectively shield against.
Fortunately, the magnetic field of the earth provides a large measure of protection for
LEO orbits, except for the areas over the poles.
They are the primary concern for satellites at higher altitudes (medium earth orbit and
above).
2.2.3 Van Allen belts
The Van Allen belts consist of geomagnetically trapped electrons, protons and low
quantities of heavy ions. They occupy a toroidal volume of space with an altitude
of about 300km to 59000km.
The particle distribution can be divided into an inner zone and an outer zone at ap-
proximately 2.5 earth radii. The flux of electrons in the outer zone is about 10 times
greater than in the inner zone. Electron energy levels in the outer zone are around 7
MeV, while it is less than 5 MeV in the inner zones.
Proton energies vary approximately inversely proportional to altitude. Energy levels
greater than 400MeV is possible close to earth. Protons form the most significant radi-
ation component in the inner belts and therefore also in LEO orbits.
The Earth’s magnetic field is offset by approximitely 11◦ from the Earth’s axis in the
southern hemisphere. The displacement is towards the Western Pacific, which results
in a dip in the magnetic field above the Atlantic Ocean. LEO spacecraft travelling
through this area will pass through the Van Allen belts and consequently experience
a dramatically higher fluence of trapped particles, as is shown in Figure 2.4.
2.2.4 Secondary radiation
Nuclear interaction, especially with neutrons and GRCs, can create unstable atomic
isotopes. These isotopes decay over time and produce gamma rays.
This is more often observed on materials with a high atomic number - for instance
traces of heavy elements in chip packaging and solder.
2.3 Effects of radiation
When considering the effects of radiation, a distinction is made between hard errors;
that cause permanent damage to the device, soft errors; that cause a loss of state (ie.
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information) without damaging the device and firm errors; that do not cause permanent
damage but persist until the device is reset or reconfigured.
2.3.1 Single Event Effects (SEE)
Single event effects are caused by the impact of a single particle on amaterial depositing
sufficient energy to cause an effect on the device. This can happen either through the
prime strike (e.g., direct ionisation via GCRs) or by the secondary particles that are
caused by the strike (e.g., indirect ionisation via protons).
Devices are characterised by their ability to withstand particles of different linear en-
ergy transfer (LET) level, which is measured in MeV/cm2/mg. This is usually ex-
pressed for silicon, as it makes up the majority of a semiconductor device.
The effects of the SEE depends on the architecture of the device, as well as the location
where the event occurrs.
The following events are of prime importance:
Single event upsets (SEU)
SEUs are bit flips in registers, latches, the on-chip RAM or the configuration memory
of SRAM FPGAs. Enough charge is deposited to change the stored logical value from
0 to 1, or 1 to 0.
SEUs are typically non destructive, they are therefore classified as soft errors. They can
be corrected by simply updating the corrupted bit.
The relatively high proton flux makes SEUs the most prevalent SEE in SRAM FPGA
and memory devices, in the LEO environment.
Multiple bit upsets (MBU)
MBUs are similar to SEUs, except that multiple memory elements are upset simultane-
ously. High density SRAM and SRAM based FPGAs are susceptible.
Single event functional interrupt (SEFI)
SEFI describes a sudden loss of normal operation, due to an SEE in a sensitive part of
the device circuitry.
This is observed in complex devices with built-in state and control circuitry, such as
FPGAs and microcontrollers. It is usually not fatal, but requires the device to be reset
to recover.
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Single event transients (SET)
SETs are caused by charged particles depositing (or removing) charge on a circuit ele-
ment, which leads to an incorrect logic value.
In combinatorial logic, the charge will leak away (over several hundreds of picosec-
onds) and the system will return to a consistent state. The only danger therefore exists
when synchronous logic is disturbed on a clock edge and the temporarily incorrect
value is latched into a register. The incorrect value can then propagate through the rest
of the system.
The sensitivity of a system to SETs increases in nanometer technologies, at high clock
speeds and in low voltage systems.
Single event disturb (SED)
SED involves a momentary corruption in the value of a bit.
This has been observed in combinatorial logic and especially the latches in electronic
devices.
Single hard error (SHE)
SHE is an unalterable change in the state of a memory element (a stuck bit).
It can occurs in memories and latches in logic devices.
Single event latch-up (SEL)
SEL is a hard error that occurs when interaction with a high energy particle triggers
parasitic thyristors in CMOS devices.
This creates a short circuit, which is capable of damaging the device by thermal ef-
fect. Not all SELs are fatal - in SRAM FPGAs SEL can also lead to corruption of the
configuration data, which requires reconfiguration of the device to restore the correct
functionality.
SELs are an important concern in any space-borne system, because of the potentially
fatal effects of latch-up.
Single event snapback (SES)
SES is similar to SEL, and results in high current in N-channel MOSFET and SOI de-
vices. It is also potentially destructive.
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Single event gate rupture (SEGR)
SEGR has been observed when heavy ions hit power MOSFETs while a large bias volt-
age is applied to the gate. This leads to thermal breakdown and gate rupture.
Flash-based systems can be at risk during programming when a relatively large voltage
is applied to the storage elements.
SEGR has a low probability of happening, but very little can be done to protect against
it, other than considering the device characteristics during device selection.
Single event dielectric rupture (SEDR)
SEDR is similar to SEGR, in that it results when the gate dielectric is ruptured. It can
occur in non-volatile NMOS structures and non-volatile FPGAs.
Single event burnout (SEB)
SEBs may occur in N-channel power MOSFETs and BJTs when the impact of a heavy
ion forward biases the thin base region under the source of the device. If the drain-
source voltage exceeds the local breakdown voltage of the transistor, the device can
burn out due to large currents and high local power dissipation.
SEB, like SEGR, is unlikely, but should be taken into account during the component
selection process.
Figure 2.4: Mapping of data error density (in log scale) for 28 memories on-board ICARE ex-
periment (Nov 2000 - Sept 2002). Dots show the locations were SEUs occurred; the high error
rate in the South Atlantic Anomaly (SAA) is clearly visible. [2]
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2.3.2 Displacement damage
The deposition of a non-ionising dose by protons and high energy α particles leads to
lattice defects due to displacement of atoms in the structure.
This can be critical in devices where electrical parameters and background noise di-
rectly impacts on performance, such as CCDs, sensors and amplifiers.[2]
2.3.3 Total Ionising Dose Effects
TID is a measure of the cumulative effects of prolonged exposure to radiation, causing
degradation in device performance.
The main sources are Solar Energetic Particle Events; which usually occur in associa-
tionwith solar flares, as well as trapped radiation in the South Atlantic Anomaly (SAA);
where the Earth’s magnetosphere dips closest to the earth, causing more trapped radi-
ation. (See Figure 2.4.)
TID causes threshold shifts, increased device leakage (higher power consumption), tim-
ing changes, decreased functionality and ultimately device failure.[6]
Accelerated TID testing of devices can be done using a Cobalt 60 source. Although the
source generates primarily γ-rays, the cumulative radiation effects are similar to those
experienced in space.
Electronic devices can also display annealing. This refers to the total or partial self-
healing that can be observed on a device after irradiation.
2.4 Conclusion
Of the various radiation effects discussed in this chapter, proton-induced SEUs form
the most significant threat to LEO spacecraft.
The mitigation techniques discussed and implemented in later chapters are therefore
aimed specifically at mitigating SEUs.
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Chapter 3
Soft-core Processor Selection
With the advent of larger and faster FPGAs, the possibility of implementing a micro-
processor in programmable logic has become more feasible. These soft-core processors
(SCPs) combine the flexibility of software with the power of a parallelised design.
Their greatest strength lies in the high level of integration they offer, making true
system-on-a-chip (SoC) design possible. By allowing customisation of the architecture,
high performance can be achieved for specific tasks, while maintaining the ease of use
that conventional processors offer. In addition, all the adaptive possibilities of reconfig-
urable FPGAs are applicable when an SCP is implemented on them. All these features
make them highly attractive for the low-volume space market.[7]
Several high performance SCP cores are available. The use of this open-source intellec-
tual property (IP) allows one to quickly and easily develop a high value product.
Two soft-core processors, the LEON3 from Gaisler Research and the Xilinx PicoBlaze,
were investigated in detail to select a demonstration platform for SEU mitigation tech-
niques.
3.1 GRLIB/LEON3
The LEON processor is an open source, soft-core processor developed and supported
by Gaisler Research1.
It is implemented as a high level VHDL model which is fully synthesisable with com-
mon synthesis tools. The model is extensively configurable through a graphical config-
uration package, which allows options such as cache size and organisation, arithmetic
operation implementation, I/O modules and other IP cores to be selected.
1www.gaisler.com
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3.1.1 History
The LEON processor was originally developed by Jiri Gaisler[8], while at the European
Space Agency, in order to provide a high performance fault tolerant processor that can
be implemented on non-radiation-hardened commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) compo-
nents. The source code of a version without fault tolerance was subsequently released
under the GNU Public License[9] (GPL) to stimulate research and development using
the processor.
LEON2 was released in 2002, with improved arithmetic support, and has since become
the standard LEON implementation used in most applications[10].
LEON3 was initially released in 2004 and provides some extensions to the architecture
of LEON2. It is provided as part of GRLIB[11], an open source library of IP cores.
3.1.2 Architecture
Features
All members of the LEON processor family are SPARC V8 (32 bit)[12] compliant pro-
cessors, with separate instruction and data caches (Harvard architecture), an interrupt
controller, on chip debugging support, timers and UARTS. Ethernet MAC and PCI in-
terface IP is provided, as well as support for a separate co-processor.
LEON3 implements a 7 stage integer unit (IU) with hardware multiplication and divi-
sion (see Figure 3.1). An optional interface to the Meiko floating point unit that sup-
ports serial access is also available. Alternatively, the high performance GRFPU[14]
floating point unit, which can execute instructions in parallel with the IU can be used.
If no floating point hardware is available, the calculations can be emulated at lower
performance in software.
The SPARC V8E[15] extensions for embedded and real time systems are implemented
and up to 4 multi-processors are supported. (A 4 processor system should fit into a
3000000 gate Xilinx XC2V3000 FPGA and operate at 80MHz.) LEON3 is distributed
with a large library that is also released under the GPL. The libray includes IP cores for
a CAN controller and CCSDS telemetry and telecommand functions.[13]
Structure
The processor is built around the ARM AMBA[16] bus specification and consists of
configurable modules that can, if desired, be compiled into the system.
The core processor units are attached to the AHB (Advanced High-performance Bus),
through which almost all communication takes place. Peripheral components are at-
tached to the lower speed APB (Advanced Peripheral Bus), which connects to the AHB
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Figure 3.1: LEON3 Integer unit pipeline.[13]
through an AHB/APB bridge. Every module has a unique ID, which the AHB con-
troller uses to arbitrate access to the bus.[17]
This architecture allowsmodules to be added or removedwith minimum impact on the
other modules. Multiprocessor LEON3 systems simply have more than one processor
core on the AHB, as shown in Figure 3.2.
3.1.3 Fault tolerant version
All the LEON processors are also available in a fault-tolerant version, under a commer-
cial IP license.
One of the major goals of these processors is to allow fault tolerant processors to be
built using COTS hardware and software components, drastically reducing the system
cost.[8] The system can be implemented in an FPGA with latch-up protection or resis-
tance, like an Actel antifuse FPGA or a Xilinx XQVR device.
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Figure 3.2: LEON3 multiprocessor configuration showing the bus-centric design, with all the
components connected the AHB bus.[13]
LEON 1/2
These processors tolerate SEU errors by using triple redundant registers and on-chip er-
ror detection and correction codes (EDAC). Pipeline flushing and forced cache missing
is used to clear SEUs without interrupting the processor.
The overhead of the fault tolerant implementation is about 100% of the original design.
The first prototypes were implemented on the Atmel ATC35 0.35µm process and per-
formed successfully under heavy ions testing. All injected SEU errors were corrected
without impacting the functioning of the system. The actual device threshold was mea-
sured at 6 MeV, while ion energies of up to 110 MeV were used in testing.
LEON 3
A fault tolerant version of the LEON3-FT was released in 2006. The application appears
to be targeted at the rad-hard Actel RTAX antifuse FPGAs, with only the registers and
memory being protected.
The overhead of the fault tolerant implementation is about 15% of the original design.
3.1.4 License
A brief discussion of the GPL is provided in Appendix A.
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GRLIB/LEON3
The GRLIB source code is freely available, protected by the GNU GPL license. This
means that designs based on GRLIB have to be distributed in full source under the
same license. For commercial applications, where source distribution is not possible or
not desirable, a commercial IP license can be obtained from Gaisler Research.[11]
Correspondence with Gaisler Research showed that the commercial licenses are nor-
mally granted on a project basis, which allows users to modify the source for a specific
application. Other licensing schemes can also be negotiated.
LEON1 and LEON2
The LEON VHDL model is provided under two licenses: the GNU Public License
(GPL)[9] and the Lesser GNU Public License (LGPL)[18]. The LGPL applies to the
LEON model itself while remaining support files and test benches are provided under
GPL.
This means that the LEON can be used as a core in a system-on-chip design without
having to publish the source code of any additional IP-cores one might use. One must
however publish any modifications that have been made to the LEON core itself, as
described in LGPL. [19]
3.1.5 Performance
The core of the LEON processor requires approximately 30 000 gates (5 000 LUTs) plus
RAM. This can go up to 100k-250k gates when other IP cores are included.
The LEON executes instructions at about 0.85 Dhrystone MIPS/MHz. [20][21]
Power consumption is largely dependent on the operating frequency, as well as the
technology the design is implemented on.
3.1.6 Development Tools
GRLIB/LEON is designed to be used on a wide variety of hosts. As such, the pro-
vided scripts should work on any recent GNU/Linux or Solaris distribution. Microsoft
Windows and Cygwin can also be used as a development platform.
Operating Systems
Several operating systems have been ported to the LEON processor.
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The Real Time Executive for Multiprocessor Systems (RTEMS)[22] appears to be the
most popular operating system, whether or not real-time scheduling is required. It
was originally developed as a missile operating system by OAR Corporation, but has
found applications in many other cases where a real-time system with multiprocessor
support is needed.[23] RTEMS is released under a modified version of the GPL, with
no restrictions on use.
A port of Snapgear Linux to the LEON architecture is provided by Gaisler Research and
the LION development community[24]. Versions supporting memory management
(MMU) and non-MMU systems are available, but no multiprocessor configurations are
supported.
eCos is an open source, royalty-free, real-time operating system intended for embedded
applications.[25] The highly configurable nature of eCos allows the operating system
to be customised according to precise application requirements. This delivers the best
possible run-time performance and an optimised hardware resource footprint. The
symmetric multi-processor (SMP) functionality allows up to 16 LEON3 processors to
run a single (multi-threaded) application. It has been tested with up to four processors,
with good results.
VxWorks and Aonix ADA are the supported commercial operating systems.
Compilers
Gaisler Research provides the LEON Bare-C Cross Compiler System. It is based one the
GNU compiler tools and the Newlib standalone C-library. The cross-compiler system
allows compilation of sequential (non-tasking) C and C++ applications. It supports
both hard and soft floating-point operations, as well as both V7 and V8 multiply and
divide instructions.[26]
The RTEMS Cross-Compiler System is also available for systems running RTEMS.[27]
Related Software
TSIM is an instruction level simulator that offers high performance simulation of LEON
systems.[28]
GRMON is a general purpose debugging monitor for the LEON debug support unit
(DSU).[29] It improves upon and replaces the original DSUMON[30] debugging pro-
gram. TSIM can be used as back-end, or on-chip debugging can be done using the
Debug Support Unit (DSU) of the LEON.
Free evaluation versions of these programs are available.
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3.2 PicoBlaze
The Xilinx PicoBlaze is a HDL defined microcontroller core that is optimised for Xilinx
FPGAs.[31] It is extremely compact and offers a cost-effective control and simple data
processing solution.
3.2.1 History
The PicoBlaze was originally written by Ken Chapman at Xilinx Corporation, as a
simple, high performance IP core targeted at Xilinx FPGAs. The PicoBlaze comple-
ments the higher performance 32-bit MicroBlaze processor by providing a simple pro-
grammable state machine that requires very little logic resources.
The design was originally developed for Virtex, Virtex-E and Spartan-II devices, but
versions supporting the CoolRunner-II, Spartan-3, Virtex-II and Virtex-4 have since
been released. The KCPSM3, aimed at Spartan-3, Virtex-II and Virtex-4 devices, was
used in this study.
3.2.2 Architecture
The PicoBlaze is an 8-bit RISC processor with 16 byte-wide general purpose registers.
Instructions are executed frommemory within the FPGA, for the Spartan-3 version this
can be up to 1024 18 bit instructions. The instructions are compiled with the FPGA
design and automatically loaded during the FPGA configuration process.
The arithmetic logic unit (ALU) performs all microcontroller calculations. There is no
dedicated accumulator, therefore result of arithmetic instructions can be stored in any
register. ZERO and CARRY flags may also be set.
An internal 64-byte scratchpad RAM provides more internal read/write storage. This
increases the data that can be stored inside the processor and reserves the inputs and
outputs ports for data that needs them.
The Input/Output ports allow the PicoBlaze to be connected to custom peripherals and
to other FPGA logic.
The 10-bit program counter (PC) supports up to 1024 instructions. It normally points
to the next instruction to be executed and increments automatically. Only JUMP, CALL,
RETURN and RETURNI instructions can change this behaviour. On reaching the highest
address; 0x3FF, the PC rolls over to 0x000.
A CALL/RETURN stack with 31 entries is maintained to support up to 31 nested CALL
sequences.
An optional external interrupt input is available to handle asynchronous events. Five
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clock cycles are required to respond to an interrupt.
After configuration of the FPGA, the PicoBlaze is automatically reset, which forces the
processor into the initial state. The program counter is set to 0x000, the flags are cleared,
interrupts disabled and the stack is reset.
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Figure 3.3: PicoBlaze Embedded Microcontroller Block Diagram.[31]
3.2.3 Performance
Despite the small size of the PicoBlaze it offers very respectable performance.
One instruction always executes in 2 clock cycles, which allows accurate predictions
regarding performance. When implemented on a Spartan-3, up to 44 MIPS is possible,
while a Virtex-II or Virtex-4 will reach 100MIPS.
3.2.4 License
The PicoBlaze is released in full source, without any restrictions on the use, modifica-
tion or redistribution of the source code, as long as it is implemented on a Xilinx device.
The design is provided “as-is”, with no warranties or conditions, express, implied,
statutory or otherwise. It is not supported as an official Xilinx product by Xilinx techni-
cal support, but the author can be contacted with issues or improvements to the design.
3.2.5 Development Tools
PicoBlaze programs are written in assembly code, which is translated into a VHDL file
that contains the initialisation values of the on-chip program ROM. This file is instanti-
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ated by the PicoBlaze core and is synthesised along with the rest of the design.
Several PicoBlaze assemblers and simulators are available, some offering integrated
development environments (IDEs), as listed in Table 3.1. The IDEs are fairly similar in
terms of the offered features; most of which simplify the debugging process.
The author of the PicoBlaze maintains that the use of an assembler instead of a compiler
allows more flexibility in the architecture, because changes in architecture can easily be
accommodated by small changes in the assembler. He believes that a task that requires
a compiler for the PicoBlaze would probably be more suited to a more powerful SCP,
such as the MicroBlaze. [32]
A small-C compiler, PCCOMP2, is available for the standard PicoBlaze configuration.
Other tools that can speed development include a JTAG-based program loader and a
function to update the program code without having to recompile the whole design.
3.3 Processor selection
For the purposes of this investigation, a SCP was needed that would allow the easy
application of different mitigation techniques. Constraints were posed by the available
hardware, especially the capacity of an FPGA.
Based on these factors, the PicoBlaze was selected to serve as platform for the evalua-
tion of SEU mitigation techniques.
3.3.1 Application of error mitigation techniques
The highly modular and configurable design of the LEON makes it relatively straight-
forward to replace sub-modules with a fault tolerant equivalent. This makes it possible
to apply different levels of protection, depending on the available resources. The rela-
tive complexity of the LEON would, however, make debugging fairly complex.
The PicoBlaze is a much smaller design than the LEON, with a simpler architecture.
The low-level implementation is harder to modify directly, but the complete system is
more manageable, even when major structural modifications are made.
3.3.2 Target FPGA
The LEON supports all the major FPGA vendors, while the PicoBlaze is only targeted
at Xilinx FPGAs. The choice of FPGA was greatly influenced by the desire to simulate
SEUs in the configuration memory, for which Xilinx FPGAs were regarded as the most
suitable. The factors influencing FPGA selection are discussed in Chapter 6.
2http://www.poderico.co.uk/
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The capacity of the FPGA was a major concern: it needed to be at least 3.5 times the
space required by the reference design, to allow triple redundant implementations. It
was calculated that a triple redundant LEON would only fit into the largest device
supported by the available software, a Xilinx Spartan-3 XC3S1500. A larger device
would have required an additional software license for Xilinx ISE.
The availability of the target FPGA also played a role in the selection of a processor.
A Spartan-3 XC3S200 development board that supports all the desired functionality
could be purchased at low cost, while a circuit with an XC3S1500 would have had to be
designed and manufactured.
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Chapter 4
Fault Tolerance in FPGAs
Error detection and correction (EDAC) techniques, that are used to improve the fault
tolerance of FPGA-based designs to SEE’s, are discussed in this chapter. These tech-
niques are presented in detail to serve as a reference for future error mitigation work.
The proposed guidelines for applying these techniques are presented at the end of this
chapter.
As with the rest of this thesis, the focus is primarily on the application of fault tolerance
techniques to high-density SRAM devices, especially the Xilinx Virtex-II and Spartan-3
families.
4.1 SEE effects on FPGAs
The effect of an SEE on an SRAM FPGA can vary greatly depending on its location on
the device. In this section the influence on FPGA primitives is discussed.
All devices have a static cross-section; representing the likelihood of an SEU, as well
as a dynamic cross-section; which represents the likelihood of an SEU occurring that
influences the functioning of the device.
4.1.1 Static cross-section
The static cross-section, σ, of a device is defined as:
σ =
N
Φ
sec θ (4.1)
where N is the number of upsets,Φ the fluence that caused N upsets and θ the incidence
angle of the particles relative to the surface normal.
This cross-section is composed of the sum of the cross-sections of the different elements
26
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on a device (discussed below):
σ = σcon f ig + σBRAM + σFF + σSET + σHL + σSEFI (4.2)
This relationship is expressed as a set in Figure 4.1. The sizes of the subsets are deter-
mined by the number of bits involved, as well as the susceptibility of the bits to upsets.
Most categories are common in many digital devices (flip-flops, Block SelectRAM, tran-
sients, SEFI), while others are unique to SRAM FPGAs (configuration memory). Some
of the subsets can be observed directly, which allows for measurement of the cross-
sections, while cross-section of others can only be inferred.
Transients
All upsets
FF
Half latches
SEFI
Configuration bitsBRAM
Figure 4.1: The set of possible upsets on Xilinx FPGAs
Table 4.1 lists the relative contributions of the different components for a Virtex QVR1000
and a Spartan-3 XC3S200. The contributions marked with a question mark are impos-
sible to measure directly.
Configuration bits (σcon f ig)
The largest contribution to the cross-section on SRAM FPGAs is made by the configura-
tion memory. The configuration memory consists of SRAM ( also known as static-cell)
Table 4.1: Relative size contributions to FPGA static cross-section, using a uniform upset sensi-
tivity. The contribution by SETs and half-latches is not taken into account. The “?” values are
impossible to measure directly. Adapted from [33]
Virtex XCVR1000 Spartan XC3S200
Bits % Bits %
User Flip-Flops 26,112 0.4% 3840 0.37%
Block SelectRAM 393,216 6.4% 221184 21.2%
Configuration 5,603,456 91.0% 818016 78.4%
SEFI ? <.0021% ? ?
SET ? ? ? ?
Half-latches ? ? ? ?
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elements that determine the functionality of the programmed device by configuring
routing bits and look-up tables (LUTs).
Upsets in this section may lead to erroneous processing, but because a large proportion
of the elements are left unused on all designs, not all upsets will result in failure of the
design.
The configuration memory of Xilinx FPGAs can be accessed through a mechanism
called “readback”. This allows inspection of the configuration while a device is run-
ning to detect SEUs. The configuration can be partially reconfigured in some devices to
correct upsets in certain segments without influencing the design as a whole.
The look-up tables can also be configured as shift registers or as distributed RAM, with
similar behaviour to the BRAM discussed below. For the purpose of this investigation,
LUTs were considered as part of the configuration memory, except where otherwise
stated, because they were primarily used to implement logic function.
Block RAM (σBRAM)
The Virtex and Spartan families of FPGAs offer an internal RAM element, Block RAM
(BRAM), to store larger amounts of user data. These elements also make a significant
contribution to the device cross-section.
BRAM is organised as configurable, synchronous 18-Kbit blocks in recent devices. It
stores up to 18-Kbit more efficiently than flip-flops would.
The BRAM, like the configuration memory, can also be read back, if the device is shut
down first. The structure of the BRAM makes it easy to implement parity codes to
protect the stored data.
Flip-flops (σFF)
Flip-flops can be used as either registers or latches to store values in a design. The
number of flip-flops used is usually small in comparison to the bits in the BRAM and
configuration memory, so they only contribute a small part to the cross-section.
Although the state of a flip-flip can be captured, it is hard to predict correct values in
a complex design. The easiest way to protect against SEUs is to compare redundant
flip-flops.
Half-latches (σHL)
Half-latches are a convenient way of providing a constant 0 of 1 value in a design,
without consuming LUTs or routing resources.
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The element can be seen as a latch with no input; it is initialised at configuration. An
upset in this element will only be indicated by the failure of the logic that depends on
it.
It has been proposed that half-latches be replaced with a connection to a pin, to provide
an external reference, but the cross-section of the routing elements used may lead to
other problems. However, by moving the problem from the unobservable half-latch
domain to the more accessible configuration memory, upsets can be detected.[34]
Transient effects (σSET)
Transient upsets are largely filtered by the clocking of registers, which limit the sensi-
tivity to a very small period.
The duration of transient pulses is a couple of hundred picoseconds. In the future,
SETs will probably become a greater problem at higher frequencies on faster FPGAs:
very few FPGA based experiments have detected SETs to date.
SEFI (σSEFI)
FPGAs also contain various special elements to control the configuration and start-up
of the device. Upsets in elements such as the JTAG controller, SelectMap controller,
Power-on-reset logic and other unobservable logic can cause the device to reset, shut-
down or to stop responding. The upset of readback logic can lead to an apparent large
number of upsets in readback data.
The SEFI cross-section can be considered a lower bound on the dynamic cross-section,
since it is determined by the physical properties of the device and can not be decreased.
Special elements
Most FPGAs offer special elements to improve device utilisation, such as delay-locked
loops and hardware multipliers. These elements provide commonly-used, specialised
logical functionality on the FPGA. They are configured by the configuration memory,
but their internal states are usually hard to access.
Luckily, most of these elements also have a very small SEU cross-section.
4.1.2 Dynamic cross-section
The static cross-section presented above provides an upper bound on the sensitivity of
any design on a particular device, because it is determined by the device itself. Another
figure, the dynamic cross-section (σ′) gives a more accurate representation of the SEU
sensitivity of a design.
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The utilisation and extent to which SEUs are mitigated determine the difference be-
tween σ and σ′. Even in dense designs only a part of the configuration memory is used.
Upsets in unused areas rarely influence the functioning of the rest of the design. SEUs
in the logic and memory may also be suppressed by logic, in effect mitigating the SEUs.
The dynamic cross-section can be expressed as:
σ′ = ασ (4.3)
= αcon f igσcon f ig + αBRAMσBRAM + αFFσFF +
αSETσSET + αHLσHL + σSEFI (4.4)
≈ αcon f igσcon f ig + αBRAMσBRAM + σSEFI (4.5)
where the α values represent the respective scaling between the static and dynamic
cross-sections. No scaling is applied to the SEFI cross-section since it is device depen-
dent, not design dependent. All the other cross-sections are influenced by the level of
utilisation and mitigation in the design. The cross-sections of the configuration mem-
ory and BRAM areas are significantly larger than the others, making it possible to the
approximation in Equation 4.5. The SEFI cross-section is also included in this approxi-
mation, since it will stay constant even if mitiagtin is applied.[35]
σBRAM was initially included in σcon f ig but radiation testing showed they have differ-
ent levels of susceptibility to SEUs (ie. different bit cross-sections). This description
distinguishes between the two cross-sections and is therefore more accurate.
4.2 Physical tolerance
The susceptibility of a device to radiation effects is primarily determined by the phys-
ical properties of the device. Devices with a reduced cross-section due to changes in
the manufacturing process is referred to as radiation hardend. Chip manufacturers have
altered the fabrication process to provide better radiation tolerance, in order to satisfy
demand in the military/aerospace market. However, the stringent verification proce-
dures required and low volumes involved mean that the price of these devices remain
prohibitively high.
Physical tolerance has mostly provided an increase in the TID and SEL thresholds of
devices. Memory elements (registers, latches and RAM) usually still need protection
through other mechanisms.
4.2.1 Configuration memory
Although this thesis is primarily concerned with SRAM FPGAs, the significant contri-
bution the configuration memory makes to the device cross-section makes it important
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to note the alternatives.
Some FPGAs use flash memory to store the configuration, while antifuse devices are
configured by burning physical fuses on the device. Flash devices allow reconfigu-
ration, while antifuse devices are one-time programmable. In both cases the configu-
ration memory is effectively immune to SEUs, with only memory elements requiring
SEU protection. This makes these devices extremely attractive if the high capacity and
reconfiguration offered by SRAM devices are not strong requirements.
It is also important to note that although the mask sizes of SRAM devices have been
shrinking with every new generation of FPGAs, the devices have also become more
robust to upsets. This can be attributed to improvements on the design of the elements
used to implement the SRAM cells. [36]
4.2.2 Transistor level redundancy
Several SEU tolerant SRAM cells have been proposed. Most of these proposals add
extra transistors to protect against SEUs. The greatest benefit of this approach is that
it is completely transparent to the end user. The use of a commercial foundry is also a
possibility.
One interesting mechanism, proposed by Rockwell Collins, is called “Multiple Inde-
pendent Redundant Transistors” (MIRT). Gates are constructed by interleaving three
redundant transistors that are physically separated. The separation and interleaving
provides automatic triple voting. The physical structure is shown in Figure 4.2.
The physical separation ensures that only a single transistor is upset by an SEU. If
a value in one of the devices is momentarily upset, the two complementary devices
will dominate the output and result in variation of only 33% from the expected output
voltage. The deviation should be sufficiently far from the threshold voltage for the
correct value to be recognised.
The area overhead required to implement full MIRT protection is about an extra 125%.
It can be decreased to only 25% if used in conjuction with other EDACmechanisms.[37]
The only SEU tolerant FPGA released to date is the Atmel AT40KEL040. A configura-
tion upset rate as low as 3×10−6 upsets per device per day is claimed in the datasheet.[38]
4.2.3 Manufacturing technology
The radiation characteristics of devices can be improved at great expense by using
techniques such as Silicon-on-Insulator (SOI) or Silicon-on-Sapphire (SOS). These tech-
niques require high precision manufacturing, which is reflected in the cost. Improve-
ments in the TID response and latch-up susceptibility have been the main gains, but
the configuration memory of SRAM FPGAs still requires other mechanisms.
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Figure 4.2: The physical structure used by Multiple Independent Redundant Transistors
(MIRT). The spacing and interleaving provide automatic majority voting.[37]
Xilinx radiation hardened QPro devices are manufactured on a thin epitaxial wafer.
This allows a guaranteed TID of 125krad (Si), while the device is also latch-up immune
to a LET of 125MeV cm2/mg. A redundant HDL implementation is still required for
full SEU immunity.[39]
4.3 Error mitigation
Error mitigation is based on the philosophy that a device with adequate radiation error
handling capabilities can provide a similar degree of dependability as a hardened de-
vice, but at a fraction of the cost. Instead of preventing errors, the propagation of errors
is suppressed which limits further disruption to the system. If expressed in terms of
cross-sections, error mitigation entails decreasing α (the scaling factor that relates the
dynamic to the static cross-section).
All forms of error mitigation inherently depend on redundancy in one form or another.
This meta data is used to reconstruct the correct behaviour. In some cases detecting an
error offers enough protection – by flagging the data as incorrect, it can be handled in
the rest of the system.
4.3.1 Spatial redundancy
Multiple physical copies of the same circuit can execute in parallel, so that outputs can
be compared for error detecting and correction.
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Table 4.2: Dual redundancy error detection and correction. When x and y do not match, an
upset has occurred. The XOR only detects errors, the AND assumes that 1 → 0 cannot happen,
while the OR assumes 0→ 1 upsets are impossible.
x y XOR AND OR
0 0 0 0 0
0 1 1 0 1
1 0 1 0 1
1 1 0 1 1
Dual redundancy (DR)
Dual redundancy entails placing two identical copies of a logic block in parallel to de-
tect errors. Any discrepancies in the outputs indicate an error.
DR has a significantly lower cost than triple redundancy, but usually cannot correct any
errors. Correction would normally be handled by another mechanism. In this manner,
the LEON-FT model uses dual redundancy in the integer unit pipeline. When an error
is detected the pipeline is restarted to mitigate any effects.[8]
If SEUs on a device are biased; which means they display a different cross-section for
0 → 1 than for 1 → 0 upsets, DR can be used to implement an efficient probabilistic
correction scheme. If 0 → 1 upsets are more frequently observed, performing a logical
AND on the outputs of a module with that of a redundant copy would assume the 0
output to be correct. Devices displaying more 1 → 0 upsets can similarly be corrected
using a logical OR, which favours a 1 output.
The truth table for the detection and correction possibilities is listed in Table 4.2.
Triple Modular Redundancy
Triple modular redundancy uses three copies of the same module and a majority voter
to correct any errors. If two or more inputs to the majority voter are the same, that
value is regarded as correct and propagated. The most common example of TMR is the
redundant D-flip-flop in Figure 4.3. The truth table for the voting circuit is given listed
in Table 4.3.
Its relative simplicity and ease of implementation, as well as the excellent error mitiga-
tion properties, makes TMR the most most popular EDAC method for many applica-
tions. The greatest drawback is the high size overhead (a system with full TMR can be
up to 350% the size of the original design).
Multiple voters
When using TMR in the modules of a system, having a single voter presents a risk,
because the voter itself is also sensitive to upsets. Tomitigate this risk, redundant copies
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D Q
D Q
D Q
Output
Clock
Input
Figure 4.3: Triple modular redundancy with voting
Table 4.3: Majority voter truth table
x y z Output
0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0
0 1 1 1
1 0 0 0
1 0 1 1
1 1 0 1
1 1 1 1
of the majority voters are used, each one driving its own module, as shown in Figure
4.4.
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(b) Redundant voters
Figure 4.4: Using a single voter between sub-modules (a) creates the risk of the voter itself being
upset. By using redundant voters (b), even if a voter is influenced, the redundancy ensures that
the system is not influenced.
This is especially important in SRAM technologies, but when it is implemented in hard
silicon, a single voting circuit is often enough.
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Feedback and memory
Systems containing feedback andmemory also need special consideration when imple-
menting TMR. Although the voting circuit corrects the outputs, an incorrect value may
persist internally through feedback, state machine values or when stored in memory.
By placing a voter inside the feedback loop, as shown in Figure 4.5, one can ensure that
the correct data is fed back, maintaining the correct state inside the module.
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(a) Feedback without voting
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(b) Voting inside the feedback loop
Figure 4.5: Voting inside the feedback loop helps to prevent persistent errors.
Xilinx TMR (XTMR)
Xilinx has proposed a comprehensive TMR scheme for their Virtex FPGAs, in order to
obtain full data retention and autonomous recovery.[40]
The different parts of a design are classified according to their function and structure:
• Throughput logic is a module of any size, synchronous or asynchronous, where
no logic loops exist in the signal paths. Throughput logic is protected by simple
duplication of the logic.
• State machine logic has a registered output that is fed back into a previous stage of
the design. Replication and voting inside the feedback loop provide the required
protection.
• I/O logic is protected by using redundant pins that are connected outside the
FPGA. Input pins are merely connected to the same trace. Output signals re-
quire protection against conflict on the external bus, a minority voter is therefore
used to disable a tri-state buffer on the pin of the misbehaving signal, as shown
in Figure 4.6.
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All pins are also triplicated, with the tracks connected outside the chip, to elimi-
nate all single points of failure in the design. Signal conflict is prevented byminor-
ity voters which disable misbehaving pins from inside the FPGA. This scheme has
been simulated and tested to provide 100% coverage of the configuration mem-
ory, leaving only the SEFIs in the control logic as a very small cross-section.
• Special features include dedicated hardware modules, such as Block RAM (BRAM)
and the digital clock manager (DCM). The best way of protecting these elements
is to wrap them in custom logic that provides EDAC functionality. This could be
a parity based correction code for Block RAM, or a more advanced scheme that
also refreshes data. Other elements can most easily be protected using TMR, with
a reset circuit to correct potential state errors.
Minority
Voter
Minority
Voter
Minority
Voter
P
R1
R2
P
R1
R2
P
R1
R2
TR0
TR1
TR2
OBUFT
OBUFT
OBUFT
FPGA PCBPIN
TRACE
XAPP197_19_031201
Figure 4.6: Minority voters used to disable an output pin.[40]
Applying these techniques can be quite laborious, so Xilinx has made templates avail-
able for several protected components. The complete mitiagation process has also been
automated in software called TMR Tool.
Functional Triple Modular Redundancy (FTMR)
Gaisler research has formulated a VHDL approach to error-mitigation that performs
TMR at gate level. The goal is to free the designer from having to take TMR into con-
sideration at all, allowing one to utilise the power of a high level description language,
such as VHDL. Splitting the design into modules that conform to a specific behaviour
and interface, allows various levels of TMR to be implemented, without the designer
having to keep the details of the mitigation process in mind.[41]
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Combinatorial block
Next state record
Output records
Clock
Reset
Input records
Current state record
Sequential block
Figure 4.7: Sequential and combinatorial logic blocks in FTMR.[41]
A design is split into combinatorial and sequential blocks, as shown in Figure 4.7. The
redundancy of the sequential block is achieved by implementing flip-flops with a spe-
cial TMR-equivalent.
The redundancy in the combinatorial section is implemented by describing the combi-
natorial logic in a procedure that is instantiated multiple times.
VHDL records are used extensively to package redundant signals, for both voting and
for passing between modules. The sequential block has one input record; containing
the next state of all the elements in the block, one output record; that carries all the
current values in the block, as well as clock and reset signals.
Only directly instantiated flip-flops are triplicated, as noway exists to triplicate inferred
flip-flops.
Varying levels of redundancy is possible:
• The structural implementation uses only triplicated flip-flops.
• The sequential implementation uses redundancy only on the sequential logic
• The combinatorial implementation provides triplication of all the combinatorial
logic and ports.For purely combinatorial logic, no voting occurs inside the mod-
ule, since it is assumed that it will be voted when it reaches an output or a flip-
flop.
Although FTMR seems to offer a way of separating the error mitigation process from
the design procedure, the constraints for separating the sequential and combinatorial
logic can often lead to a fairly low-level description of the system, in order to maintain
control. This is contrary to the power of using a high level description language.
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4.3.2 Temporal redundancy
Transient errors can be detected by repeating the execution sequence at another time.
A series of sequential operations can be repeated to confirm results. In software this in-
volves executing all instructions more than once. This will more than halve the effective
speed of the design, but will not increase the spatial requirements of the design.
A delay-based redundancy scheme can been used on sequential logic to correct tran-
sient errors. Unwanted transients can be effectively eliminated by replacing D flip-flops
in a design with a equivalent, error-correcting flip-flip, as shown in Figure 4.8.
Combinatorial
logic
D Q
D Q
D Q
δ
δ
n
voter
Majority
Equivalent D flip−flop
OutputInput
Clock
Figure 4.8: Time redundant D flip-flop. By using a delay δ, the clock and data can be shifted to
eliminate transient errors with a duration less than δ.
In this equivalent flip-flop, a delay element (δ) is used to shift the clock and data sig-
nals to sample the result at 3 different times. For an SET to influence the results, it
would have to last long enough to influence two of the samples (longer than δ). The
performance penalty is largely determined by the the delay element.
This scheme is most suitable for ASIC applications, where an extra buffer can be in-
serted to provide the delay. In FPGAs, the delay can be implemented by routing the
signals through another logic element. The best way to achieve it, would be to modify
the netlist generated by the synthesis tool, because any high level description of the
time redundant flip-flop would be optimised away.
A similar scheme was used for error detection in the ROC81, a fault tolerant version of
the LEON-1 developed by iROC Technologies.[42]
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4.3.3 Data redundancy
Data redundancy can also be seen as a subsection of spatial redundancy. Due to the fact
that data is usually used in words or blocks it is possible to apply more sophisticated
techniques than TMR.
In general, the more data needs to be protected, the more efficiently it can be done.
However, advanced EDAC techniques also take longer to execute.
These techniques can be applied in hardware or software. Hardware can abstract the
mitigation mechanisms from the programmer, but will decrease performance in high
speed systems. Software techniques also decrease performance, but do not increase the
hardware requirements.[43]
Single error detection
Errors can be detected by storing an extra parity bit with every word of data.
This bit is calculated to make the number of 1 bits in the word an odd number for odd
parity, or an even number for even parity. The parity is checked again when the word
is read. If it does not have the expected odd or even number of 1 bits, the word has
been corrupted.
8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 + P
Figure 4.9: 8-bit word with parity bit (P). The parity bits are calculated to set the number of 1’s
in the word to an odd (odd parity) or equal (even parity) number. The parity is checked when
the word is read: if it differs from the expected odd or even parity scheme, an upset has been
detected.
The high demand for applications that use parity bits has encouraged Xilinx to provide
extra bits in the internal RAM of their FPGAs to store these parity bits.
4.3.4 Error correction codes (ECC)
More meta data can be stored to allow error correction. Error correction can be applied
to one dimensional data words (longitudinal codes), or to two dimensional blocks of
data (block codes).
Block codes are usually applied to large blocks of data, while longitudinal codes are
more useful for flow-through data, where EDAC needs to be performed on a single
word.
Hamming codes are a popular example of ECC codes, due to their adaptability and
easy implementation. Parity bits are generated by XOR’ing different combinations of
bits in the data word, to check different sets of bits in the code word. In a Hamming
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Bit position: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Code word P1 P2 1 P3 2 3 4 P4 5 6 7 8
Figure 4.10: Structure of a (12,8) Hamming code word. The Pn bits are parity bits; the other
store data.
code word, r parity bits are added to the m-bit data word, forming an (m+ r)-bit code
word. The bits are numbered from 1, with bit 1 the highest order bit. The parity bits
are placed at all positions that are a power of 2; data is stored in the other bits (Figure
4.10). Bit b is checked by those parity bits b1, b2, . . . , bj such that b1 + b2 + · · ·+ bj = b.
For example, bit 7 is checked by bits 1, 2 and 4.
The unique set covered by the parity bits allows us to determine which bit was upset
and correct it. The position of this bit is found by taking the intersection of the sets of
bits covered by the incorrect parity bits. One will not be able to correct the data if two
upsets occurred, but the corruption can still be detected.
The overhead decreases as more data is protected by Hamming ECC codes. In this way
a (12,8) Hamming code uses a 12-bit word to store 8 bits data, a (23,16) Hamming code
uses 23 bits to store a 16-bit word, a (38,32) Hamming uses only 6 parity bits to protect
32 data bits and so forth. Every word can only correct one or detect two errors. The
decoding logic becomes progressively more complex as the word size increases.
The HDL implementation is done with XOR-operations, to obtain the encoded word. In
software, code words can be generated by performing modulo-2 multiplication of the
data with an encoding matrix.[44][45]
4.3.5 Selective redundancy
The high cost of TMR has prompted various techniques that exchange some protection
for a lower system cost. “Gate level selective redundancy” involves evaluating relative
frequency of input values at gates. Only those inputs that are deemed to be major
contributors to possible errors are protected.[46]
This offers a good trade-off between cost and reliability, but requires beforehand knowl-
edge of the relative signal frequencies in the design.
4.3.6 Granularity
Various levels of granularity are possible for all the above techniques. Generally, the
error tolerance of a systemwill increase with a finer granularity, but the cost in terms of
area and timing will increase. The error tolerance is only a consideration whenmultiple
independent upsets are a threat, such in case where the reset rate is comparable to the
dynamic upset rate.
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The lowest cost TMR application has only top-level voting, ie. three copies of the com-
plete design will be redundant. The overhead will only be one voter for every output of
the design. However, this approach has very little internal protection. The large cross-
section of the modules makes it quite possible for more than one module to be upset.
If the errors persist, the majority voter will fail. The probability of failure decreases if
redundancy is applied to modules inside the design with majority voting between the
modules, as shown in Figure 4.11.
Design b
Design c
Design a
Inputs
SEU induced failure
Outputs
(a) High level TMR
Module 1b
Module 1c
Module 1a
Module 2b
Module 2c
Module 2a
Module 3b
Module 3c
Module 3a
Inputs Outputs
SEU induced failures
(b) Finer granularity TMR
Figure 4.11: TMR at different levels of granularity. The high-level TMR in (a) can only miti-
gate a single SEU induced failure, while the implementation of finer granularity in (b) will still
function correctly, even if one module in each of the three subsections fail.
4.4 External protection
External protection is used to protect the device against latch-up and to correct SEUs in
the configuration.
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4.4.1 Latch-up protection
When latch-up occurs, the FPGA draws an unexpectedly high current. To protect the
device, the supply current must be monitored and interrupted if it exceeds a preset
threshold. Doing this will cause a power off-on reset: if enough time is provided for
the parasitic thyristors to switch off, permanent damage to the device can be prevented.
The power consumption of FPGA needs to be characterised before use in order to
do this effectively, because different designs can draw drastically different currents.
The current can be monitored with an analogue comparator which triggers a mono-
stable (“one-shot” oscillator) to reset the device. Alternatively a microcontroller and an
analogue-to-digital converter (ADC) can be used, either by the microcontroller polling
the ADC or having the ADC raise an interrupt.
4.4.2 Configuration memory
The configuration memory, as discussed before, is a major contributor to the SEU cross-
section of SRAM FPGAs. Although redundancy techniques such as TMR can mitigate
the effects of upsets in the configuration, these errors need to be corrected to prevent
accumulation.
“Scrubbing” involves reloading the entire configuration memory, thereby correcting all
SEUs. This can be done at regular intervals (as determined by the desired reliability of
the design) or triggered by error detection logic.
Xilinx FPGAs also allow readback and partial reconfiguration of the configurationmem-
ory. Readback can be used to verify the integrity of the configuration, and partial recon-
figuration can be used to only correct the corrupted frame. It is possible to perform this
readback and reconfiguration without interrupting the FPGA (on Virtex-II to Virtex-5
devices), which provides protection with almost 100% device availability.
The implementation and constraints of readback are discussed in Chapter 5.
4.5 Soft-core processors
Soft-core processors often have special features that require consideration, because of
the complexity of the system. These features are mentioned here for the sake of com-
pleteness and because it illustrates some of the innovative ways that fault tolerance can
be achieved in systems with higher complexity.
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4.5.1 Cache memory
On-chip cache memory is used to speed up access to external memory by caching re-
cently used items. This type of memory is also susceptible to upsets and needs protec-
tion.
SEUs need only be detected (for example by using a single bit parity code), since a
correct copy of the original entry is still available in the external memory. Corrupt data
will force a cache miss, refreshing the entry with the original data.
A write-through policy is normally used when writing to cache memory: dedicated
hardware also writes the data to the external memory, without impacting on the per-
formance of the rest of the system.
4.5.2 Checkpointing
The system needs to be capable of recovering from unexpected interruptions, whether
from an SEU or an external reset. In the case of processors, a technique called “check-
pointing” can be used to recover from these interruptions.
By storing a complete copy of the internal state of the processor in an off-chip location,
the system can simply reload these values and continue executing as before. High per-
formance can be obtained despite interruptions, if precautions are taken to ensure the
data used by the processor is still valid. Such precautions can involve atomic opera-
tions – operations are performed in blocks, where enough data is stored to recover the
previous state should anything go wrong. THis ensures that hte system is always in a
consistent state. Alternatively all memory can be moved off-chip, so that the state of
the design is not lost when the design is interrupted.
Checkpointing can be done in software, with a routine that is explicitly called at inter-
vals, or is executed in such way that operations are performed atomically. The routine
requires some processing overhead, so the frequency can also be changed to adapt to
the threat of upsets. Alternatively, it is also possible to perform checkpointing in hard-
ware, with dedicated logic taking a snapshot of the processor at intervals.
4.6 Implementation considerations
It is crucial to keep the final implementation on the FPGA in mind when considering
the application of these techniques. Applying error-mitigation without realising the
effect that implementation has, can nullify any benefits gained. The following provide
some guidance on the issues encountered in implementation.
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4.6.1 FPGA resources
All FPGAs use some form of configuration memory to combine the basic logic building
blocks into the desired logic function.
Some elements, such as latches, registers, shift registers and RAM are more sensitive
to SEUs than other elements. Most FPGAs also have some dedicated hardware to per-
form common tasks, such as integermultiplication or frequency scaling of clock signals.
These elements, which use very few configuration bits, offer a very efficient way of im-
proving performance and can decrease the upset cross-section.
In the case of Xilinx FPGAs, majority voters are implemented using 3 input look-up
tables (LUTs). These LUTs store the output values in 8 registers, which are set during
configuration. An upset in one of these registers will change the logic function imple-
mented by the LUT. The LUTs are connected by the programming of routing bits in
the configuration memory. These bits are also sensitive to upsets: an SEU can cause
connections to be broken or unwanted connections to be created.[47][48]
The high level description of a multiplier in VHDL can lead to two widely different im-
plementations. If the synthesis software recognises the structure and uses a dedicated
hardware multiplier, it will have a much smaller cross-section than when the multiplier
is implemented in the configurable logic. To encourage the software to recognise the
logic it can translate to dedicated resources, it may be necessary to manually instantiate
the hardware multiplier.
4.6.2 Synthesis software
A lot of time, effort and money has been spent on improving the logic synthesis tools,
especially to make them more adept at recognising and optimising logic. The origi-
nal motivation was to minimise the logic utilisation of a design, but the software also
has the unfortunate tendency to remove the redundancy used to implement error mit-
igation. To prevent this unwanted optimisation, the synthesis software needs to be
instructed to keep certain components and connections, even if they are obviously du-
plicated. Unfortunately, the method in which it is specified in HDL differs for different
synthesis engines.
Most software use the “attribute” statement to specify which nets or modules should
not be optimised. In Synplify Pro, this can be done by setting syn_keep on a wire,
which prevents unwanted optimisation from removing combinatorial logic. Similarly,
syn_preserve is used to protect sequential elements and syn_noprune stops uncon-
nected instantiated elements from being removed.
A section of source code that illustrates the use syn_preserve with Synplify Pro is
listed below (from the design discussed in Chapter 7.1.7).
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library synplify;
use synplify.attributes.all;
entity test_attr is
port (
...
);
end test_attr;
architecture behav of
attribute syn_preserve:boolean;
attribute syn_preserve of dec_loop:label is true;
...
begin
...
dec_loop: hamming_dec_12_8
port map(loop_in ,loop_in_orig );
...
end architecture;
An alternative to using attributes would be to synthesise the unprotected design to
produce an intermediate output file in an format such as EDIF. This file can then be
processed to implement the required error mitigation techniques, before performing
the final place-and-route (PAR) operation.
4.7 Conclusion
From the myriad of techniques available, a strategy must be selected to protect designs
on SRAM FPGAs.
It is impossible to find a single solution that will provide optimal fault tolerance in all
cases, since every case has different requirements. Instead, the following guidelines
that should be taken into account, are proposed:
Cross-section: The relative cross-sections of the different sections on the FPGA need to
be taken into account. The cross-section of the configuration memory and BRAM
areas dominates, so these areas should be protected first. Mitigation techniques
will decrease the scaling factor (α) for both these sections, as well as the other
smaller parts. σSEFI remains unchanged, therefore it will become the dominant
cross-section, if sufficient error protection techniques are applied to the other sec-
tions. This would be the maximum level of protection one can obtain on these
devices. Luckily, σSEFI is very small and should not pose a significant threat to
most devices.
Multi-level error mitigation: SRAM FPGAs require a multi-level error mitigation ap-
proach. Errors can be mitigated in VHDL, but for reliable operation, external
protection of the configuration memory is required. This system can further be
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expanded to combine hardware, HDL and software based mitigation techniques
to protect different areas of the system. By combining the strengths of the indi-
vidual techniques, good protection can be obtained with a minimal overhead.
Spatial redundancy: Spatial redundancy is needed to protect against SEUs in the con-
figuration memory, as it is the only way of providing protection against upsets
in the configuration memory. While TMR is the most effective approach, many
variations with different levels of protection exist.
Most soft-core processors also have elements, such as memory, that can be pro-
tected in other, more efficient ways.
Cost: The cost of mitigation can bemeasured in various ways. Themost significant fac-
tors usually considered are the logic overhead, implementation effort, power and
speed. Although is convenient to consider these factors separately, one should
remember that they are all highly interdependent.
Logic overhead: A design with high-level TMR requires more than three times the
logic required by an unprotected design. This overhead can be decreased by care-
ful combination of TMR with other techniques.
Device utilisation is not the only way of defining cost: one can also look at the
remaining resources on the FPGA. By analysing the design in this manner, extra
logic could be traded off against scarcer elements, such as memory. This approach
is more sensitive to the use of the remaining resources on the FPGA.
Implementation effort: The effort required to implement and debug a fault tolerant
system is often a deciding factor when selecting techniques.
Ideally, the application of error mitigation mechanisms should be independent
from the design process, in order to meet deadlines and keep costs down. This
could be done by treating the design as a black box when applying the mitigation
techniques, or automating the process in software.
Libraries of fault-tolerant components are also often used. This hides the fault
tolerance mechanisms, but still requires cognisance on behalf of the designer.
Low-level fault-tolerance can be done, but is extremely labour-intensive and error-
prone, and therefore not attractive.
Power: Power consumption is an important factor in satellites, where it is a limited
resource.
Hardened designs are larger and require more power. Careful device and clock
speed selection decrease power consumption significantly.
One could also use themitigation techniqueswhere the threat of SEUs are deemed
large enough. By reconfiguring the FPGA with a protected design when it passes
through the SAA (and the over poles, is desired), while using an unprotected
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design in the rest of the orbit, high levels of SEU protection can be obtained, while
limiting power consumption.
Speed: The speed of a designwill be decreased by placing EDAC logic in the data path.
Majority voters and small EDAC circuits (which have a large logic overhead), are
faster than larger, more space efficient EDAC circuits. Multiple voting in a logic
path will also decrease speed.
Several of these mechanisms were evaluated by applying them to a PicoBlaze soft-core
processor design. It is discussed in detail in Chapter 7.
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Configuration Controller
The configuration controller is used to perform high speed, advanced configuration
functions on a target FPGA. It can also serve as the foundation of a configuration single
event upset simulator and be used in radiation testing.
The controller responds to commands from a host PC by performing configuration or
readback on the target FPGA. By locating all the necessary configuration hardware
close to the FPGA, the system can autonomously maintain the integrity of the FPGA.
This chapter focuses on the design of the configuration controller; the SEU simulator
and radiation testing are discussed in detail in the following chapters.
5.1 Target FPGA selection
The selection of a target FPGA was based on cost, configuration functionality and the
availability of applicable literature.
The use of a Xilinx FPGA immediately seemed attractive. The devices are SRAM based,
which makes reconfiguration and SEU simulation possible. The parallel SelectMap in-
terface allows for very fast reconfiguration, as well as readback to verify the contents
of the configuration memory. Xilinx also produces the only large, radiation-tolerant,
SRAM-based FPGAs – working on a commercial Xilinx device makes possible migra-
tion to a hardened chip much easier. Finally, Xilinx provides a large amount of infor-
mation about SEU protection on their devices.
The use of an Altera device was also considered. They offer equivalent high speed
configuration, but because Altera does not offer any high reliability devices, very little
information on the radiation characteristics of these devices is available.
The Spartan-3 Starter Kit (S3Kit), a low cost development board was purchased to pro-
vide the target FPGA. This board features an XC3S200-4C Spartan-3, 1 MB of external
SRAM, an RS-232 transceiver, a PS-2 port, a VGA port, LEDs, buttons and switches.
48
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Most importantly, it supports all the configuration modes supported by the Spartan-3.
[49][50]
The XC3S200-4C has 200 000 usable system gates, 30Kbit distributed RAM and 216Kbit
Block RAM. It also contains 12 dedicated multipliers and four digital clock managers.
The package is a 256 pin ball-grid array. The device is specified for the commercial
temperature range (0◦C to 85◦C) and has the speed grade “4”. The package markings
(AFQ0412) indicates that it was manufactured in December 2004, using 90nm technol-
ogy on a 200mm UMC wafer. The mask revision is marked “A” and the lot code was
D107348A. This information is necessary because the radiation test results in Chapter 8
are influenced by the device’s lot number and mask revision.
Although no radiation-tolerant version of the Spartan-3 exists, it is similar in archi-
tecture and fabrication technology to Virtex-II, which can be obtained in a radiation-
tolerant version. The cost of a Spartan-3 is also significantly lower than that of similar
Virtex devices. Large Spartan-3 devices are also supported by the free ISE WebPack, so
an additional software license was not required.
Plenty of information on the effects of SEUs on Xilinx based FPGAs can be obtained by
using this FPGA as a development and testing platform. Although the architecture of
the Altera devices differ, the techniques developed on the Spartan-3 would translate to
these devices without requiring major modification. The effects of SEUs on flash and
antifuse devices can be regarded as a subset of the effects displayed by SRAM devices.
5.2 FPGA configuration
The FPGA is configured by loading an application bitstream into the internal configu-
rationmemory of the device. The bitstream is organised into 32-bit words. These words
carry instructions for the configuration logic, as well as data that will be stored in the
configuration memory.
5.2.1 Configuration modes
The configuration memory can be programmed in different ways by using either serial
or parallel data. In the “Master Serial” or “Master Parallel” modes, the FPGA clocks ex-
ternal non-volatile memory to obtain the configuration data. Alternatively, an external
device can supply the clock signal along with the data to the FPGA, in what is known
as “Slave Serial” or “Slave Parallel” modes. The mode is specified by setting values on
the Spartan-3 mode pins (M0,M1 and M2).
The different configuration modes are listed in Table 5.1. The configuration is synchro-
nised to a clock signal, which can either be an FPGA output (for Master Serial and
Master Parallel), or an input (when using JTAG or the Slave modes). Depending on the
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Table 5.1: Spartan-3 configuration modes.
Configuration mode Synchronising clock Data Width
JTAG TCK input 1
Master Serial CCLK output 1
Slave Serial CCLK input 1
Master Parallel CCLK output 8
Slave Parallel CCLK input 8
configuration mode, several dedicated and dual-purpose pins can be used. The dual
purpose pins can be used as general input/output pins after configuration, or can be
configured to persist which allows the configuration to be read back at a later stage.[51]
5.2.2 Configuration speed
The highest possible speed is desired for the purposes of configuration and readback,
to minimise downtime and maintenance overhead. Complete access to the bitstream
is also required for SEU simulation purposes. The parallel configuration modes (Se-
lectMap) provide the fastest configuration. Byte-wide data is written to the FPGA
with a BUSY flag controlling the flow of data. To provide the required configuration
and readback functionality, Slave Parallel mode with persistent configuration pins was
used in the configuration controller. Configuration speeds of up to 50MHz/byte can
be achieved in this mode, without the need for handshaking. The configuration flow is
shown in Figure 5.1.
5.2.3 Configuration file
The place-and-route (PAR) software generates a binary file (.bit) that is used for con-
figuration. This file contains header information, instructions to perform configura-
tion, as well as the configuration data that is loaded into the configuration memory.
The header contains information such as the name of the netlist used to create the file,
the time of creation and the device it was fitted for. The configuration data is used to
program logic and routing on the device, while the final part of the file starts the device.
The configuration file can also be generated without the header portion (.bin) to sim-
plify in-system programming. The rest of the file can be used without further process-
ing to program a device. The latter option is used in the configuration controller.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
5.2 FPGA configuration 51
Figure 5.1: SelectMap (Parallel) configuration flow diagram[50]
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Figure 5.2: Readback data verification flow.[51]
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5.2.4 Readback verification
The configuration memory is verified by:
1. Reading the contents (target data)
2. Masking the volatile bits
3. Performing a bit by bit comparison with the expected readback data. Any mis-
matches indicate upsets.
The configuration logic needs to be instructed to read the configurationmemory. This is
done by commands at the head of the readback file (.rbb). The target data is preceded
by a block (one configuration frame) of padding data that should not be checked. The
values of volatile data (registers, latches and RAM) are unknown and can therefore not
be verified. These values are spread throughout the target data, therefore a mask file
.msk is used to identify them. If a bit in the mask file is set to 0, then the corresponding
bit in the readback data is checked. This process is shown in Figure 5.2, while Figure
5.3 shows the alignment of the different data streams.[51]
Figure 18:  Readback Data Stream Alignment
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Figure 5.3: Alignment of the readback data stream.[51]
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
5.3 High level design 54
Constraints
The device needs to be shut down before performing readback. This prevents corrup-
tion of data in the internal RAM elements by access conflicts between the user and
configuration logic. The FPGA does not lose the configuration data or register values
when it is shut down, which allows it to be restarted without reconfiguration.
To overcome this constraint, a more complex verification method can be used. It entails
reading only the parts of the configuration that do not contain volatile elements. This
can be done without shutting the device down. The locations of the RAM elements are
provided by the place and route software. This method allows the device to function
while the configuration is checked.
5.3 High level design
The features required for the different applications were compared with possible de-
signs, before one using a CPLD as the central component of the system was selected.
5.3.1 Requirements
The following requirements were identified:
• It is desirable for the configuration controller to be used with different devices.
• The configuration controller requires non-volatile memory to store the configura-
tion data for the FPGA. The size of the configuration bitstream is 1047616 bits for
an XC3S200, but can increase up to 13271936 bits for the largest devices.
• For normal configuration purposes, this data is loaded into the FPGA, but to sim-
ulate SEUs, any single bit needs to be accessed and flipped.
• The speed at which the FPGA is configured is of great importance, as this process is
repeated for every bit in the bitstream. A parallel interface with the FPGA greatly
improves the speed.
5.3.2 Possible designs
Various designs that could fulfill these requirements were considered.
A microcontroller that reads configuration data from flash and presents it to the FPGA,
with the necessary control and clock signals, is one solution (Figure 5.4). This design
has the benefit that all data handling is done inside the microprocessor, with the min-
imum of other components, thereby simplifying programming and control. However,
the number of pins to implement a 20-bit address bus, two 8-bit data buses, plus an
additional 8-bit bus for data, as well as the various control and clock signals required
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by the FPGA and flash, made this configuration unrealistic. Even when an external
address decoder is used, very few low cost devices exist that can provide the required
pin-out. A high-performance processor is also needed to provide the desired perfor-
mance.
Data
Address
M
ic
ro
p
ro
ce
ss
o
r
Non−volatile
memory FPGA
Target
Figure 5.4: Microprocessor-centric configuration controller design. The required number of
pins on the microprocessor makes a high performance version of this implementation unrealis-
tic.
A Xilinx application note[52] describes how to use a Motorola microprocessor to up-
load the configuration bitstream to an FPGA, through a CPLD. The bitstream is stored
on external flash memory, while the microprocessor, CPLD and flash share an address
and data bus as shown in Figure 5.5. The speed of this design is again limited by the mi-
croprocessor, since configuration can only take place as quickly as the microprocessor
can provide address and clock signals.
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Figure 5.5: Using a microprocessor to configure a FPGA. The microprocessor provides control
and address signals to the flash memory and CPLD to perform configuration (adapted from
[52]).
The design that was eventually selected for implementation, improves performance by
using the CPLD as the central component in the design. The CPLD receives commands
from the microprocessor, reads and writes the non-volatile memory and performs the
configuration functions on the FPGA. By providing the CPLDwith a higher speed clock
than the microprocessor, configuration can take at place at high speed. This design
has the added advantage of easing the load on the microprocessor. This is achieved
by encapsulating the configuration functionality in the CPLD, thereby allowing any
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microprocessor to control the configuration sequence. The final block diagram is shown
in Figure 5.6.
RS232
Microcontroller
CMD
Interrupt
CPLD
Data
Flash
CMD
Addr
Data
SelectMap
Host PC
Target FPGA
Figure 5.6: Block diagram of configuration controller. This design uses the CPLD to implement
high speed configuration of the FPGA.
Figure 5.7: Docked S3Kit (left) and configuration controller (right).
5.4 Detailed design
In this section a detailed description of the major components and design considera-
tions of the configuration controller is given. Although the components are discussed
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independently, they are highly interdependent and therfor require interdependent se-
lection and design.
The schematics for the configuration controller are given in Appendix C. A printed
circuit board was laid out using Altium DXP and manufactured at University of Stel-
lenbosch in-house facilities.
5.4.1 System voltage
The FPGA needs 2.5V signals on the configuration port. It is also possible, however, to
use 3.3V signals if precautions are taken to prevent damage to the FPGA. Alternatively,
a level translator can be used on the configuration bus to protect the FPGA.
It was decided that 3.3V should be used as the system voltage, since all the major com-
ponents could be found in a compatible version.
5.4.2 CPLD
The CPLD forms the core of the configuration controller. Most of the high-speed con-
figuration functionality is contained in its logic.
Device selection
A Xilinx Coolrunner XPLA3 was selected, because it requires a 3.3V and the target
FPGAwas from the same manufacturer. This allowed tool chain for the FPGA could be
used “as-is“ for the CPLD, which saved a lot of development time.
To determine the required capacity of the CPLD, most of the design was implemented
in VHDL, synthesised and fitted to a device. The XCR3384XL[53], with 384 macrocells,
comfortably contained this preliminary design, with enough space for additions and
modification. In addition, XCR3384XL is the largest Xilinx CPLD available in thin quad
flat pack (TQFP) packaging. The Xilinx TQFP devices use a 10 mil pitch, which is the
limit of what can be used on an in-house manufactured printed circuit board.
Further modifications and extensions to the logic eventually filled up the CPLD, show-
ing that a smaller device would not have sufficed.
Connections
The CPLD has a 20-bit address bus connected to the flash memory as well as a 16-bit
data bus and the necessary control signals.
The slave-parallel connections to the FPGA include an 8-bit data bus (FPGA_DATA), a
configuration clock (CCLK) and control signals (FPGA_DONE, PROGB, INITB and CSB). The
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physical connection to the FPGA is made through a 2×20 right angle header, as pro-
vided by the S3Kit.
The connections with the microcontroller are described below.
The design was supposed to use an external 20MHz oscillator as source for the high
speed clock (CLK), but due to component availability, a 12 MHz oscillator was used
instead.
5.4.3 Microcontroller
The microcontroller receives data and commands from a host PC and then commands
the rest of the configuration controller correspondingly. Most of the processing is done
by the CPLD, which leaves very few requirements for the microcontroller to satisfy.
Device selection
The MicroChip PIC architecture and the AVR from Atmel were considered as low-cost
candidates.
The Atmel ATmega 128L[54] was selected. It has an 8-bit RISC architecture with 128KB
of in-system programmable flash memory, 4KB RAM and 4KB EEPROM. It has enough
input/output pins to provide the CPLD with 16-bits data, control signals and external
interrupts. The microcontroller has enough RAM and flash memory that prototyping
of the FPGA configuration algorithms can be done in software, before porting them to
the CPLD.
Open-source software was used exclusively in the development and programming of
the device. avr-gcc1, which is part of the high quality GNU Compiler Collection, was
used as C compiler. Several open-source downloading tools were evaluated, avrdude2
was used extensively.
The opportunity to learn from using a new architecture (as the AVR was, unlike the
PIC) was also attractive.
Connections
Themicrocontroller has a 5-bit command bus (CPLD_CTL), a 16-bit data bus (MICRO_DATA)
and a clock/write signal (SYS_CLK) to the CPLD. Seven miscellaneous pins also connect
the two devices; two of these can be used as external interrupts. The use of these con-
nections is discussed in Section 5.5.
1http://gcc.gnu.org
2http://savannah.nongnu.org/projects/avrdude
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The UART is connected to an RS-232 driver (MAX3232 from Texas Instruments). The
analogue-to-digital converter pins are connected to a header, for use in current moni-
toring.
A 7.372 MHz crystal provides the clock signal.
5.4.4 Non-volatile memory
Flash memory is used as non-volatile storage for the configuration bitstream. The data
is read from the flash in order to configure the FPGA.
The storage space requirement necessitated the use of flash over EEPROM. At least 4
time as much space as the size of the configuration file was required (see below). A
16-bit data bus to simplify readback and verification was also desirable. In addition,
the device should preferably be byte or word addressable, so that a specific bit could be
upset during SEU simulation. The programming time required for the device was not
that important, but fast reading a priority.
Atmel NOR flash, AT49BV322D[55] satisfied all these requirements. It has a 32-megabit
capacity that can be accessed as 2048 16-bit words or 4096 bytes. This is approximately
32 times more storage space than is required for the selected target FPGA (configu-
ration file size for XC3S200 is 1047616 bits), but allows the configuration controller to
be used with any device up to an XC3S2000 (2000000 system gates with a 7673024 bit
configuration file), at very little extra cost.
The flash memory has a read access time of 70ns, which allows configuration to take
place at up to 14.3 MHz, if a single byte is read per cycle.
The use of a NAND flash device was also considered because it has a high capacity and
fast access times. NAND flash mostly supports reading in blocks. The overhead that
would be required to keep track of byte addresses when reading small blocks of data
was deemed to be too much to justify the performance increase.
Memory organisation
Due to the relatively limited resources on the CPLD, the non-volatile memory usage
was arranged to minimise the logic and memory required to perform configuration
and readback.
The memory was organised in such a way that the lower 8 bits can be connected to
the FPGA (Figure 5.8). The configuration and readback data is stored in this section.
The mask file is stored in the upper 8 bits, parallel to the readback data. This allows a
single address access to retrieve all the required information to check the configuration
memory. Although this approach does not utilise the flash completely, it simplifies the
logic required to perform readback and verification of the FPGA.
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Figure 5.8: Usage of flash memory to store configuration and readback data. By storing the
readback and mask data in parallel, upset detection can easily be performed.
5.4.5 Interface to FPGA
The connection of the configuration controller board to the FPGA required special care,
since it connects a board with 2.5V logic to one with 3.3V logic.
A Xilinx application note describes this interface[56]. Series resistors have to be inserted
on the dedicated configuration pins to account for the voltage drop, while pull-up re-
sistors are used to increase the noise margin. In addition, the regulator on the Spartan
side needs to be able to handle reverse current, or a parallel resistor needs to be inserted.
Figure 5.9 shows the required connections for slave-parallel configuration.
Careful tracing of connections was required to ensure compatibility, because the target
FPGA was already mounted on a populated board.
The standard configuration uses LVCMOS25 (2.5V swing, 12mA drive and fast slew-
rate) for all dedicated configuration signals. Most of the resistors required for the con-
nection was already on the S3Kit board; only the series resistors on PROGB and CCLK
were needed.
5.5 Programmable logic and software
The CPLD is primarily responsible for the high speed configuration of the FPGA using
data stored on the flash memory. It is also used to program the flash and perform
readback on the FPGA.
It receives instructions that are synchronised to a clock signal from the microcontroller
(sysclock). The instructions may initiate a state machine that is clocked by an external,
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Figure 5.9: 3.3V configuration of a Spartan-3 device in slave-parallel mode, showing the addi-
tional connections and resistors required.
high speed oscillator (clk). This design allows the CPLD to operate much faster than
the microcontroller. Consequently most functions do not require handshaking between
the components.
The most important functions are discussed in this section. Figure 5.10 show the con-
nections between the components.
5.5.1 Erasing the flash memory
The flash device needs to be erased before it can be programmed.
When the AVR receives the erase instruction (“{”), it commands the CPLD to reset the
flash by pulling down the flash_nrst pin. This is done to place the flash device in
a known state, which prevents the accidental storage of the erase instructions. The
microcontroller then sends the erase command to the CPLD, which executes a series of
write instructions that will initiate the erase sequence on the flash. These instructions
are given by a state machine that is driven by the high speed clock (clk).
The flash_nbusy pin is pulled low by the flash for the duration of the erase process
(approximately 25 seconds). The CPLD relays the flash_nbusy signal to the microcon-
troller through the cpld_nbusy pin. The microcontroller polls the busy-state until the
pin goes high again, whereafter it notifies the host PC.
Figure 5.11 shows a sequence diagram of the erase sequence. The diagram shows the
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Figure 5.10: Block diagram showing connections in the configuration controller. The signals
used in the text are shown.
activity of the system over time – it should be read from top to bottom. The host PC is
an “actor”: it is the device that initiates the sequence. Messages are passed between the
components, as indicated by the arrows.
It was found that sequence diagrams provide a better description of the distributed
processing and message passing that happens in the system. They are therefore used
throughout this thesis to document the functioning of the configuration controller.
5.5.2 Programming the flash memory
Configuration data is downloaded to the configuration controller via an RS-232 link.
The microcontroller interprets the data it receives according to the byte offset, as shown
in the packet structure in Figure 5.12.
The “f” identifies the command as a configuration file download. The microprocessor
responds by resetting the flash memory and preparing it for programming. A state
machine on the CPLD writes instructions to the flash device to set it into “Single Pulse
Programming mode”. This mode allows data to be stored using a single clock pulse,
which greatly simplifies the storage process.
The microcontroller stores five indices that are used during configuration and readback
of the FPGA. The values of these indices depend on the configuration data; they are
therefore set during the programming of the flash.
The configuration data is defined to start at address 0 in the flash memory, therefore no
starting index is stored. The first index (A1 in Figure 5.12) provides the last address of
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Host PC
ATmega CLPD Flash
nbusy=1
nbusy=1
erase
nrst=0
erase complete
erase_flash
reset_flash
erase
Figure 5.11: Sequence diagram describing the flash erase operation.
file length A1 A2f A3 A4
10 5 9 13 17 21Offset:
configuration dataA5
25
Figure 5.12: Structure of packet used to program flashmemory. The “f” identifies the command
as a configuration file download. The “file length” field specifies the length of teh configuration
data. The indices A1 to A5 are used in configuration and readback.
the configuration bitstream. A2 is the start address that is used during readback. The
first section of the readback data consists of instructions that are written to the FPGA.
A3 indicates where these instructions end and the readback data starts. A4 points to the
end of the readback data. The instructions required to restart the FPGA are in the range
of A4 to A5. These indices are stored in the internal EEPROM of the microcontroller
which allows the device to maintain these values, even if power is removed.
The final segment of the programming packet contains the actual data that is stored on
the flash. The microcontroller waits until it has received two bytes and then the data is
then written to the flash memory via the CPLD. The file length field in the packet tells
the microcontroller howmuch data can be expected. The flash device is reset to exit the
Single Pulse Programming mode when all the data has been received.
Figure 5.13 shows the sequence of events executed to program the flash memory.
5.5.3 CPLD registers
The CPLD maintains three registers that are used during configuration and readback.
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PC
CPLDATmega Flash
Write individual 
data words to flash
Exit single pulse
programming mode
Enter single pulse
programming mode
reset_flash
reset_address_reg
write_words
program_mode
reset_flash
nrst=0
write_words
program_mode
nrst=0
end_of_file
config_data
set_addresses
program_flash
Figure 5.13: Sequence diagram for programming the flash memory.
• TheAddress Counter is used to provide a 20-bit address signal to the flashmemory.
It can be incremented at half the frequency of the CLK signal.
• The Address Counter is incremented during configuration until it equals the Stop
Address, also a 20-bit value.
• A 23-bit Upset Address is used to specify a bit that needs to be upset during con-
figuration error injection (Chapter 6). The upper 20 bits are used to match the
address of a byte and the lower three bits are decoded to provide the index of the
bit to flip.
The registers are set by writing two 16-bit words from the microcontroller to the CPLD.
The first byte sets the lower 16 bits; the second the remaining bits. This requires a state
machine that is synchronised to sysclk.
5.5.4 FPGA configuration
The FPGA is configured by loading the configuration data from the flash memory into
the FPGA through the SelectMap port. The microcontroller intiates this sequence upon
receipt of the “Configure” command (“R”).
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The fpga_progb pin of the FPGA is pulled low for one clock cycle to reset the device
and prepare it for configuration.
The CPLD registers are initialised to specify the data range that is used for configura-
tion. The Address Counter is set to 0 by resetting the CPLD and the Stop Address is set
to the end of the configuration bitstream (A1 in 5.12).
FPGAFlashCPLD
PC
ATmega
fpga_data
Read
progb=0
nrst = 0
flash_data
Configure
setUpsetAddress
setStopAddress
setStartAddress
ResetConfigure
Figure 5.14: Sequence diagram for configuring the FPGA.
The CPLD then reads data from flash memory by incrementing the Address Counter
until it equals the Stop Register. The lower 8 bits of the data is presented to the FPGA
(syncronised to fpga_cclk). This transfer is performed by a high speed state machine,
which allows data to be written to the FPGA at 6MHz (half clk frequency). The up-
set register is set to 0xFFFFF to perform configuration without injecting any upsets.
SelectMap does not require handshaking if the configuration speed is below 50MHz,
therefore it was not implemented.
Configuration takes approximately 21.8ms when all the overheads are taken into ac-
count.
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5.5.5 Readback verification
Readback is performed by sending the microcontroller an “N”. The readback flow, as
shown in Figure 5.2 is controlled from the microcontroller by giving commands to the
CPLD.
The readback instructions and data stored on the flash memory are composed of three
sections. The first section consists of instructions that initiate the readback process. The
address counter and stop address registers are set to A2 and A3 respectively to specify
the instruction address range (Figure 5.12). These instructions are written to the FPGA
by using the same writing logic as described in the previous section.
The microcontroller then sets the readback data range (fromA3 to A4). The fpga_rdnwr
pin is pulled high to allow data to be read from the FPGA. Data is then simultaneously
read from the flash memory and the FPGA. The upper 8 bits of the flash data are used
to mask the data read from the FPGA. The result is then compared with the lower 8
bits of the flash data to find an upset. If an upset is found, the upset interrupt pin on
the microcontroller is driven high. The connections during verification are shown in
Figure 5.15.
Stop address
enable
0..7 8..15
20
8
81
Address counter
Data Mask
{
16
upset
CPLD fpga_cclk
fpga_data[7..0]
sysclock
flash_data[15..0]flash_address[20..0]
Figure 5.15: Diagram showing the connections for readback and verification on the CPLD
The final part of readback verification involves restarting the FPGA. The fpga_rdnwr
pin is pulled low and instructions are read from A4 to A5 in the flash memory.
This upset detection scheme only indicates if an upset is found. To determine the lo-
cation, the readback flow must be interrupted so that the current value of the address
register can be read.
5.5.6 Control software
The host PC communicates with the configuration controller through the serial port.
A program like minicom (Linux) or telnet (Windows) can be used to do most of the
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communication with the device. A control program confctl.pywas especially written
to provide an accessible interface to the configuration controller.
The script takes command-line parameters, interprets them as instructions and data,
in order to transmit the correctly formatted commands. This is especially important
where the microcontroller expects binary data, as when programming the flash mem-
ory or setting configuration addresses. The script also performs byte-swapping on the
configuration data.
Two options are available when downloading the configuration data to the flash mem-
ory. One can either download only the bitstream file (.bin), or the bitstream, readback
and mask data need to be transmitted. In the latter case, it is necessary to generate an
image file (.img) first that can be downloaded to the flash.
This image file is generated by combine.py, which arranges the configuration, readback
and mask data as shown in Figure 5.8. A plain text file (.idx) with the addresses of the
end of the configuration data, start of readback instructions, start of readback data, end
of readback data and end of readback instructions indices is also generated. These files
are used to construct the packet structure discussed in Section 5.5.2.
5.6 Conclusion
The configuration controller was sucessfully constructed. The availability of a config-
urable platform that can implement advanced configuration functionality greatly sim-
plified the development of a radiation tolerant PicoBlaze.
The use of a similar design to perform operations on the configuration memory of
SRAM devices is highly recommended in a space environment, because it allows the
reconfiguration and reprogramming abilities of these devices to be utilised to their full.
5.6.1 Configuration controller
The platform is versatile enough to configure most Xilinx devices that support the Se-
lectMap (parallel-slave) interface, without modification.
The load on the microcontroller is decreased substantially, by encapsulating most of the
configuration and readback logic in the CPLD. This allows any processor that is already
in the system to control the configuration functions.
The configuration controller provides one with considerable freedom in uploading dif-
ferent designs onto the same FPGA. The flash memory can be used to store an SEU
protected and an unprotected design. If the spacecraft is in an area where upsets are
likely (eg. the SAA or over the poles), then the protected design can be loaded onto
the FPGA. The unprotected, lower power design can be used for the rest of the orbit.
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The high reconfiguration speed keeps the interruption to the rest of the system at to
minimum. The same principle of multiple designs on one device can be applied to
completely different designs, where only the currently needed design is instantiated.
5.6.2 Readback
The benefits of using readback as part of an SEU mitigation scheme are limited on
Spartan-3 FPGAs. Readback of the entire device takes as long as reconfiguration. The
device needs to be shut down to prevent data corruption, which results in a similar
downtime as simple scrubbing would.
It is therefore recommended that periodic scrubbing is used to correct upsets. This will
required vital data on the FPGA to be checkpointed to minimise the disruption.
FPGAs in the Virtex family do not suffer from the same limitations as the Spartan-3
does: readback with partial reconfiguration can be used to protect the configuraton.
5.6.3 Limitations
The readback verification function was implemented, but not fully debugged due to
time constraints.
The programmable logic interface to the FPGA has been verified by simulation with
ModelSim and by tracing the signals in the hardware. The problem appears to lie in the
configuration commands written to the FPGA. A very specific sequence of commands
is required to initiate readback. This sequence also needs to be synchronised to the
configuration logic in the FPGA.
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Single Event Upset Simulator
The configuration controller was used to construct an error injection tool-set that could
simulate the effects of SEUs in the configuration memory of an FPGA.1
At the highest level of abstraction, the simulator consists of a reference design that
exhibits the correct behaviour and a design with injected errors in the configuration
memory. The operation of the two designs is compared to determine if the injected
errors influenced the functionality of the design.
The main objective of the simulator was to provide a tool that could empirically help
predict the dynamic cross-section of a given HDL design, without the cost and admin-
istration involved in having to resort to actual radiation testing.
Once sufficient data has been gathered about the properties of different techniques, a
mitigation strategy can be selected that combines the most suitable techniques with the
properties of the design.
6.1 Background
The SEU simulator exploits the ease by which SRAM FPGAs can be reprogrammed
with a different configuration. By flipping individual bits in the configuration bit stream,
SEUs in the configuration memory are be simulated. This is done by using the config-
uration controller, but instead of configuring the FPGA as usual, a single bit is flipped
before it gets loaded into the device. Not all the configuration bits are used in a design.
The SEU simulator can indicate the number and location of the bits that will cause the
design to fail.
As stated in Chapter 4, the configuration memory and BRAMmake up the largest seg-
ment of the SEU cross-section. Both can be corrupted by using the SEU simulator,
providing a good approximation of the scaling factor (α) for these components.
1As used in this document, “SEU simulator” refers specifically to this hardware and software error-
injection tool-set.
69
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
6.1 Background 70
A deeper knowledge of the configuration memory is required to interpret the SEU sim-
ulator results. The discussion here is specific to Xilinx Spartan-3 devices, but can apply
(with minor modifications) to other Xilinx devices.
6.1.1 Device architecture
All FPGAs have non-programmable areas such as the configuration logic and boundary
scan logic, as well as programmable areas that configure the routing and look-up tables
used to implement logic.
The Spartan-3 is composed of “Input/Output Blocks” (IOBs), “Configurable Logic Blocks”
(CLBs), a “Digital Clock Manager” (DCM) and an interconnecting routing and clock
network. Specialised hardware resources, such as hardware multipliers and Block
RAM, are also available. The organisation of these elements is shown in Figure 6.1.
The IOBs are placed on the edge of the device, surrounding the CLBs. The CLBs are
connected by a rich network of traces and programmable traces.
DS099-1_01_032703
Figure 6.1: Spartan-3 family architecture.[50]
These elements are programmed by setting bits in the configuration memory. The con-
figuration data needs to be reloaded on start-up, because the configuration memory is
implemented using volatile SRAM cells.
6.1.2 Configuration memory
The configuration memory of the Spartan-3 can be visualised as a rectangle of bits.
These bits are organised into frames that are one bit wide and extend from the top to
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Table 6.1: Spartan-3 XC3S200 Column Types. The entries marked with * are device
dependent.[51]
Column type Number of frames Number of columns Column
per column per device address
TERM(L/R) 2 2 00
IOI(L/R) 19 2 00
CLB 19 20* 00
BRAM 76 2* 01
BRAM interconnect 19 2* 10
GCLK 3 1 00
the bottom of the configuration memory. A frame is the smallest portion of the config-
uration memory that can be read from or written to.
Frames are grouped in columns depending on the hardware they configure. The hard-
ware configured by a frame is not limited to that implied by its name. For example,
certain input/output blocks (IOBs) are configured in frames that primarily configure
CLBs. In addition, frames do not map to a single piece of hardware, but rather config-
ure part of several logic resources, as well as do some routing.
Table 6.1 lists the different types of columns. The TERM columns configure the output
standards of pins on the left and right of the device. Those along the top and bottom
are configured in the CLB frames. The IOI columns supply additional information
pertaining to registers, multiplexers and buffers in the IOBs. The CLB columns provide
configuration of the CLBs, as well as all routing and interconnects (other than the global
clock trees). The Block RAM initialisation data is contained in the BRAM columns,
while the BRAM routing information is in the BRAM interconnect columns. The GCLK
column contains DCM attributes and global clock buffer information.
6.1.3 Configuration bitmap
A configuration bitmap; a graphical representation of the configuration bitstream, was
found to be an extremely useful tool in the application of error mitigation techniques.
A program, bin2im.py, that can convert binary configuration files to images was writ-
ten as a specialist tool. The program generates a rectangular bitmap, where black pixels
correspond to bits that are set to 1, while 0 bits are grey. The XC3S200 configuration
consists of 615 frames of 1696 bits each, which results in a 1696×615 pixel image.
The locations of the major column types in Table 6.1 were found by using this program
to inspect the bitstream of various designs. In addition, the program also provides a
means of visually inspecting the density and distribution of a design. Figure 6.2 shows
a sample of the output for the PicoBlaze reference design discussed in the following
chapter. The different column types are shaded and major features have been marked
to aid in interpretation.
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Figure 6.2: Annotated configuration memory bitmap for Spartan-3. Bits that are set to 1 in
the configuration memory are represented by black pixels. The different types of columns are
shaded and the major features marked. The image is rotated through 90◦ to save space: the
frames are on horisontal lines from top (frame 0) to bottom (frame 615).
It is also interesting to note the correspondence between the physical layout of a de-
sign and the configuration memory. Figure 6.3 shows the layout, as produced by Xilinx
FPGA Editor. The major features have again been pointed out. Note that the shape of
the physical layout corresponds to the shape of set bits in the CLB section of the config-
uration bitmap, while the set bits in the BRAM and BRAM interconnects are located in
the same area as the BRAM on the floor plan.
bin2im.pywas also used to investigate the location of sensitive bits, ie. bits that influence
the operation of the design when flipped. This is illustrated in Chapter 7.
Unfortunately, no way exists to identify the exact function of all the individual bits, as
it is proprietary information. A bit level manipulation library, JBits, does exist, but
only Virtex-II and Virtex-4 devices are supported.
6.2 Similar projects
Only a handful of SEU simulators have been built. A large part of the research in
this area has been performed by Xilinx, to qualify SRAM FPGAs for use in radiation
environments.
6.2.1 Los Alamos National Laboratory
An SEU insertion tool-set was developed at the Los AlamosNational Laboratory (LANL),
using a Xilinx Multilinx programming cable and a Virtex FPGA.[57] This system was
used by Xilinx to verify that no single bit upset in a fully triple redundant systemwould
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Global clock
Unused CLBs
Used CLBs
Used BRAM
Unused BRAM
network
Figure 6.3: Annotated floor plan of design in Figure 6.2. The major features have been marked.
Note the similarity between the used CLBs and the distribution of the set bits in the configura-
tion bitmap. This image is rotate to correspond to the configuration bitmap.
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influence the system behaviour.
6.2.2 Brigham Young University
The FPGAReliability Studies group at BrighamYoungUniversity (BYU) has constructed
an single event upset simulator to characterise the reliability of FPGA designs, in the
hopes of developing efficient techniques to mitigate the effects of SEUs.[57]
The system is based on the SLAAC-1V reconfigurable computing board. As can be seen
in Figure 6.4, the board has 3 Virtex XCV1000 FPGAs (X0, X1 and X2) connected via a
three port crossbar, ZBT SRAM, and a PCI bus interface.
Figure 6.4: SLAAC-1V reconfigurable computing board.[57]
The C block in the figure is the configuration controller. It uses an Virtex XCV100 to
provide dedicated high speed reconfiguration on any of the other FPGAs.
Testing involves loading correct designs into X1 and X2. The first bit in the configu-
ration stream is flipped through partail reconfiguration, and the frame containing it
is reloaded into X1. X0 is used to monitor the outputs of the other two FPGAs. Any
discrepancies are reported to the host machine through the PCI bus. The bit is then
repaired, in order to restore X1 to its original state. The test is repeated for every bit in
the configuration stream.
The greatest advantage of using the SLAAC-1V board is the very high speed at which
upsets can be tested. A single loop requires only 267us because only one frame is re-
configured at a time. This means that testing the entire configuration memory requires
just under 27 minutes (for 5,962,944 configuration bits).
The simulator has been thoroughly verified by radiation testing.
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6.2.3 Politechnica di Torino
A fault injection environment was developed at the Politechnica di Torino by using
JBits, a Java library for manipulating the bitstream of Xilinx Virtex devices.[58]
JBits allows the flipping of bits associated with specific resources (CLBs and routing
bits) on an FPGA. This allows the user to obtain information on the influence of bit-flips
on specific components.
Bits used by a design are identified with JBits and individually flipped. The corrupted
configuration file is simulated in the VirtexDS simulator. It is a program that uses the
actual configuration file to simulate the behaviour of the device. This approach offers
a very simple way of testing corrupted designs, but since the VirtexDS software is not
optimised for speed, simulation is time-consuming, taking from hours to days. It would
be possible to replace the software with hardware, to overcome this limitation.
6.3 Error detection
A critical part of the simulator, is the detection of errors. Several mechanisms that can
perform the comparison between a reference design and a corrupted design exist.
The BYU simulator uses the “Golden Chip” method, where two identical devices are
executing synchronously and in parallel. All the output are checked for any mismatch,
therefore another FPGA or CPLD is required. This method detects all errors and offers
high performance, but greatly increases the complexity of the system.
Two other methods were implemented and tested for this SEU simulator. The first uses
a cyclic-redundancy check to perform a “virtual golden chip” test. The method that
was selected for use in the simulator is based on a self-testing software routine.
6.3.1 CRC monitoring
One can also log the outputs of the reference test and compare this with the outputs of
the design under test, instead of having a Golden Chip running in parallel to the design
under test. This simplifies the system design, but still requires a way in which a large
volume of data can be measured and logged.
A novel variation on this method was investigated. Instead of storing all the data, the
outputs were used to compute a checksum by using a cyclic redundancy check (CRC).
Although it was not used in the final simulator design the method is described here, as
it is an important demonstration of automated VHDL generation and it is promising
enough to warrant further investigation.
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Cyclic redundancy check
A CRC is a type of hash function that is calculated by using a linear feedback shift
register (LFSR), as shown in Figure 6.5. Input values (D) are shifted into the register,
while an XOR loop is used to calculate new values. As a result, a unique checksum is
generated for a particular input series. If a bit changes between the reference design
and the design under test, a different checksum is calculated. CRC codes are used
extensively in communication systems, where they are used to detect burst errors.
1552 3 4 11 12 13 14
D
Output
6 107 8 90 1
Figure 6.5: 16-bit CRC calculator with (1+ x2 + x15 + x16) polynomial for 1-bit data. The data
bit (“D”) is fed into the shift register to calculate a new chekcsum.
Implementation
A CRC calculator was written in VHDL in order to apply CRC checking to the outputs
of a design. All the outputs pins are sampled on every clock cycle, to obtain the inputs
to the LFSR. After a predetermined number of clock cycles, the CRC calculator inter-
rupts execution and raises an external interrupt. The checksum is then be read from the
CRC calculator.
The only way to sample all the used output pins was to place the CRC calculator inside
the FPGA, therefore it contributes to the dynamic cross-section. The CRC calculator
is implemented with dual redundancy to allow the mitigation of upsets in the CRC
calculator. By reading two checksums from the FPGA and comparing with the golden
checksum to detect upsets, the cross-section of the CRC calculator wasminimised. If the
two checksumswere not the same, an upsetmust have occurred in one of the redundant
CRC calculators. If any of the two checksumsmatched the golden checksum, the design
was assumed to have functioned correctly.
The CRC caluculator was controlled from CPLD. Upon receiving a command from the
microcontroller, the CPLD would read a checksum from the FPGA and store it as a
reference value. After every run, when the CRC calculator raises an external interrupt,
the CPLDwould again read both checksums and check for differences. The result could
then be reported to the microcontroller, which would pass it along to the host PC.
A CRC with a 16-bit checksum and a 256-bit data width was implemented, based on
open source code.2 It uses the (0,2,15,16) polynomial, similar to the one in Figure 6.5.
A 16-bit parity code is calculated from the data, where every parity bit checks a unique
2http://www.easics.com
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set of data bits. This is XORed with the checksum and transformed according to the
polynomial to produce the new checksum. Synthesis was performed using Synplify
Pro. Unused data inputs were removed during the synthesis process.
The modules were implemented and tested on the S3Kit and configuration controller
boards.
Automated CRC calculator insertion
A program called addcrc.py was developed to automate the process of adding the
CRC calculator to a design. This program also provided an opportunity to evaluate the
possibilities of modifying VHDL through software to insert EDAC mechanisms.
CRC calculator B
CRC calculator A
Clock monitor
Inputs Outputs
Clock
CRC A out
CRC B out
Read ctl
Original design
CRC design
Figure 6.6: Design file with added CRC calculator. The clock monitor is responsible for inter-
rupting execution after a predetermined number of clock cycles.
The program takes a top-level VHDL design file as input and generates a wrapper file
to connect the design to a CRC calculator. It scans the entity declaration part for output
ports, which it connects to the input signals of the CRC calculator in a new top level
module. The name of the clock signal is specified as a parameter. The resultant file
structure is shown in Figure 6.6.
Bidirectional ports are currently not supported, but including them will be a fairly triv-
ial task.
The program is completely separated from the design of the rest of the system and only
needs to be run right before a design is compiled.
The source for addcrc.py is listed in Appendix B.
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Drawbacks
Although this method is promising, some of its drawbacks led to it it being rejected in
favour of the self-test routine described below.
The greatest problem involved running tests of long duration, especially during radi-
ation testing. The CRC monitor works well for a single upset test, but multiple upsets
over a longer periods of time can lead to failed tests appearing correct.
It is very difficult to determine the cycle time of the CRC monitor, ie. the time before
values in the sequence starts to repeat. Apart from computer simulation, one has no
way of predicting the possibility of the checksum valuesmatching if the inputs differed.
Even a 5ms PicoBlaze test would generate 250000 samples for every output pin. It is
quite possible for the hash collisions to occur, which would obscure test failures.
6.3.2 Self-testing routine
Another alternative is to check the system response to a set of predetermined input
vectors. If the vectors are selected with care, very good coverage of the system can be
achieved at very little extra complexity. This has been used to good effect on systems
containing finite impulse response filters, where a given input will always result in a
given output.
The instructions for a self-testing routine of a soft-core processor can be seen as such a
specific input vector. Very good coverage can be obtained if the test is constructed to
cover the instruction set and to utilise all the elements in the design.
A self-testing routine (described below), was designed to use all the elements in the Pi-
coBlaze design, as well as cover most of the instruction set. The test results are reported
to the host PC, which checks whether a run failed or not.
The self-testing routine can also be used during radiation testing, by repeating the test
in an infinite loop.
6.4 System description
The SEU simulator uses the configuration controller, described in the previous chapter,
to rapidly inject errors into every configuration bit. The reference design is a PicoBlaze
soft-core processor that is programmed to perform a number of integrity checks. The
results are monitored on a PC and the data is logged. If a design behaves differently
than expected for a flipped bit, that bit is recorded as a “sensitive bit”, ie. a bit that will
cause the design to malfunction when upset.
Runs are classified as having passed or failed, no distinction is made between the dif-
ferent types of failures.
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Figure 6.7: Block diagram of SEU simulator
A sequence diagram of a single upset sequence is shown in Figure 6.8. This is simi-
lar to the configuration sequence discussed in the previous chapter, except the “Upset
Address” register is set to the bit address that is flipped.
6.4.1 Control software
The simulation run is controlled from the host PC, by running the test_pico2.py pro-
gram.
This program uses confctl.py to configure the FPGA with a flipped bit in the first
position in the configuration memory, while it monitors the PicoBlaze through the se-
rial port. The PicoBlaze returns the results of the self-checking routine, which the host
software compares to a string of expected characters. Any deviation from the expected
values is logged as a failure, as the function of the PicoBlaze has been compromised.
When a result for the first test has been obtained, the device is reset and the process re-
peated for the second bit, then the third and so on. All 1043040 bits in the configuration
memory are tested in this manner.
The injected upsets may cause unexpected behaviour by the PicoBlaze. The software
has a time-out function that terminates the test is the PicoBlaze fails to respond. Simi-
larly, if PicoBlaze gets stuck in an infinite loop and keep transmitting data, the program
has to reset the FPGA and clear the serial buffer on the PC.
A log file is used to store the address, result and received string for every test. To cope
with the frequent power failures that were experienced during the time the simulator
was used, the logged data was frequently written to disk. The simulation was split into
sections of approximately 100000 bits each, with separate log files for added security.
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Figure 6.8: Sequence diagram for a single error injection operation. This sequence is repeated
for every bit in the configuration memory.
6.4.2 PicoBlaze
A self testing program is used to verify the functionality of the implemented PicoBlaze
designs.
The goal of the test routine was to mimic an actual embedded system by using compo-
nents that are frequently used in such systems, such as a large number of output pins,
UART and external memory. This is not an exhaustive test, in the same way that such
a system would rarely be using all the components. Instead, the routine tries to detect
upsets that would influence the system under normal execution conditions.
The different PicoBlaze configurations used are discussed in the next chapter.
Start-up
The PicoBlaze automatically starts after configuration of the FPGA. The first instruc-
tions are used to disable the external SRAM in order to prevent possible bus conflict.
A value of 0xCC is written to the LED output port to give a visual indication that the
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system has been configured and is running.
Synchronisation
The PicoBlaze then sends a 32-bit synchronisation string (0xFF669955) to the host com-
puter – this is used to set up the state machine in the control software.
External SRAM
The external SRAM is tested by calculating and writing values to eight different ad-
dresses in both the lower and upper SRAM chip. The values are then recalculated and
compared with the read back data.
The primary interest lies in verifying the access to the external RAM, since upsets are
injected into the FPGA and not the RAM chips. Although this test is not exhaustive,
is does provide enough coverage of the possible failure modes for the purposes of this
study, without taking up too much time.
It was therefore decided that the lower two address registers should be loaded with 1,
this value is shifted to the left to obtain the next address. The data written to the RAM
starts at 0x5A, this is decremented with 0x02 for every new address.
Timer interrupt
The timer interrupt is tested by enabling an interrupt service routine that increments a
register every 1µs. The program waits in a loop, until the value of the register is 0xFF,
before sending a character to the host.
The test fails if the host computer does not receive the correct character before it times
out.
UART
Although the UART has already been used in the previous tests, the PicoBlaze also
transmits 0xA55A to the host.
Then the PicoBlaze blocks execution until a character has been received from the host.
This character is incremented by 1, before transmitting it back.
Scratch pad RAM
The on-chip scratch pad RAM is tested by writing 0x5A to all the memory locations.
This data is then read back and compared with the original data. The process is re-
peated with 0xA5.
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As with the external SRAM, this test can be more exhaustive, firstly by checking for
upsets in the memory before rewriting it and secondly by writing different bit patterns.
Once again, the objective is to find upsets that influence the normal operation of the
design, rather than to find all upsets.
CALL/RETURN
The CALL/RETURN stack of the PicoBlaze is tested using a recursive function.
The function increments a counter until the stack is full and then decrements another
for every RETURN call it makes. Both counters are returned to the host for verification.
Registers
Access to the registers is tested by propagating data 0xA55A from register s0 to s1, then
s1 to s2, up to s15. If the final value differs from the initial value, an error is reported.
External input and output
The use of input and output pins is tested by reading and writing data to external
components on the S3 Kit board.
A loop-back port was constructed by connecting 8 output pins to 8 input pins. A value
is written to the output port, and the result read on the input port. The value of the 8
sliding switches on the board is also read.
Both values are reported to the host computer.
ALU
The arithmetic logic unit is verified by executing a sequence of ALU instructions and
comparing the result with an expected value.
Logical instructions (and, or, xor and test) are tested first, then the shift instructions
(rl, rr, sla and sra).
The addition and subtraction instructions are used extensively in the rest of the test
program and as such did not warrant individual testing.
Hardware multiplication
The hardware multiplier is used to multiply two values. The result spans the width of
the output port. A weakness in this test is that only one multiplication is performed,
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but this is in keeping with the philosophy of running a test that is representative of an
actual application.
Program memory
The code occupies about 30% of the programmemory. Upsets in the unused part would
not interrupt the functioning of the design, similar to a real-world application.
Instructions
All instructions, with the exception of the more esoteric types of shift and rotate in-
structions were used in the test program. Any error in the instruction decoding logic
would cause the device to deviate from its expected behaviour.
6.4.3 Post-processing
When a simulation is complete, the log files are processed to construct a list of upsets
that caused the design to fail.
By running bin2im.py, the locations of the set bits in the configuration memory can be
obtained, as well as a mapping of the locations of the sensitive bits.
The sensitive bits give us a good indication of the dynamic cross-section (σ′) of the
different designs. Since no physical cross-section measurements are available, the α
values of different designs are calculated to allow comparison.
The cross-sections of bits in the BRAM columns differ from the cross-section of bits in
the rest of the configuration, therefore these areas are considered separately.
α =
σ′
σ
αBRAM =
nBRAM
257792
αcon f ig =
ncon f ig
785248
Note that αBRAM is calculated by dividing with the total number of bits in the BRAM
columns, which is 15% more than the number of bits in the configuration memory. By
making this approximation, all further measurements are greatly simplified without
losing much accuracy.
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6.5 Conclusion
The SEU simulator provides a low-cost tool that can aid in developing SEU tolerant de-
signs for SRAM FPGAs. It can be used to validate SEU tolerant designs, helping to find
the optimal trade-off between cost and hardness, without having to resort to radiation
testing. The simulator can measure the dynamic cross-section of the configuration and
BRAM areas of the target FPGA.
The greatest difference between this SEU simulator and other implementations, is that
a very good trade-off between speed and cost has been obtained.
6.5.1 Speed
Every upset iteration of the simulator requires, on average, 27.5ms. To test an entire
XC3S200 configuration takes just under 8 hours.
Of this 27.5ms, about 5 ms is used for the execution of the self-checking routine, 21.8ms
is used for reconfiguration and the remaining 700us is the overhead required for control
and verification.
Although this slower than the BYU simulator, it is still quite respectable, given the
much lower cost of the system. The simulator also provides faster results than exhaus-
tive radiation testing does.
6.5.2 Limitations
It is important to keep in mind that the SEU simulator can only observe (and test) the
configuration memory and BRAM areas on the devices. The effects of upsets to half-
latches, registers and upsets resulting in SEFI, can not be simulated. These sections
have a relatively small cross-section when compared to the tested area, therefore the
simulation gives a good approximation of the dynamic cross-section.
The current implementation of the SEU simulator can only inject errors before start-up.
Amore accurate model can be obtained by using partial reconfiguration to inject upsets
into an already running device. This will add a time dimension to upsets, resulting in
a more realistic model of actual SEUs.
The current method of upset testing is “blind”, because the exact element influenced
by a bit-flip is unknown. By using Virtex devices, one could use the JBits-library to
overcome this limitation.
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6.5.3 Recommendations
Although already an extremely useful tool, future implementations of the simulator
can still be improved in various ways.
The system can be sped up significantly. The SelectMap interface allows configuration
at up to 50MHz. The current system performs configuration at 6MHz. The access speed
to the flash memory limits the configuration speed to 14MHz, but this can be improved
by using faster flash. From the PAR results, the current implementation should support
configuration speeds up to 16MHz, if the high frequency characteristics of the board is
improved. Even higher speeds should be possible by improving the speed of the HDL
design, or using a faster device.
Alternatively, the low cost of the system can be exploited to build multiple hardware
copies and perform simulations in parallel.
The system can be stream-lined by laying out a single board. A socket can be used to
accommodate different FPGAs, making the testing of different devices possible.
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Chapter 7
Fault Tolerant PicoBlaze
A solid background knowledge of the effects of radiation and the techniques used to
mitigate them have been established in preceding chapters. A mechanism to measure
the improvement in fault tolerance has also been constructed. All these components
are now combined to create a fault tolerant PicoBlaze implementation.
The power of the SEU simulator lies in its ability to measure the improvement offered
by the appliedmitigation techniques. However, it was interesting to also evaluate other
aspects of the different mitigation techniques, such as the impact on performance and
the ease with which it could be implemented.
Several variations of the PicoBlaze were implemented and tested on the SEU simula-
tor, to evaluate various error mitigation techniques. The best features of the different
designs were combined to produce an SEU tolerant PicoBlaze implementation.
7.1 Designs
A PicoBlaze design was implemented to serve as reference design. This design was
modified to test different fault tolerancemechanisms. The different designs all executed
the same self-checking routine, as described in the previous chapter. This allows us to
compare the hardness of the different designs.
In all cases, except where noted otherwise, the designs were synthesised to operate at
50MHz. No other constraints, except for routing, were applied.
7.1.1 Reference PicoBlaze (ISE)
The PicoBlaze soft-core processor was extended to implement various features com-
monly used in an onboard 8-bit microcontroller.
86
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Implementation
The connections made to the KCPSM3 core to implement the reference design are
shown in Figure 7.1.
The Spartan-3 Starter Kit has two external 512kB SRAM modules. These were com-
bined by using the chip enable (CE) signal to form continuous memory. Only the lower
8-bits of the 16-bit data bus were utilised, which resulted in the memory being con-
trolled as a single 512kB module. The upper bits were later used in some of the hard-
ened designs.
The LEDs on the board were connected to an output port to serve as visual indication
that the system was running. The sliding switches were used as an 8-bit input signal.
To increase the number of pins used, an 8-bit loop-back port was instantiated. The
output pins were connected to the inputs pins by an external connection. By writing
data to this port, upsets in the IOBs can be detected.
One of the hardware multipliers on the Spartan-3 was used to provide asynchronous
integer multiplication. Two output ports supplied the input values, while the result
could be read on an input port.
The bidirectional UART supplied with the core was used for communication (115200
baud, 8N1). The design was configured to run at 50MHz. A counter was set up to
generate a 1µs timer interrupt.
The program code was stored in a single BRAM block.
Synthesis, mapping and PAR were performed with Xilinx ISE 8.1, which mapped the
design to 208 flip-flops and 326 4-input look-up tables. The complete design used 91
pins.
Error injection results
The configuration memory bitmap is shown in Figure 7.2(a). Grey pixels represent
0 bits in the configuration memory, while 1 bits are black. The locations of bits that
caused the device to fail have been marked in black in Figure 7.2(b).
It can be seen that the locations of sensitive bits correspond to utilised resources on the
devices. It is very important to note that not only 1 bits in the configuration memory
are used to implement the logic of the device, but that upsets in 0 bits can also cause
the design to fail.
The utilised area of BRAM,where the processor instructions are stored, is very sensitive
to upsets.
Another important observation is that a large number of bits that do not influence the
design. These bits correspond to unused resources on the device.
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Figure 7.1: Block diagram of reference PicoBlaze design, showing decoding used on external
SRAM
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(a) Configuration bitmap for reference PicoBlaze
(b) Sensitive bits in configuration memory
Figure 7.2: Configuration bitmap for reference PicoBlaze with sensitive bits indicated. For the
configuration bitmap, a 1 bit in the configuration memory is represented by a black pixel, while
0 bits are grey. The bits that caused the device to fail (sensitive bits) are indicated by black pixels
in (b). Note the correspondence between the used bits in (a) and the sensitive bits in (b).
2678 sensitive bits are located in the BRAM area, with another 13642 bits in the rest of
the configuration memory. This allows one to calculate the scaling factors as follows:
αcon f ig =
13642
785248
= 0.01737
αBRAM =
2678
257792
= 0.01309
It is important to realise that these α values are small, because the reference PicoBlaze
design uses very little logic (only about 6% of the FPGA is utilised). A larger design
without mitigation will have larger α values.
ISE reported that the design could run at up to 76.64 MHz.
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7.1.2 Reference PicoBlaze (Synplify Pro)
The reference PicoBlaze described above was synthesised using Synplify Pro and ISE
was used to perform PAR. This was done to test the performance of other software and
to verify the results obtained with ISE.
Most of the design has been specified with low level VHDL, so the difference in im-
plementation between the two software engines is very small. Synplify Pro used a few
more registers (241), but fewer LUTs (316). Timing analysis in ISE predicted a maxi-
mum operation frequency of 71.15MHz.
Error injection results
SEU simulation supported the measurements made with the ISE implementation. The
configuration bitmap and sensitive bit distribution were similar to the other implemen-
tation, and are therefore not shown.
13345 sensitive bits were found in the configuration memory and 2673 in the BRAM
columns. This gave the scaling factors as:
αcon f ig = 0.01699
αBRAM = 0.010377
7.1.3 High-level TMR (ISE)
A high-level TMR implementation was obtained by instantiation of three redundant
copies of the reference PicoBlaze design and using majority voters to check the outputs.
The PicoBlaze was treated as a black box for this implementation. No protection or
correction mechanisms were applied internally.
Implementation
Implementation took place in four phases, which are also reflected in the top-level
VHDL file. The Picoblaze was modified to allow a TMR instantiation, arrays were de-
clared to simplify the implementation process, redundant copies of the PicoBlaze were
instantiated and the signals were connected using voters.
The only modification to the PicoBlaze, was to replace the bi-directional ports (INOUT)
with uni-directional ports (both IN and OUT). The signal that controls reading and writ-
ing was changed to an output signal.
By declaring arrays with three elements for all the ports on the PicoBlaze, a GENERATE
statement could be used to easily instantiate three redundant copies of the entity.
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All output signals, as well as the control signals for bi-directional buses, were voted
using LUT-based voters. The voters were implemented by using two overloaded func-
tions, one for single bits (type STD_LOGIC) and one for bit vectors (STD_LOGIC_VECTOR).
Input signals were simply connected to the input signals of the different instantiated
entities. The connections for a bi-directional port are shown in Figure 7.3.
Control:
Output:
Input:
C
B
A
C
B
A
A
C
B
RAM_OUT[0]
RAM_IN[0]
RAM_DATA
Voter
RAM_RNW
Voter
Figure 7.3: Majority voting on a bi-directional bus, as implemented on the external SRAM data
bus. The output signal and the control signal are both voted, while the input signal is directly
connected to the inputs of the redundant modules. The letters on the individual traces corre-
spond to the redundant instance of the entity they are connected to.
The design was implemented with Xilinx ISE 8.1, which reported using 1026 4-input
LUTs (3.14 times as many as the original design) and 648 registers. One would expect
the number of registers to be exactly three times more than in the reference design
(3×208 = 624), but 24 latches were inferred to implement the voting logic, increasing
the number slightly.
Error injection results
The configuration bitmap and sensitive bit locations are shown in Figure 7.4. The
increased number of used configuration bits can clearly be seen, as well as the three
BRAM elements now being used. Despite the increase in device utilisation, the number
of sensitive bits decreased dramatically.
Only 19 bits in the BRAM area cause the design to fail when upset. The rest of the
configuration memory has only 1175 sensitive bits. This shows that α has decreased to
αcon f ig = 0.00150
αBRAM = 0.00007
The dynamic cross-section of the design has therefore been substantially decreased by
the TMR implementation.
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(a) Configuration bitmap
(b) Sensitive bits
Figure 7.4: Configuration bitmap and sensitive bits for high-level TMR design. Note the in-
crease in used bits in the configuration memory in (a), due to the design now being more than
300% the size of the original. Majority voting manages to significantly decrease the number of
sensitive bits, as can be seen in (b).
7.1.4 High-level TMR (Synplify Pro)
The same TMR design was also implemented with Synplify Pro. As before, the results
correlated well with those of the ISE implementation.
The design was mapped to 648 registers (24 were used as latches) and 997 LUTs (3.16
times as many as the reference design synthesised with Synplify Pro). The maximum
clock frequency was reported as 68.71MHz.
Error injection results
The configuration bitmap and sensitive upsets are not shown, since they are very simi-
lar to that of the ISE implementation.
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αcon f ig = 0.00156
αBRAM = 0.00010
7.1.5 High-level TMR (BUFTs)
The majority voters used in the previous two designs, can also be constructed using
active-low tri-state buffers (BUFTs).
According to a Xilinx application note[40], the circuit in Figure 7.5 can be used as a
majority voter. The active low tri-state buffers with a pull-up resistor on the output will
transmit the correct values if all the inputs match. If the input signals do not match,
simulation will show contention on the output, but on hardware it will act as a majority
voter.
BUFT
BUFT
BUFT
Vcc
Result
A
B
C
Figure 7.5: Majority voter using tri-state buffers
This happens because the architecture of Virtex and Spartan devices allows the circuit
to be implemented in the bus logic of the FPGA. The circuit, after mapping to the BUFTs
that connects CLBs to the buses, is equivalent to a majority voter.
A benefit of this technique is that the voter circuits do not require extra logic, it is there-
fore useful in designs where limited logic resources are available.
Implementation
This design could only be synthesised with Synplify Pro, as ISE 8.1 predicted con-
tention on the voter outputs.
The voting function used in the LUT-based TMR implementations, was replaced with
a voting module (TRV_BUFT.vhd). Single voters were also wrapped in a file that would
generate an arbitrary number of voters, to be used with vector signals.
The source for the voting circuits is listed in Appendix B.
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The circuit was synthesised using Synplify Pro and was mapped to 648 registers and
1007 4-input LUTs. The maximum clock frequency was reported as 77.27 MHz.
Error injection results
The configuration bitmap and upset distribution are similar to the previous TMR im-
plementations, and are therefore not shown.
17 BRAM bits and 1165 configuration bits were found to be sensitive. This gives α as:
αcon f ig = 0.00148
αBRAM = 0.00007
7.1.6 TMR flip-flops and protected program ROM
A design with automatically inserted TMR flip-flops and protected program ROMwas
also tested.
This implementation had two objectives:
• Illustrate that protecting only the memory elements in a design does not offer
sufficient protection in designs implemented on SRAM FPGAs (unlike flash or
antifuse devices).
• Evaluate themanipulation of a design on EDIF level, after Synplify Pro had been
used to synthesise and map a design.
Implementation
A TMR version of the program ROM was implemented with LUT-based voters. Since
the focus was on only protecting the memory, the interface to the TMR version was the
same as the original, allowing a drop-in replacement in the original file.
The design was then compiled with Synplify Pro to produce an EDIF netlist as output.
The netlist would normally be used as an input file by the Xilinx software, but in this
case software was used to replace all the instantiated flip-flops and latches with a TMR
equivalent. The program tmrff.pywas specially developed for this purpose.
The EDIF files generated by Synplify contain all the inferred logic and connections,
but describes it in terms of primitive components. These components are defined in
libraries, which are included in the file. The file is in plain text and the structure is
extremely modular, making parsing and manipulation very easy.
By studying the generated EDIF file for a manually instantiated TMR flip-flop, an gen-
eral template for TMR flip-flops could be constructed. This template was used to gen-
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erate an EDIF library of redundant flip-flops that have a three input look-up table as
majority voter. By keeping the interface to the equivalent TMR flip-flops the same as
that of the originals, the references to the original components could be updated by a
simple string substitution.
The resulting netlist could then be translated by the Xilinx tools to generate the con-
figuration file. The final implementation uses 723 flip-flops and 571 4-input LUTs. The
maximum operating frequency was reported as 53.61MHz. This is lower than the other
designs, mainly because of the voting logic that was inserted in the path between the
program ROM and the instruction execution unit. The timing optimisations made by
Synplify Pro were also invalidated by modifying the design after synthesis and map-
ping.
The source code of tmrff.py is listed in Appendix B
Error injection results
SEU simulation proved that only protecting the flip-flops does not offer much improve-
ment in SRAM FPGAs.
13770 sensitive bits were found in the configuration section, while the TMR BRAM
implementation showed only 30 sensitive bits. The scaling factors were calculated as:
αcon f ig = 0.01754
αBRAM = 0.00012
7.1.7 Hamming-encoded memory and pins
To evaluate the use of an error-correction code, the reference design was modified to
use Hamming-encoded instructions. The Hamming encoder was also applied to some
of the output pins in the design, to implement pin-redundancy.
The main concern with this implementation was to keep the decoding fast, as it takes
place in the instruction path. A Hamming code was selected, because it offers single bit
correction and double bit detection, while being relatively simple to implement in both
VHDL and (for generation and verification) on a PC. Once implemented, it is also easy
to scale to other wordwidths. Other encodings, such as Bose-Chaudhary-Hoquenghem
(BCH) offer higer levels of protection, but are more complicated to calculate.[45]
Implementation
The 18-bit instructions in the programmemory were protected with a (23,18) Hamming
code. This encoding uses 5 parity bits to protect 18 data bits.
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Table 7.1: (23,18) Hamming encoding matrix. The bits marked with an asterisk are XOR’ed
together to calculate the check bits.[44]
Parity Bit address in data word
bit 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
P1 * * * * * * * * * * *
P2 * * * * * * * * * * *
P3 * * * * * * * * * * *
P4 * * * * * * *
P5 * * * * * * *
One of the output files of the KCPSM3 (PicoBlaze) assembler is a text file with hex-
adecimal instructions, generated from the program code. The assembler generates a
program memory VHDL file that contains a single BRAM block, initialised with the
instructions.
The hexadecimal instructions were processed by a program, hamming_mem.py, that cal-
culated the parity bits by performingmodulo 2multiplication with the encodingmatrix
in Table 7.1. The code word was constructed by placing the partity bits in the positions
that are a power of 2 to form a 23-bit code word. Two BRAM primitives were initialised
with the encoded instructions by using a VHDL template file. This encoded memory
module replaced the original program memory that was generated by the assembler.
To initialise both RAM blocks, it was required that the encoded instructions were split
into a lower 16-bit portion, a 2-bit central portion and an upper 5-bit portion. The
separation of the instructions was required because of the way the BRAMprimitives are
initialised (data (0:15) and parity (16:17) bits are separated). The half of thememory that
is not used by the programmemory can still be used for other purposes by instantiating
a 9x2048 BRAM element (by changing the address width-to-depth ratio).
The template file also instantiated a (23,18) Hamming decoder, to provide the decrypted
instructions to the rest of the system. Decoding involves recalculating the check bits and
XOR’ing them with the original check bits to generate an error syndrome. The syndrome
is compared with a look-up table to determine if any have errors occurred. If only one
error occurred, the position is given by the integer value of the syndrome and the bit
corrected. Table 7.2 lists the error syndrome values.
The encoded memory module was tested by simulating it in Modelsim and comparing
the decoded instructions with the original ones.
The data buses to the SRAM and loop-back port were protected with a (12,8) Hamming
code. This implemented a form of pin redundancy.[59] Only the buses where extra pins
were available were protectedwith the Hamming codes, because the S3Kit did not have
external traces connected to allow internal voting.
The SRAM data bus and loop-back port were widened to 12 bits to accommodate the 4
extra parity bits. By sending protected data over these ports, the buses were protected
against any one pin or a connection to a pin being upset.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
7.1 Designs 97
Table 7.2: (23,18) Hamming error syndrome look-up table. This table provides the error type
and location, which allows single upsets to be detected.
Inverted Syndrome error code
bit P5 P4 P3 P2 P1
No error 0 0 0 0 0
Bit 1 0 0 0 0 1
Bit 2 0 0 0 1 0
Bit 3 0 0 0 1 1
Bit 4 0 0 1 0 0
Bit 5 0 0 1 0 1
Bit 6 0 0 1 1 0
Bit 7 0 0 1 1 1
Bit 8 0 1 0 0 0
Bit 9 0 1 0 0 1
Bit 10 0 1 0 1 0
Bit 11 0 1 0 1 1
Bit 12 0 1 1 0 0
Bit 13 0 1 1 0 1
Bit 14 0 1 1 1 0
Bit 15 0 1 1 1 1
Bit 16 1 0 0 0 0
Bit 17 1 0 0 1 1
Bit 18 1 0 0 1 0
Uncorrectable All other syndromes
Note that, although encoded data was stored on the SRAM, it was not tested for upsets
like the FPGA was. In a real application the use of Hamming protection on external
memory is be highly recommended.
By implementing the Hamming decoders and encoder in separate modules they can be
inserted into the design with very little modification.
Figure 7.6 shows the changes made to add ECC protection.
The design was synthesised with Synplify Pro and PARwas performed with ISE 8.1.
It uses 419 4-input LUTs, 241 flip-flops and has a maximum clock frequency of 52.27
MHz.
Error injection results
The configuration bitmap and sensitive bit locations are shown in Figure 7.7. The one
and half BRAM primitives used by the Hamming encoded memory show very few
sensitive bits in that area. It should also be noted that the number of sensitive bits in
the IOB columns is dramatically less than before, indicating that theHamming-encoded
buses are effective in mitigating single flipped bits in that area.
Error injection found 13803 sensitive bits in the configuration section and 14 in the
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Figure 7.6: Block diagram of PicoBlaze with Hamming-encoded memory and data ports. The
decoder for the memory is encapsulated in the program memory files.
(a) Configuration bitmap
(b) Sensitive bits
Figure 7.7: Configuration bitmap and sensitive bits for design with Hamming encodedmemory
and output pins. The one and a half BRAM blocks that are utilised by the design can be seen in
(a). The decrease in sensitivity in the IOB columns is also visible in (b).
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BRAM area, giving the scaling factors as:
αcon f ig = 0.01758
αBRAM = 0.00005
7.1.8 Final design
A final design was composed from the results of the above experiments. The objective
was to find a good trade-off between protection, resource usage and implementation
effort.
Implementation
The high-level TMRdesign using BUFT voters wasmodified to use less BRAMand only
one multiplier. In addition, the SRAM data bus and loop-back port were protected by
using redundant pins.
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Figure 7.8: Block diagram of final Picoblaze design, showing major error mitigation elements.
TMR is used to protect the internal KCPSM3 logic, while Hamming codes protect program
memory and pins. The loop-back port is not shown, but it uses a similar TMR/Hamming
encoding structure as the SRAM data port.
The XC3S200 has twelve 18×18 multipliers, as well as twelve 1024×18 bit BRAMs. As
these are resources that are frequently used in designs, it was considered worthwhile
to use fewer of these resources, even if it increased the dynamic cross-section slightly.
The program memory was again protected using a Hamming (23,18) encoding, as dis-
cussed in the previous section. To protect against upsets in the decoding logic, the
decoders were implemented in triplicate, one for every redundant PicoBlaze core. The
address buses were voted using a single majority voter.
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The outputs to the SRAM data bus and the loop-back port were encoded first, then
voted, as shown in Figure 7.8. This configuration required more logic than first voting
and then encoding would, but the resulting SEU cross-section is significantly smaller.
The single hardwaremultiplier was connected to the three KCPSM3 instances. Majority
voting was used to protect the input signals.
The design was synthesised with Synplify Pro and PAR performed with Xilinx ISE
8.1, resulting in 1316 used 4-input LUTs, 660 registers. Timing analysis calculated the
maximum clock speed at 55.633MHz.
(a) Configuration bitmap
(b) Sensitive bits
Figure 7.9: Configuration bitmap and sensitive bits for design the final PicoBlaze design.
Error injection results
The configuration bitmap and sensitive bit locations are shown in Figure 7.9.
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Error injection found 40 sensitive bits in the BRAM columns and 1529 in the rest of the
configuration memory. The scaling factors were calculated as:
αcon f ig = 0.00195
αBRAM = 0.00016
7.2 Results
The tested PicoBlaze designs vary greatly in performance and logic utilisation. Table
7.3 summarises the characteristics of the different implementations in terms of logic
utilisation and performance, while 7.4 lists the measured scaling factors.
The logic utilisation can be expressed in terms of the number of used LUTs and regis-
ters, which give a good indication of the size of the user logic. However, this does not
take the specialised resources such as BRAM and multipliers into account. The equiva-
lent number of gates gives us another a measure that includes these components. This
figure is produced by the PAR software to give an indication of the number of gates
required to implement a given design in and ASIC. The gate count for the final design
is lower because the design requires much less BRAM than the TMR design.
It can be seen that the TMR implementations are the most expensive in terms of logic,
but offer the smallest performance penalty. On average, these TMR implementations
require about 310% of the LUTs used by the reference design. All the memory and mul-
tipliers are also triplicated. TMR was found to be fairly straight-forward to implement,
making it an attractive, if expensive, mitigation techinique.
The use of Hamming ECC to protect the memory decreased the BRAM use by half,
but also slowed the design down to 52.3MHz. This trade-off is seen as worthwhile,
since BRAM is a relatively scarce resource. The performance penalty is mainly due to
the (32,18) Hamming decoder being on the path between the program memory and
instruction decoder. Software was used to generate an encoded memory module, con-
sequently the designer did not have to take memory protection into account. This al-
lowed the mitigation to be another step in the compile cycle of the software, which
worked very well.
The final design required more care in the preparation of the source code, as the design
had to bemodified for the different connections. This effort was rewardedwith a design
that offers protection comparable to that of TMR, but with a lower overhead.
7.3 Observations
Other observations, that are not bound to a specific design, were also made.
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Table 7.3: Logic utilisation and performance of different PicoBlaze implementations.
Design 4-input Registers Equivalent Speed
LUTs Gates (MHz)
Reference (ISE) 326 208 83107 76.64
Reference (Synplify) 316 241 83308 71.15
High-level TMR (ISE) 1026 648 249531 75.48
High-level TMR (Synplify) 997 648 249348 68.71
High-level TMR using BUFTs 1007 648 249408 77.26
TMR flip-flops 571 723 219784 53.61
Hamming-encoded memory 419 241 149414 52.27
Final design 1316 660 185660 55.633
Table 7.4: The scaling factor measured for different PicoBlaze implementations.
Design αcon f ig αBRAM
Reference (ISE) 0.01737 0.01039
Reference (Synplify) 0.01699 0.01037
High-level TMR (ISE) 0.00150 0.00007
High-level TMR (Synplify) 0.00156 0.00010
High-level TMR using BUFTs 0.00148 0.00007
TMR flip-flops 0.01754 0.00012
Hamming-encoded memory 0.01758 0.00005
Final design 0.00195 0.00016
7.3.1 Upper bound on improvement
The α values obtained by the high-level TMR designs should be interpreted as being
close to the upper bound on the improvement that can be obtained. The remaining
sensitive bits are due to the unprotected voters and routing bits. Using redundant pins
will eliminate even these bits.
It is important to note that any design of arbitrary size would obtain the same level of
protection from TMR. TMR does not decrease the dynamic cross-section by a constant
scaling factor, but rather makes the cross-section of the configuration and BRAM areas
approach 0 cm2.
7.3.2 Synthesis engine
The two synthesis engines used (Xilinx ISE 8.1 and Synplicity Synplify Pro) pro-
vided approximately the same level of SEU sensitivity. Differences in their synthesis
and mapping strategies lead to differences in the implementation, which can explain
the observed discrepancies.
The greatest benefit of using Synplify Pro was that more mitigation techniques could
be applied when using it.
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7.3.3 Majority voter implementation
The TMR implementation that uses TRV_BUFTs appears to be slightly more resilient
to injected errors, when compared to the LUT implementations. The expected cross-
section of both components is expected to be the same, which may indicate that the
placement of the design on the device made the difference.
Functionswere generally used to implement LUT-based voters, while the tri-state buffer
voters were instantiated as entities. The latter approach was found to be more flexible,
since the voter implementation was kept separate from the design source code. It al-
lowed the voter to to modified without running into any language or synthesis prob-
lems.
7.3.4 Redundant output pins
The designs using Hamming ECC to protect the output pins showed amarked decrease
in the IOB sensitivity.
In many cases it is not feasible to use triple redundant output pins, due to device or sys-
tem constraints. In these cases it can still be beneficial to implement an error-correction
code, such as Hamming ECC, to provide protection.
7.3.5 Implementation considerations
It was observed throughout the design process that the application of these error miti-
gation techniques could be automated, or at least simplified, to a large extent by using
software and fault tolerant libraries.
Software
The design and implementation of a HDL design involves several distinct stages. Er-
ror mitigation code can be added at different stages in the design process. In general,
adding the code earlier, allows one to use the power of the HDL to easily describe the
mitigation process. By inserting the code at a later stage in the process, the synthesis
engine can be used without fear of optimisation removing redundant components, but
a detailed knowledge of the target FPGA is required.
The use of software to manipulate both VHDL source files and EDIF netlists was evalu-
ated. The extremely modular structure of an EDIF netlist and the low-level description
it provides, makes it the more attractive option for automated error mitigation. 1
1Synplify Pro can also generate a mapped VHDL design that provides a similar low-level netlist
description. This description is similar to the EDIF description and should require similar effort to manip-
ulate.
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VHDL that has beenwritten by a person uses a larger syntax and it oftenmore complex.
In this case the only attractive use for automated mitigation would be to implement
high-level TMR, which treats the design as a black box.
Fault-tolerant libraries
A library of fault-tolerant components was created during the implementation of the
different designs. It includes majority voters, Hamming encoders and decoders of var-
ious widths, as well as wrappers around the different ECC-encoded BRAM elements.
This library greatly simplifies the application of mitigation techniques, as the designer
can instantiate components, without having to consider the intricacies of the imple-
mentation. Some consideration is still required when doing the high-level design, as
one needs to decide how and where the different elements of the design connect to the
error mitigation modules.
The files are provided on the included CD.
7.4 Conclusion
A fault-tolerant PicoBlaze implementation was developed by measuring the benefits
offered by different mitigation techniques and applying the most suitable ones to the
reference soft-core processor design. The implementation is not the most resistant to
SEUs, but it offers a high level of protection at a lower cost than full TMR.
The HDL implementation hardens the logic, but the device still requires external pro-
tection. An external configuration controller is required to correct upsets in the config-
uration memory and latch-up protection is also needed.
Chapter 8
Radiation Testing
Proton irradiation of selected designs was performed to test the actual hardness gained
from the fault tolerance mechanisms. The results from radiation testing also serve to
measure the validity of the SEU simulator. In addition, valuable information about the
physical SEU properties of the device is gained.
Protons were selected because they are the most significant source of SEUs in LEO
satellites. SEUs caused by other high energy particles are similar to proton induced
upsets, therefore testing with protons gives a good indication of how a design will
respond in the LEO environment.
8.1 iThemba LABS
The iThemba Laboratory for Accelerator Based Sciences is the only facility in South
Africa where proton irradiation can be performed.
The facilities are used for radiation medicine, including proton and neutron treatment,
isotope manufacture, as well as particle science research.[60]
8.1.1 Accelerator operation
Particles can be accelerated by a cyclotron or a Van der Graaff accelerator. It works
on the principal that a charged particle, moving in a magnetic field, experiences a force
perpendicular to the plane formed by the particle velocity vector and the magnetic field
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vector, as described by the Lorentz force law.
f(r, t) = q (E(r, t) + v× µ0H(r, t)) (8.1)
with
q = Particle charge
f = Force vector
E = Electric field vector
v = Velocity vector
µ0 = Permeability of free space
H = Magnetic field vector
r = Position
t = Time
The electric field is used to accelerate the particle, while the magnetic field is used for
steering.
iThemba has 3 cyclotrons: a large Separated Sector Cyclotron (SSC) and two smaller
Solid Pole Cyclotrons (SPCs). The SSC can accelerate protons to a maximum energy of
200 MeV, while the SPCs are used as injector cyclotrons.
In a cyclotron particles are accelerated by a potential difference between a so-called
“dee” and “dummy dee”. Four acceleration gaps are created by two dees. Ions are
produced by an internal ion source and are accelerated towards the first dee, which
has an opposite polarity to the particle. The polarity to the dee is changed by a radio
frequency generator, which causes the particle to be accelerated to the ground polarity
dummy dee and then towards the next dee. This process is repeated while the particle
gains energy and spirals outwards. At a high enough energy, the trajectory of the par-
ticle intersects the electrostatic extraction channel, where the particle is redirected from
the cyclotron onto the beam line, using a different magnetic field.[61][60]
8.2 Relevant previous tests
8.2.1 Testing at iThemba LABS
H. Berner previously tested the SEU characteristics of an ADSP processor at iThemba
LABS, using both a vacuum chamber and the proton therapy station. In the final report
it was recommended that future tests be carried out at the therapy station, as it made
setup much easier and provided much better results.[61]
Only the therapy station was therefore considered when designing this experiment.
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Figure 8.1: Diagram showing solid pole cyclotron (SPC), with dee and dummy dee locations.
8.2.2 Rosetta experiment
The Rosetta experiment is a long running experiment by Xilinx to determine the effects
of atmospheric radiation on SRAM FPGAs at different altitudes.[36]
Banks of Virtex family and Spartan family FPGAs are run continuously, with the con-
figuration of each being checked sequentially through readback. If an upset is detected,
the configuration is corrected and the event logged. By running similar tests over a long
period of time, at different altitudes, useful information about the effects of atmospheric
upsets on SRAM FPGAs has been collected.
8.2.3 Brigham Young verification of SEU simulator
The Brigham Young SEU simulator that was discussed in a previous chapter was veri-
fied by proton testing at the Los Alamos National Laboratories.
A previously simulated FPGA design was exposed to the beam, and the configuration
checked at intervals. The interval was adjusted to usually result in a single memory
upset. Any upset bits were corrected through partial reconfiguration, while the FPGA
output was compared to a golden chip running concurrently. By using the high perfor-
mance SLAAC-1V board as base, a large number of samples could be taken in a fairly
short period of time.
By comparing the simulated and experimental results, it was shown that the simulator
accurately predicted the effect of 98% of the configuration memory upsets.[62]
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8.3 Experimental design
In planning the experiment, a testing methodology had to be decided on to ensure
useful results.
The main objective was to determine the scaling factor (α) that relates the static and dy-
namic cross-sections. To achieve this one requires enough samples to draw statistically
sound conclusions. Factors such as the observation speed and the dose rate of the beam
also had to be taken into account in the design of the experiment.
A secondary objective was to measure the physical cross-section of the device, so that
predictions of the upset rates in space can be made.
8.3.1 Tested designs
Three designs were tested:
• The PicoBlaze reference design, synthesised with Synplify Pro (Chapter 7.1.2)
• The high-level TMR design that uses tri-state buffer majority voters (Chapter
7.1.5)
• The final design that protected memory and output pins with Hamming codes,
with the rest of the design covered by TMR, alsowith tri-state buffer voters (Chap-
ter 7.1.8).
The selected designs allowed comparison between the reference design and two hard-
ened designs. SEU simulation reported the TMR design as being the most robust. The
final design is also good at mitigation, but uses less logic than the TMR implementation.
8.3.2 Expected cross-section
No proton SEU data for Spartan-3 devices was available. Xilinx only tests the sensitivity
of the commercial devices to atmospheric neutrons[36]. For Xilinx to provide reliable
proton data would require strict and expensive quality control and testing, because the
sensitivity varies with the manufacturing technology and mask set.
As no information for an equivalent 90nm device was available, the cross-section from
neutron testing was used to obtain an approximate cross-section. The non-ionising en-
ergy loss (NIEL) can be used to relate the upset cross-sections of different particles, if
one assumes the amount of fragmentation in the silicon nuclei to be proportional to
the NIEL cross-sections. For protons and neutrons, the NIEL cross-sections are approx-
imately similar above a few tens of MeV, thus the SEU cross-sections should also be
similar.[63].
8.4 Experimental setup 109
The bit cross-section for the configuration and BRAM areas (σcon f ig(bit)n and σBRAM(bit)n)
from Xilinx testing[36] was multiplied by the number bits to obtain an expected device
cross-section to neutrons (σn).
σn = ncon f igσcon f ig(bit)n + nBRAMσBRAM(bit)n
= 821856× 2.4× 10−14 + 221184× 3.48× 10−14
σn = 2.742× 10−8cm2
The SEU simulator predicts that the dynamic cross-section for the designs is much
smaller than the static cross-section. It is consequently not feasible to test the device
using single upset doses (as was done in the verification of the BYU simulator), because
the expected failure rate is so small. To achieve high confidence in the measurements
would require thousands of runs, which would take much longer than the available
beam time.
It was decided to expose the device to a large enough dose that multiple upsets are
caused, which increases the probability of failure. The experiment can then bemodelled
as a set of Bernoulli trails, which allows one to obtain the actual cross-section. Three
different doses were used to obtain different failure rates.
8.3.3 Experiment structure
The static cross-section of the device had to be determined first. The FPGA was reset
and irradiated before the upsets in the configuration was checked.
The dynamic part of the experiment consisted of a series of runs where one design was
repeatedly irradiated with a specific fluence. This provided an average failure rate for
the design at that dose. The runs were then repeated with two higher doses on the same
design. The process was repeated for the two other designs.
A constant proton energy (100MeV) was used for all the runs.
8.4 Experimental setup
The experimental setup was kept as similar as possible to the simulation setup, because
the simulator hardware had already been thoroughly tested. It also eliminated the
possibility of a design change influencing the results.
Minor changes had to be made to the program running on the PicoBlaze to repeat the
self-test sequence. A latch-up protection circuit was also added. A differential trans-
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mission cable, with transceivers at both ends, had to be designed and constructed to
allow communication between the control station and the testing chamber.
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Figure 8.2: Block diagram of setup for radiation experiment
The system consisted of the test board, with the Spartan 3 Starter Kit and configuration
controller, a latch-up protection circuit, two transceivers to communicate over a 100m
cable, a control computer and a 100m power cable.
8.4.1 Test board
The Spartan 3 Starter Kit board and configuration controller were used in the radiation
vault. The FPGA was regarded as the device under test. No other active components
were exposed to the beam. The rest of the system acted as supporting hardware.
This allowed the use of exactly the same HDL code as had been simulated, only the
code of PicoBlaze had been modified to loop repeatedly over the self test code. The
PicoBlaze blocked execution while waiting for a character from the control station –
this was used the control frequency of self testing.
8.4.2 Latch-up protection
An external power control circuit was adapted from [61] to allow the configuration con-
troller to do a power off/on reset of the FPGA board, in case of latch-up. The original
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SEU simulator design had the configuration controller providing the S3Kit with an un-
regulated 5V input. This connection was cut and the board was instead powered by the
controlled output of the latch-up protection circuit.
The controlled power supply consists of an IRF9350N n-channel powerMOSFETwhich
could be switched on and off by the AVR. An LM358 operational amplifier is used as
buffer between the 3.3V AVR and the 5V supply voltage.
The current powering the FPGA board was monitored by measuring the voltage drop
over a 0.5Ω resistor with a differential amplifier. The measured voltages have a 5V
nominal value. The voltages are first divided down to 2.5V, to prevent saturation of
the op-amp, before amplifying the voltage difference. The differential amplifier was
designed that the output voltage will be small enough that the AVR will not experience
more than 3.3V on the ADC pin.
The output of the differential amplifier is also divided down to the voltage range of
the configuration controller (0-3.3V) and measured using the built-in 10-bit ADC of
the AVR. The resistors used in the different stages are chosen to differ by orders of
magnitude, allowing the division and amplification stages to be designed separately.
A current measuring function was driven by the timer interrupt to monitor the current
every 125ms. If the current exceeds a preset level (≈ 200mA at 5V), the AVRwill remove
all power from the FPGA circuit and notify the control computer. The computer has to
switch it on again for the test to continue. The control computer can also query the
configuration controller for the last read current value. One unit measured by the ADC
translated to 0.556 mA.
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Figure 8.3: Latch-up protection circuit.
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Provision had to be made for power leaking from the connecting pins between the
FPGA and configuration controller’s CPLD. The 1.25 V internal voltage requirement of
the FPGA was easily satisfied by having a high output on one of the pins of the CPLD.
It was consequently found that the configuration memory would not reset, because the
FPGA still had too much power. This problem was remedied by forcing the interface
pins to ground and disabling the internal pull-up resistors in the CPLD. Alternatively,
a CPLD with an output-disable pin could have been used.
8.4.3 Communication link
The control room is located approximately 80m from the therapy station due to safety
reasons. The experiment was controlled from the control room, because the room is
also used to control the beam. Apart from the normal monitoring and control systems
used during proton therapy, no communication connection to the therapy station exists.
A communications link had to be designed to connect the test board with the control
software.
The experimental setup required that two RS-232 serial links as well as a parallel JTAG
cable was patched to a significantly greater range than specified by the original com-
munication standards. The serial links was used to communicate with the AVR and
PicoBlaze, while the JTAG connection was used for readback of the FPGA configura-
tion memory.
Various options were available for extending the range. A radio frequency link was
initially considered, but the reinforced concrete shielding of the vault made it unlikely
to work reliably.
When considering wired transmission, a differential protocol was immediately attrac-
tive, due to the noise immunity and greater distance it would provide. To minimise
disruption in the existing SEU simulation system, the output from the PC was con-
verted to TTL levels. This was performed by RS-232 transceivers on the serial links and
a TTL buffer for the JTAG cable. The TTL signal was fed into RS-485 drivers (Texas
Instruments SN65HVD5x full-duplex RS-485 drivers and receivers) which transmitted
the data across a 100m 20-core telephone cable. The remote transceiver converted the
differential RS-485 signal to TTL levels and used RS-232 drivers to generate the origi-
nal signal protocol for transmission to the test board. Exactly the same procedure was
followed for transmitting signals back to the computer.
This cable was laid down the hallway from the control room to the proton vault. By
only using one communication cable and one power cable, the experiment could be set
up quickly and easily.
The JTAG output of the parallel port on the host PC proved to be very noisy. This noise
was enough to reach the threshold voltage for the TTL-buffers, resulting in a corrupted
signal being supplied to the RS-485 converters. Small capacitors were placed on the
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traces to clean the signals before the buffers. The use of a shielded cable between the
transceiver and the PC would probably also have solved the problem.
This system provided a high quality signal, only the transmission delay (see below)
caused some trouble. The RS-232 links were tested with a loop-back plug and per-
formed faultlessly at 230k baud over 200m; far exceeding the requirements for the ra-
diation test.
The schematics are provided in Appendix C.
8.4.4 Readback software
The JTAG link has a clock line for synchronised data transfer. It was found that the
Xilinx configuration and readback software, Impact, failed when communicating over
the cable. This can be ascribed to Impact attempting to communicate at 200kHz, but
the transmission delay over the 100m cable is about 800ns. The buffers and transceivers
caused approximately 300ns of this delay, the rest was due to the propagation delay on
the cable itself:
vcable = 0.66× c
= 0.66× 3× 108
= 1.98× 108m/s
With l = 100m:
tcable = l/vcable
= 505ns
The problem lay in the high communication speed, but Impact offered no setting to
decrease it for the programmer in use, so other software was investigated.
AndrewRoger’s xc3sprog1 is open source Spartan-3 programming software for GNU/Linux.
It could successfully identify and program the FPGA over the 100m cable, but no read-
back capability was available. The source code was extended to allow this.
To perform readback on a on Xilinx FPGA, one needs to give a series of commands
to the JTAG logic, before one can access the readback functionality of the FPGA. The
necessary JTAG commands were added to the source of xc3sprog by studying the in-
formation provided in Spartan-3 configuration application notes, along with the output
of Impact.
The procedure reads data at about 100kHz, but the total readback time is still similar to
that provided by Impact.
The main readback function is listed in Appendix B.
1http://xc3sprog.sourceforge.net/
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8.4.5 Configuration upset detection
The upsets are detected as described in Chapter 6, but using the PC.
The readback function writes the read configuration data into a file. This file contains
the original configuration information, current RAM and (optionally) register values.
The register and RAM values are expected to change, so a mask file (.msk) is XOR’ed
with the readback data to prevent checking of these values. The result is then com-
pared with the reference readback bitmap (.rbb), as generated by the ISE tools. Any
discrepancy is classified as an SEU.
A verification method was implemented in Python to detect SEUs and their positions
in the configuration memory. It was tested by manually corrupting bits in the configu-
ration file before uploading it to the device and then checking that only the unmasked
upsets were found by the verification algorithm. This also verified the location of the
detected upsets.
The source code for the verification program is listed in Appendix B.
8.4.6 Control software
A control and data logging program was written in Python. The program provides a
command line interface for controlling the test, while all communication with the ex-
perimental hardware is logged. The power consumption of the FPGA is also monitored
for latch-up behaviour. Interfacing between the software and the beam control system
was not possible, so all beam settings and measurements had to be entered by the op-
erator.
Initialisation
The program starts the test by checking communication with the AVR. If this succeeds,
it attempts to establish contact with the PicoBlaze, warning if it is not found. A detec-
tion scan is also run on the JTAG chain, to verify that the FPGA is accessible.
Readback is then verified by twice reading the configuration memory of the static de-
vice. Both readback files are compared with a reference file, an upset may indicate
problems in the communication setup, or permanent damage to the chip due to a stuck
bit.
Static testing
For static testing the device is reset and exposed to the beam for a preset dose. When the
dose has been delivered, the operator initiates readback of the configuration memory.
The number of upsets, dose, beam on-time and current are logged.
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Static testing requires the binary comparison of two files (the readback data with a
reference). This was done by calling the utility cmp from the software and parsing the
output to find the upset locations.
At the end of static testing, the program generates a graph of the dose-upsets relation-
ship, which is used to set the dose for dynamic testing.
Dynamic testing
Dynamic testing is similar to the testing done during simulation, in that the PicoBlaze
repeatedly executes the same self-checking program and reports the results to the host
PC. The run is stopped by the user when the required dose has been delivered, and
readback is performed to determine the number of upsets. All communication between
the PicoBlaze and PC is logged, as well as current and beam information.
8.4.7 Power
The system requires 200mA at 12V. 100m flex cable was used to provide power to the
remote equipment. Linear regulators were used to clean and regulate the voltage pro-
vided to the test boards. The voltage drop across the cable was measured as less than
1.5V under normal current conditions.
8.4.8 Shielding
The filter on the beam was regarded as adequate protection for the supporting hard-
ware, no other shielding was used. The expected out of beam fluence is less than 1% of
that in the beam, with background neutron radiation being the primary concern.
When considering SEUs the microcontroller on the configuration controller board is the
most sensitive component, but thememory cross-section was regarded as small enough
to be at low risk. Recovery from an SEU would involve a manual power off/on reset
of the microcontroller. This could easily and quickly be performed from the control
station, causing a only a minor disruption in the test sequence.
Total dose effects would probably cause the power supply components to fail, but the
short duration of the tests made any TID effects negligible. TID induced failure is also
normally preceded by a gradual increase in current, which would serve as warning to
terminate the test and allow the devices time to anneal.
No radiation effects were observed on the supporting hardware, therefore confirming
the validity of this approach.
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8.4.9 Beam setup
The measurement and control equipment in the therapy station is geared towards the
treatment of patients. The accuracy of the delivered dose and position of the beam
epicentre are therefore the most important considerations.
The required dose is set before switching the beam on. The beam is switched on by
removing blocks in the beam line, which allow protons to pass. It takes approximately
3 to 5 seconds from switching on the beam to when the first particles hit the target.
The beam is stopped by lowering the blocks into the beam. This is much faster than
switching the beam on, because it is also used as an emergency shutdown mechanism.
The cross-section of a semiconductor device is dependent on the energy of the particles.
Very few upsets are observed below a certain threshold energy (<20MeV). Above the
threshold, the cross-section increases sharply before reaching a saturation value. This
can be seen in Figure 8.4, which shows the cross-section for different energy levels on a
Xilinx Vitex-II.[64]
Figure 4:  FIVIT (Fault Injection Verification Tool), a C++ based application used to check communication between the DUT and the software as well as determine the number of upsets in various memory cells and registers after each subsequent configuration and 
Each static test observed and counted upsets for one or more of the following elements: configuration memory, block 
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Figure 8.4: Cross-section vs. effective LET curve for configuration memory bits on a Xilinx
Virtex-II.[64]
The measurement equipment functions reliably at energy levels greater than 80MeV.
High energy levels increase the risk of permanent damage to the device due to stuck
bits and SEL. 100MeV protons were therefore used in all runs; the energy level is also
high enough that the saturation cross-section can be measured.
The beam is calibrated by measuring the stopping distance of protons in a water tank.
According the ICRUReport 49[65], the stopping power of protons at 100MeV is 7.29×106
eV.cm2/g. The tank is then removed and the FPGA is placed in the beam. Lasers are
used to align the FPGA in the beam, relative to the room. This allows the setup to be
exactly recreated if tests need to be continued on another occasion.
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A 30mm×30mm square collimator is used to shield the rest of the board from the beam.
The collimator is large enough to allow the entire 18mm×18mm FPGA package to be
irradiated. No other active components were irradiated.
The Spartan-3 Starter Kit and configuration controller boards were mounted on a ply-
wood board, whichwas held in a vice that was placed on the therapy chair in the proton
treatment vault. The chair can be moved to position the FPGA correctly.
Figures 8.5 and 8.6 show the setup in the proton treatment vault. A close-up of the
FPGA board is shown in Figure 8.7.
Figure 8.5: A photo of the setup in the proton treatment vault. The beam comes in from through
the structure on the left, whichmeasures and collimates the beam. The board stands on the chair
used for therapy. The water tank used for calibration is visible in the background.
8.5 Results
The experiment was performed in three sessions over two months. Every session took
approximately four hours.
The first session was used to determine an approximate cross-section for the device
by static testing, as well as testing the performance of the reference design. During
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Figure 8.6: A photo of the FPGA in position in the proton treatment vault. The collimator is on
the right, the S3Kit and configuration controller boards are standing on the treatment chair. The
transceiver is visible in the centre of the image, lying on the chair.
latch−up protection
Power supply and
Configuration
controller
FPGA S3Kit
RS232 cable
RS232 cable
JTAG cable
PicoBlaze
AVR
Figure 8.7: Close-up of the S3Kit and configuration controller in the treatment vault.
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the second session the static cross-section was again measured, and the two fault tol-
erant designs were tested. When the results of the two sessions were compared, vastly
different cross-sections and upset rates were found. A third session was scheduled to
identify which of the previous sessions was correct and to obtain better measurements.
The measurements of the second session were repeated in the third session, and the
measured cross-section and upset rates correlated well with the first session.
The measurements from the second session were disregarded in the following calcula-
tions. The discrepancy with the other measurements can most likely be ascribed to an
error in the experimental setup.
8.5.1 Initial cross-section measurements
The FPGA was reset and exposed to incremental doses of protons to determine the
relationship between the dose and the number of upsets. After every dose, the config-
uration was read back through the JTAG port and compared with the original configu-
ration memory.
During the first session, doses of 3.85×108 p/cm2and 3.85×109 p/cm2were used. At-
tempts tomeasure the number of upsets at higher doses were prevented by high current
conditions, so it was decided to continue with dynamic testing, which was expected to
reinforce the already measured values.
Static0
Static1
Static2
Figure 8.8: Measured relationship between dose and number of upsets for static XC3S200, with
error bars showing the standard deviation. The individual sessions are plotted separately. The
inconsistent values measured during the second session are clearly visible.
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The procedurewas repeated at the second and third sessions, using 3.85×108 p/cm2and
7.7×108 p/cm2doses. The second session delivered much lower values than expected,
the third session corresponded closely with the first test, as can be seen in Figure 8.8.
The graphs were extended to pass through the origin, as can be expected for the upset
mechanism. The graphs all display the expected linear relationship between dose and
the number of upsets. The much lower values measured in the second session are
clearly visible.
It was repeatedly verified that resetting the device successfully clears flipped bits in the
configuration: no persistent errors were observed.
This dose-to-upset ratio was used to determine the doses used during dynamic testing.
The values were compensated to determine the static cross-section, as discussed later.
8.5.2 Latch-up
High current conditions, indicative of latch-up, were observed on several occasions,
especially during tests of long duration.
The latch-up threshold was initially set too high which resulted in the board drawing
a large current for a several minutes. The voltage regulator on the S3kit seemed to
saturate at 280mA (at 5V), which prevented more current from being drawn. The latch-
up protection circuitry functioned correctly after the threshold was lowered. Switching
the FPGA off and on successfully cleared the condition.
The Spartan-3 seems quite resilient to high-current, as no permanent damage was ob-
served in the device. All other designs tested on the board functioned perfectly.
8.5.3 Upset distribution
The location of the upsets was investigated to check whether the upset distribution
across the configuration memory is uniform.
However, it was found that the device displays two distinct zones with different sensi-
tivities to SEUs. If one considers the histograms in Figure 8.9, that display the number
of upsets in the different regions of the configuration memory, a noticeable difference
exists between the zone from frame 430 to frame 570 and the rest of the device. Refer-
ring back to Chapter 6.1.3, where the mapping of the configuration memory to hard-
ware was discussed, this area can be seen to relate to the Block Select RAM (BRAM) of
the FPGA (frames 425 to 577).
The BRAM area appears to be more sensitive to upsets than the rest of the configura-
tion memory, except for the case of the static design, where no upsets were recorded.
Further investigation revealed that the BRAM is initialised to 0x3FFwhen the device is
reset, as can be seen in the image in Figure 8.10. Although this appears to indicate that
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(a) Static (b) Reference
(c) TMR (d) Final
Figure 8.9: Distribution of upset locations in the configuration memory for different designs.
Every bin corresponds to approximately 20 configuration frames. The BRAM can be seen to
have a different sensitivity.
0 to 1 bit-flips are more frequent, this only holds true for the static design. No biasing
in the flip direction could be discerned in the dynamic designs, which correlates with
the tests performed by Xilinx.
It is therefore presumed that the BRAM data that is read back from the static design is
not the true contents of the BRAM. Upsets in the BRAM area were consequently not
observable in the static design.
8.5.4 Relative bit cross-sections
The dynamic upset distribution was used to determine the relative bit cross-section of
the configuration memory (σcon f ig(bit)) and BRAM (σBRAM(bit)) areas.
All the dynamic designs have a significant proportion of the BRAM that is masked
during readback, which prevents the detection of upsets in that area. The number of
measured upsets was increased by the area covered by the mask for the calculations,
because the distribution of SEUs in the BRAM area is uniform.
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Figure 8.10: Configuration memory after reset,showing the BRAM initialised to 0x3FF. 0 bits
are grey, 1 bits are black.
The density of upsets, as given by the histograms in Figure 8.9, can now be used to
determine the relative bit cross-sections of the two areas:
σBRAM(bit)
σcon f ig(bit)
=
(Upset density in BRAM)×Mask area
(Upset density in config)
(8.2)
The relative cross-section used in all further calculations was obtained by taking the
average of the relative cross-sections of the three dynamic designs:
σBRAM(bit) = 1.75σcon f ig(bit) (8.3)
8.5.5 Static cross-section
The static upset measurements were scaled according to Equation 8.3 to compensate
for the lack of upsets in the BRAM section. The dynamic measurements were scaled to
compensate for the number of masked bits in the readback verification file (10% to 20%
depending on the design).
The relationship between the number of upsets after compensation and the dose is
shown in Figure 8.11. The static cross-section is calculated as follows:
σ =
N
Φ
= 2.327× 10−8cm2
The standard deviation on this cross-section is 6.171×10−9cm2.
The bit cross-sections of the configuration memory and BRAM bits can be calculated
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Static 0
Static 2
Reference
TMR
Final
Figure 8.11: The compensated cross-section measurements for the different tests and designs
match well. The error bars indicate the standard deviation. To improve clarity, only the dose
range used for dynamic testing is shown. Static 0 and 2 are the static measurements of the first
and third sessions.
Figure 8.12: Themeasured cross-section for the tested device is 2.327×10−8cm2, with a standard
deviation of 6.171×10−9cm2. This histogram shows the distribution of values obtained from the
individual runs. (282 runs were used to compile this graph.)
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using Equation 8.3 and the number of bits on the device:
σ = ncon f igσcon f ig(bit) + nBRAMσBRAM(bit)
= ncon f igσcon f ig(bit) + 1.75× nBRAMσcon f ig(bit)
⇒ σcon f ig(bit) =
σ
ncon f ig + 1.75× nBRAM
=
2.327× 10−8
821856+ 1.75× 221184
= 1.925× 10−14cm2
⇒ σBRAM(bit) = 1.75σcon f ig(bit)
= 3.368× 10−14cm2
These bit cross-sections can be used to calculate the static cross-sections of other Spartan-
3 devices. Only one device was measured, so it should be kept in mind that commercial
devices show variations in these values, depending on the mask set andmanufacturing
line.
8.5.6 Dynamic cross-section
The very small cross-section predicted by the SEU simulator for the fault tolerant de-
signs makes it difficult to accurately measure the scaling factor, without performing
thousands of tests. This difficulty was overcome by determining the failure rate for a
relatively large number of upsets, then using that to determine the failure rate for a
single upset.
Testing of a design can be modelled as a set of Bernoulli trails (where “Pass” and “Fail”
are the only possible outcomes).[66] The probability that a single event upset will occur
in one of the sensitive bits, causing the design to fail, is given by:
P{sensitive bit upset} =
(
N
k
)
pk(1− p)N−k (8.4)
with k the number of upsets in sensitive bits, N the total number of upsets and p the
probability that an upset will cause the design to fail.
If the design is still functioning after a run, one assumes that no upsets were experi-
enced in any of the sensitive bits. Therefore k = 0 and p = α, which gives:
P{pass} = (1− α)N (8.5)
⇒ α = 1− N
√
P{pass} (8.6)
The pass rates measured for the different designs are listed in Table 8.1. The average
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Table 8.1: Measured pass rates and average number of upsets for tested PicoBlaze designs. The
columns give the pass rate and average number of upsets for the listed dose. The pass rate gives
themeasured probability that a designwill still be functioning after receiving the specified dose.
The number of upsets has been adjusted to compensate for the masking of upsets by the mask
file.
Dose (p/cm2) 6.168× 108 1.234× 109 1.85× 109
Pass rate Upsets Pass rate Upsets Pass rate Upsets
Reference 0.559 13.987 0.500 27.891 0.286 42.384
TMR 0.774 14.293 0.613 27.642 0.481 41.245
Final 0.788 14.108 0.600 30.374 0.484 44.902
number of upsets for the individual designs was used to determine the scaling factors
from Equation 8.6.
The results are plotted in Figures 8.13, 8.14 and 8.15. A straight, horizontal line is ex-
pected in all cases, although some statistical uncertainty is also present. The values for
the reference design are fairly scattered due to it being composed of fewer samples than
the other two designs. The mean of these values was used in further calculations. Table
8.2 summarises the scaling factors at the different doses.
Figure 8.13: Measured scaling factor for the reference design (Design A). The scaling factor as
predicted by the SEU simulator is also shown.
It is evident that the scaling factor for the reference design is larger than those of the
two mitigated designs. The mitigated designs show approximately the same scaling
factor. This is similar to what was predicted by error injection, but the measured results
are all significantly greater than the simulator predicted.
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Figure 8.14: Measured scaling factor for the design with high level TMR.
Figure 8.15: Measured scaling factor for the final design.
Table 8.2: Measured scaling factors (α) for tested PicoBlaze designs at different doses. The mit-
igated designs have smaller scaling factors, which means the dynamic cross-section is smaller.
Dose (p/cm2) 6.168× 108 1.234× 109 1.85× 109
Reference 0.0407 0.0245 0.0291
TMR 0.0169 0.01753 0.01756
Final 0.0167 0.0166 0.01601
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Table 8.3: Comparison of measured and simulated dynamic cross-sections. The discrepancy
between the values measured through radiation testing σ′(rad) and error injection σ
′
(sim) is mostly
likely due to the SEFI cross-section, σSEFI . Although this term makes a significant contribution
to the cross-section for the tested designs, this is only due to the small size of the reference
design and the effectiveness of the error mitigation techniques in the other designs. All values
are in cm2.
σ′(rad) σ
′
(sim) e
Reference 7.687×10−10 3.460×10−10 4.227×10−10
TMR 4.035×10−10 2.393×10−11 3.796×10−10
Final 3.832×10−10 3.204×10−11 3.512×10−10
8.5.7 Comparison with SEU simulator
The radiation testing results have to be compared with the SEU simulator measure-
ments to evaluate the simulator.
The simulator determined the αBRAM and αcon f ig values, while the radiation test pro-
vides the different σ values and an α for the complete design.
The simulated and measured dynamic cross-sections are compared as follows:
σ′(rad) = σ
′
(sim) + e (8.7)
α(rad)σ(rad) = αcon f ig(sim)σcon f ig(rad) + αBRAM(sim)σBRAM(rad) + e (8.8)
The error term (e) is used to measure the mismatch between left- and right-hand side
of the equation. It contains all the dynamic cross-sections that could not be measured
by the simulator, as well as a small measurement uncertainty.
The dynamic cross-sections for the different designs, as well as the resulting e values,
are listed in Table 8.3. The measured cross-section and mean α values were used in the
calculations.
From Equation 4.4:
e = σSEFI + αFFσFF + αSETσSET + αHLσHL (8.9)
The similarity in e values indicate that the observed discrepancy is most likely due
to the measurent of the SEFI cross-section (σSEFI). The size of σSEFI is comparable to
that measured in Virtex devives in testing at JPL. Further experiments to confirm this
conclusion can still be performed.
The significant influence of σSEFI on the cross-section of the tested designs is due to
the small size of the reference design (it uses approximately 6% of the configuration
memory) and the protection afforded by the mitigation techniques in the other two
designs. The configuration and BRAMdynamic cross-sections will increase with larger,
unprotected designs, which will make their contribution to the dynamic cross-section
dominate. The effective application of error mitigation techniques in the TMR and
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reference designs has decreased these cross-sections to well below σSEFI .
It can be assumed that the techniques that protect against upsets in the configuration
will also protect against SETs, upsets in flip-flops and upsets in half-latches. Therefore
e measured in the protected designs must be approximately equal to each other and
also to the SEFI cross-section:
σSEFI ≈ 3.65× 10−10cm2 (8.10)
A similar SEFI cross-section can be expected on other Spartan-3 devices. This cross-
section should therefore be added to future error injection results to obtain more accu-
rate dynamic cross-section estimates.
e for the reference design is larger, because the other SEU cross-sections are not miti-
gated.
8.5.8 Typical LEO failure rates
The radiation data was used to determine approximate failure rates for the tested de-
signs in a space environment.
The 1996 Cosmic Ray Effects on Micro-Electronics (CREME96) is a widely-used suite of
programs for creating numerical models of the radiation environment near the earth.
It is used to evaluate the radation effects on electronic devices in orbit and provides
estimates of the high LET radiation environment for manned spacecraft. Comparison
to on-orbit data has demonstrated the accuracy of the model. The Naval Research Lab-
oratory hosts a website that allows users to perform calculations with the CREME96
program suite.[67]
CREME96 was used to calculate the expected upset rates for a Spartan-3 XC3S200 in
low earth orbit. The calculations were performed for a spacecraft in a 1000km sun-
synchronous orbit with an inclination of 99.48◦. Average flux conditions were used, ie.
solar minimum activity without flares. 3mm aluminium was used as shielding.
The Spartan-3 cross-section was approximated using a Weibull curve, similar to the
curves measured in JPL testing of Virtex-II devices.[68] The onset energy (level below
which no upsets occur) was set to 1MeV and the measured cross-sections of the differ-
ent components were used as plateau.
Figure 8.16 shows the calculated fluxes experienced by the device (after shielding).
Note that protons are the greatest radiation source. This validates the use of protons
for radiation testing and SEU rate calculations.
The results for proton induced upset calculations are listed in Table 8.4. This can be
used to determine the expected failure rates for the irradiated designs. The configu-
ration and BRAM upset rates are scaled with their repsective α values and added to
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Figure 8.16: Fluxes after shielding in 1000km sun-synchronous orbit for eight most prevalent
elements. The majority of the radiation is caused by protons (Z=1).
Table 8.4: Proton induced upset rates according to CREME96 for a Spartan-3 XC3S200. A
1000km sun-synchronous orbit in average solar conditions was used in the calculations.
SEUs/bit/sec SEUs/bit/day SEUs/device/sec SEUs/device/day
Configuration 4.94×10−12 4.27×10−7 4.02×10−6 3.47×10−1
BRAM 8.65×10−12 7.47×10−7 1.91×10−6 1.65×10−1
SEFI - - 9.37×10−8 8.07×10−3
Table 8.5: Expected failure rates for tested designs in space.
Design Failures/device/day
Reference 0.01617
High-level TMR 0.00870
Final 0.00885
the SEFI upset rate. The failure rates for the tested designs are listed in Table 8.5. As
expected, the hardened designs are more robust to SEU induced failures.
8.6 Conclusion
The radiation test showed that iThemba LABS can be used to test the response of elec-
tronic devices to SEUs. The test setup was significantly simpler and more manageable
than the previous test at iThemba.
Three designs were irradiated to compare the SEU simulator results to actual radiation
testing. The designs with error mitigation performed better than the one without mit-
igation, as predicted by the simulator. The SEU simulator performs well in measuring
the effect of error mitigation on an HDL level.
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Table 8.6: Static cross-section measurements for Spartan-3 XC3S200.
Component Cross-section (cm2) Percentage
σcon f ig 1.58×10−8 66.94%
σBRAM 7.45×10−9 31.52%
σSEFI 3.65×10−10 1.54%
Total 2.36×10−8 100%
A constant offset was observed when the radiation and simulator results were com-
pared. This can be satisfactorily explained by the SEFI cross-section, which can not
be measured by the SEU simulator. This cross-section stays fairly constant for differ-
ent Spartan-3 devices and should therefore be added to future fault injection results to
obtain a more accurate estimate of the dynamic cross-section. Further radiation exper-
ments to confirm this is recommended.
The SEFI cross-section made a significant contribution to the dynamic cross-section for
all the tested designs. It is important to note that this is only the case with small designs
(such as the reference PicoBlaze design) and designs with good SEU mitigation.
The static cross-section measurements are summarised in Table 8.6. The SEFI cross-
section is expected to be similar for other Spartan-3 devices. The BRAM and configu-
ration cross-sections will vary, depending on the capacity of the device. These figures
form an upper bound on the dynamic cross-section. The dominant contributions by the
configuration and BRAM makes the application of error mitigation techniques neces-
sary for most designs.
σSEFI can be considered a lower limit on the dynamic cross-section. This means that
mitigation techniques are only truly productive until the configuration and BRAM dy-
namic cross-sections have been decreased to below 10% of this value. Further mitiga-
tion would not make any significant improvements to the SEU hardness of the device,
because σSEFI would dominate.
Latch-up was observed during testing but no permanent damage was detected, which
is good.
The measured cross-sections were used to calculate (with CREME96) the expected on-
orbit failure rates of the tested designs.
Chapter 9
Conclusions and recommendations
This document presented the development and testing of a single-event upset resistant
PicoBlaze soft-core processor on an SRAM FPGA.
The application of error mitigation techniques to SRAM FPGAs was investigated to
derive guidelines for achieving fault tolerance on SRAM FPGAs.
A fault tolerant version of the Xilinx PicoBlaze soft-core processor was implemented
by using a developed error injection tool-set. This tool-set was used to emperically
evaluate the improvement offered by different error mitigation techniques.
Three designs were irradiated with protons to test their SEU susceptibility, as well as
measure the physical radiation characteristics of the Spartan-3 device. The designs with
error mitigation performed better than the unprotected reference design, demonstrat-
ing the effectiveness of HDL mitigation. The measurements were compared with the
simulator results to measure the SEFI cross-section, which can not be changed by HDL
mitigation.
9.1 Results
9.1.1 Error mitigation
Guidelines for achieving fault tolerance in SRAM FPGAs were derived after an exten-
sive literature study.
Comprehensive protection of a design on an SRAM FPGA requires mitigation on HDL
level, as well as external protection against latch-up and corruption of the configuration
memory.
SRAM FPGAs are particularly sensitive to upsets in the configuration memory. There-
fore spatial redundancy, such as TMR, is recommended on HDL level to minimise the
disruption caused.
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The recommended error mitigation strategy entails applying high-level TMR to a de-
sign and then optimising areas where sufficient protection can be achieved through
more efficient means. Simulation of the resulting design can be performed to obtain an
approximate dynamic cross-section.
9.1.2 SEU simulator
A set of tools, consisting of an SEU simulator and support software, has been devel-
oped.
The simulator can be used to measure dynamic cross-section of a design efficiently
by injecting errors into the configuration memory of a Xilinx FPGA. This allows the
effectiveness of different mitigation strategies to be compared, without having to resort
to the cost and administration involved in radiation tests. The software tools include
the control software for simulation and the configuration visualisation program.
The SEU simulator can be used to compare functionally equivalent designs with differ-
ent error mitigation strategies to obtain the best design. It can be used to determine an
approximate dynamic cross-section, when combined with radiation measurements for
the configuration bit cross-section (σ′con f ig(bit)), BRAM bit cross-section (σ
′
BRAM(bit)) and
the SEFI cross-section (σSEFI).
9.1.3 Fault tolerant soft-core processor
The PicoBlaze and LEON3 soft-core processors were investigated as candidates for a ra-
diation tolerant implementation. The PicoBlaze was selected based on available hard-
ware and because its smaller size allowed several fault tolerant versions to be imple-
mented and compared.
A final implemetation that offers a good trade-off between the mitigation overhead and
the hardness was derived. This design uses Hamming encoding to protect the program
memory and some output pins. TMR is used to protect the rest of the design. The
radiation tolerance is similar to that afforded by a full TMR implementation, but usage
of scarce resources such as BRAM and hardware multipliers is lower.
9.1.4 Radiation testing
Three designs were irradiated at iThemba LABS to verify the protection afforded by the
mitigation techniques and to evaluate the accuracy of the SEU simulator. The physical
radiation characteristics of the Spartan-3 device were also measured.
The hardended designs performed better than the unprotected design, indicating that
the HDLmitigationwas successful. However, the dynamic cross-section differedwith a
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constant offset from the predictions of the SEU simulator. This difference was identified
as the SEFI cross-section (σSEFI).
9.2 Recommendations
9.2.1 Error mitigation
The use of active readback and partial reconfiguration to improve the dependability of
designs on SRAM FPGAs can still be investigated.
The methods discussed and implemented were considered with Xilinx SRAM-based
FPGAs as target. Altera devices have architectural differences thatmay need to be taken
into account. The protection of registers and memory were regarded as sufficient for
flash and antifuse devices, actual radiation testing of these devices with different EDAC
strategies can still be done. Flash devices offer especially interesting posibilities, with
the low SEU cross-section, low power consumption and the ability to be reconfigured.
The automated application of error mitigation techniques with software can also be in-
vestigated further. Once an appropriate model of a design has been constructed from
the HDL or EDIF description, it should be fairly easy to apply selected hardening tech-
niques. This will make the hardening process one step in the design cycle, freeing the
developer from having to keep it in mind.
9.2.2 Configuration controller
If the configuration controller is implemented on a larger FPGA or CPLD, a soft-core
processor can be adapted to perform the duties of the configuration controller. This will
decrease the component count and possibily lead to an increase in performance.
A further extension would be to store instructions with the configuration data in the
flash memory. In this design, the data on the flash will become a program that the
configuration controller executes to perform configuration and selective readback. A
post-processing routine can format the configuration data before it is downloaded to
the flash memory. Only a small instruction set is required, but it will greatly simplify
advanced configuration functions.
9.2.3 SEU simulator
The SEU simulator has been verified to provide useful information and can now be
used for development of fault tolerant designs. Only minor modifications would be
necessary to accommodate other Xilinx devices. To tests designs on Altera devices, the
differences in configuration flow and lack of readback on these devices would be need
to be taken into account.
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The relative sparseness of sensitive configuration bits in most designs can be used to
significantly speed up testing. Multiple bits can be flipped at the same time, when the
design fails, the bits can be upset individually to find the sensitive bit(s). This will be
especially useful on large devices where tens of millions of bits need to be tested.
Further investigation of the discrepancy between the simulated andmeasured dynamic
cross-sections should also be conducted.
9.2.4 Future radiation testing
If a large number of future tests are planned, it will definitely be worth the investment
to develop a system that can be integrated with the existing setup at iThemba, to pro-
vide rapid and automated testing of a design.
9.3 Final comments
The process documented in this thesis demonstrates how a open-source IP and COTS
FPGAs can be combined to develop a robust low cost component for use inminiature space-
craft.
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Appendix A
GNU General Public License
The GNU GPL has become a popular license for releasing open source software and
HDL intellectual property.
This chapter provides a brief introduction to the GPL, and the implications of using
software/IP covered by it.
A.1 The GNU General Public License
The goal of the GNU General Public License is to protect the freedom of users of free
software (with “free” used like freedom, not price). The GPL grants users the right to
access the source code of software, to allow modification and distribution. To achieve
this, the GPL restricts anyone to deny their users these rights.
In practise, this translates into granting the users of software the same rights as
developers, most notably the right modify the sources and to redistribute (for a fee if
so desired) the software.
The GPL allows unconstrained further development and use for academic, research
and commercial purposes, however, all work derived from GPL-ed work will also be
covered by the GPL. The developer may require a fee to be paid for distribution, but
royalties from further use or distribution cannot be claimed, as this will limit the
freedom of the user.
The Free Software Foundation[69] provides the most information on the use and
implications of using the GPL.
A.2 The GNU Lesser General Public License
The LGPL is also aimed at protecting the freedom of software users, but has less strict
constraints on linking and using LGPLed software.
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Unlike the GPL, the LGPL allows code to be linked with a library under another
license, without requiring that the sources of the other library be made public without
restriction. However, if an executable created during linking is distributed, it needs to
be distributed under the LGPL, which requires all the sources to be made public.
A.3 Implications of using the GPL
The GPL allows unlimited, royalty free use and development of software, as long as
the resulting product is again distributed under the GPL. This means that a derived
product has to be distributed with the full sources of the final design.
One is allowed to distribute binary libraries under a propriety license, along with a
GPL-ed library (with its sources). A person or company which merges to two may use
it for his own purposes, but may not distribute the derived product since he can not
fulfil the GPL.
Appendix B
Selected source code excerpts
Due to the sheer volume of source code used in this project, only the academically
significant portions are presented here.
B.1 TMR using lookup tables
TRV_BUFT.vhd
-- Adapted from xapp197
-- Johannes van der Horst
--
library IEEE;
use IEEE.Std_Logic_1164.all;
entity TRV_BUFT is
port (
TR0 : in std_logic;
TR1 : in std_logic;
TR2 : in std_logic;
V : out std_logic );
end TRV_BUFT;
Architecture RTL of TRV_BUFT is
component BUFT
port ( I : in std_logic;
T : in std_logic;
O : out std_logic );
end component;
component PULLUP
port ( O : out std_logic );
end component;
Begin
BUFT0: BUFT
port map (
I => TR0 ,
142
B.1 TMR using lookup tables 143
T => TR2 ,
O => V);
BUFT1: BUFT
port map (
I => TR1 ,
T => TR0 ,
O => V);
BUFT2: BUFT
port map (
I => TR2 ,
T => TR1 ,
O => V);
PLLP: PULLUP
port map (O => V);
end RTL;
voter.vhd
--! An array of triple redundant voters.
--!
--! Instantiates an array of n TRV_LUTs or TRV_BUFTs , depending on the
--! architecture specified , as provided in Xilinx xapp197
--!
--! TRV_LUTs are faster , but consume more logical resources in the FPGA.
--!
--! TRV_BUFTs are recommended for systems with constraints on the available
--! logic resources , at a slight speed penalty.
--!
--! Johannes van der Horst
--! jvdh@sun.ac.za
--! 2005-7-26
library IEEE;
use IEEE.Std_Logic_1164.all;
use IEEE.Std_logic_arith.all;
library unisim;
use unisim.vcomponents.all;
entity voter is
generic (
n : integer := 32
);
port (
TR0 : in std_logic_vector;
TR1 : in std_logic_vector;
TR2 : in std_logic_vector;
V : out std_logic_vector );
end voter;
architecture buft of voter is
component TRV_BUFT
port (
TR0 : in std_logic;
TR1 : in std_logic;
TR2 : in std_logic;
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V : out std_logic );
end component;
begin
vector: for i in 0 to n-1 generate
sv: TRV_BUFT
port map(TR0(i),TR1(i),TR2(i),V(i));
end generate;
end architecture buft;
B.2 Tools
B.2.1 CRC calculator
addcrc.py
#!/usr/bin/python
#
# Adds a CRC calculator to the in/outputs of an arbitrary design.
# Assumes that the source file is valid VHDL.
#
# Johannes van der Horst
# jvdh@sun.ac.za
# 2006 -03 -26
import sys
import tokenize
import re
import math
import time
crcwidth = 255
newentity = "--\n-- Generated by addcrc.py on "+str(time.ctime ())+"\n-- \n--
    Author: Johannes van der Horst\n--
    Email: jvdh@sun.ac.za\n--
    2006 -03 -28\n--\n\n"
newentity += "\nlibrary ieee;\nuse ieee.std_logic_1164.all;\n\nentity "
newarch = "architecture behav of "
newsignal = "";
newcode = "begin\n\t"
dwidth = 0;
# dictionary of signals: d[name ]:(dir ,width ,bit assigned)
sig_dict = {};
def error(s):
print s
def signal(i):
global newentity
global newarch
global newsignal;
global en
global dwidth
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global sig_dict
n = 1;
sig = "\tsignal ";
while en[i-1]!=":" :
sig += en[i];
newentity += en[i]+" ";
if (en[i]!=",") and (en[i]!=":"):
sig += "_crc"
sig_dict[en[i]+"_crc"] = -1
if (en[i]==","):
n+=1
sig += " ";
i += 1
dir = en[i]
newentity += dir+" ";
i += 1
w = 0;
while en[i-1]!=";":
newentity += en[i]+" ";
if en[i].lower ()=="std_logic":
w = 1;
for c in sig_dict:
if sig_dict[c]== -1:
sig_dict[c] = (dir , 1,0);
elif en[i].lower ()=="std_logic_vector":
w = abs(int(en[i+2])-int(en[i+4])+1)
for c in sig_dict:
if sig_dict[c]== -1:
sig_dict[c] = (dir , abs(int(en[i+2])-int(en[i+4])+1) ,0)
sig += en[i] + " ";
i+=1;
if dir!="in":
newsignal += sig+"\n";
dwidth += w*n;
if en[i]!="end":
newentity += "\n\t\t";
return i;
#####################################################
## Main
if (len(sys.argv )<3):
print "CRC wrapper file generator"
print "Usage: "
print "./ addcrc.py <file > <clk > <max_cycle > : Generate CRC calculator for <file >
      using <clk > as main clock , run for <max_cycle > clock cycles"
else:
clkname = sys.argv [2]
max_cycle = sys.argv [3]
int(max_cycle)
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src = open(sys.argv [1]). read ();
start = src.lower (). find("entity");
stop = src.lower (). find("architecture");
#print "slice",start ,":", stop
en = filter(None , re.split(" --.*\r\n|[\r\n\t ]|(;)|([_a-zA-Z0 -9]*)",src[start:stop ]))
#print en
#entity (0);
i = 0;
if en[i].lower () != "entity":
error("Entity expected");
i +=1;
# name
name = en[i];
newentity += en[i]+"_crc is\n\tport (\n\t\t"
newarch += en[i]+"_crc is \n\t\t-- orignal component\n\tcomponent "
for j in range(1,len(en)-3):
newarch += en[j]+" "
if ((en[j]==';') and (en[j+1]. lower ()!="end")) or ((en[j-1]. lower ()=="port")):
newarch += "\n\t\t"
newarch += "\n\tend component ;\n\n\t\t"
while en[i]!='(':
i+=1; # is Port lbrac
i+=1;
# read all signals
newentity += "rdnwr_crc0: in std_logic ;\n
    \t\t rclk_crc: in std_logic ;\n
    \t\t crc_dout: out std_logic_vector (1 downto 0);\n
    \t\t nstop : out std_logic ;\n\t\t";
while i < len(en)-4:
i = signal(i)
newentity += "\nend "+name+"_crc;\n"
newsignal += "\tsignal din_crc : std_logic_vector (255 downto 0);\n
    \tsignal mclk_new : std_logic ;\n
    \tsignal crc_nstop : std_logic ;\n";
# component instatiation
newcode += "\n\t\t-- Original file\n\tcomp0 : "+name+" port map("
comp0 = filter(None , re.split(" --.*\r\n|:.*;| ,|[\r\n\t ]|([_a-zA-Z0 -9]*)",
src[start:stop ]))[5: -3]
for i in comp0 [:-1]:
(sd , sw , su) = sig_dict[i+"_crc"];
if (sd != "in"):
newcode +=i+"_crc ,"
elif (i == clkname ):
newcode +=i+"_new ,"
else:
newcode += i+","
newcode += comp0 [-1]+");\n"
# crc calculator
newarch += "\n\t\t-- CRC calculator\n
    \tcomponent crc16_"+str(crcwidth)+" is\n
    \tgeneric (\n\t\tmax_cycle : integer := 100000\n
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    \t);\n
    \tport (\n
    \t\tclk: in std_logic ;\
    n\t\trclk:in std_logic ;\n
    \t\trdnwr:in std_logic ;\n
    \t\tdin:in std_logic_vector("+str(crcwidth )+" downto 0);\n
    \t\tdout : out std_logic_vector (1 downto 0);\n
    \t\tnstop: out std_logic );\n
    \tend component ;\n";
print sig_dict
sigiter = sig_dict.iterkeys ();
t = 0;
sd = "in";
sw = 0;
su = 0;
sn = "mclk_crc";
done = 0;
newcode += "\n\t\t-- CRC calculator";
newcode += "\n\tdin_crc("+str(crcwidth )+" downto "+str(crcwidth -dwidth +1)+") <= ";
print math.ceil(float(dwidth )/ crcwidth)
for n in range(0,round(math.ceil(float(dwidth )/ crcwidth ))):
if n == 1:
print "\t-- WARNING: rdnwr_crc ports need to be added manually\n"
newcode += "\n\t\t-- WARNING: rdnwr_crc ports need to be added manually:"
print n
print sn ,":",sig_dict[sn]
used = 0;
while ((used < crcwidth) and (done ==0)) :
if (sw -su) == 0:
while ((sd == "in") or (sw -su == 0)) and (done ==0):
try:
sn = sigiter.next()
except StopIteration:
done = 1
[sd ,sw ,su] = sig_dict[sn]
if (used > 0) and (sw -su >0):
newcode += " &\n\t\t"
if (sw -su >0) and (sw -su <= (crcwidth -used )):
newcode += sn
if (sw -su >0) and (sw >1): #part of bus has already been used
newcode += "("+str(sw -su -1)+" downto 0)"
used += sw -su
su = sw
elif sw -su > crcwidth -used:
print "sw -su >="
newcode += sn+"("+str(sw -su -1)+" downto "+str(sw -su -(crcwidth -used ))+")"
su = crcwidth - used;
used += crcwidth - used
sig_dict.pop(sn)
sig_dict[sn] = (sd , sw , su)
newcode += ";\n"
if done !=0: # din pins unconnected
newcode += "\n\tdin_crc("+str(crcwidth - dwidth )+" downto 0) <= (others => '0');\n"
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newcode += "\n\tcrc_"+str(n)+": crc16_"+str(crcwidth )+"
    generic map ("+max_cycle+") port map("+clkname+"_new ,rclk_crc ,rdnwr_crc"
+str(n)+",din_crc ,crc_dout ,crc_nstop );"
newcode += "\n\n\t\t-- Connect output signals to inputs of crc calculator\n"
for sn in sig_dict.keys ():
(sd ,sw ,su) = sig_dict[sn];
if sd!="in":
newcode += "\t"+sn[0: len(sn)-4]+" <= "+sn+";\n"
print sn ,":",sig_dict[sn]
newcode += "\n\tnstop <= crc_nstop ;\n\tmclk_new <= mclk and crc_nstop ;\n";
newcode += "\nend behav;\n\n";
# save result
fout = open(name+"_crc.vhd",'w')
fout.write(newentity+"\n")
fout.write(newarch+"\n")
fout.write(newsignal+"\n")
fout.write(newcode );
print dwidth
print sig_dict
B.2.2 Hamming memory generator
hamming_mem.py
#!/usr/bin/python2 .3
#
# Converts hex output of picoblaze assembler to
# (23 ,18) hamming encoded equivalents.
#
# Requires numpy , string
import time
import string
from numpy import *
# encoding matrix
He = array ([
[1,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,0,1], #p1
[1,0,1,1,0,1,1,0,0,1,1,0,1,1,0,0,1,1], #p2
[1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0],
[0,1,1,1,0,0,0,1,1,1,1,0,0,0,1,1,1,1], #p3
[0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0],
[0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0],
[0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0],
[0,0,0,0,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0], #p4
[0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0],
[0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0],
[0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0],
[0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0],
[0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0],
[0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0],
[0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0],
[0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,1,1,1,1,1], #p5
[0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0],
[0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0],
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[0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0],
[0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0],
[0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0],
[0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0],
[0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1]])
def word2arr(c):
s = [];
for i in range (0 ,18):
s.append ((c>>i)%2)
return array(s)
def arr2data(a):
# lower 16 bits
l = 0;
# middle bits (stored in parity fields of bram)
p = 0;
# upper 5 bits
u = 0;
for i in range (0 ,16):
l = (l<<1)+a[15-i]
for i in range (0, 2):
p = (p<<1)+a[17-i]
for i in range (0, 5):
u = (u<<1)+a[22-i]
# print int(l) + int(p<<16) + int(u<<18)
return (u, p, l)
# encodes a data word ,
def encode(i):
return arr2data(matrixmultiply(He ,word2arr(i). transpose ())%2)
#return arr2data(concatenate ([ word2arr(i),[0,0,0,0,0]]))
def main ():
init_val = dict ();
src = open("BIST.HEX",'r'). readlines ()
##for i in range (0 ,56):
## print encode(i);
## b = concatenate ([ word2arr(i),[0,0,0,0,0]])
## print b
## print arr2data(b)
##
##print "----------------"
##
##for i in range (0xffff ,0 x1001f ):
## print encode(i);
## b = concatenate ([ word2arr(i),[0,0,0,0,0]])
## print b
## print arr2data(b)
##
##print "----------------"
##for i in range (0x2ffff ,0 x3001f ):
## print encode(i);
## b = concatenate ([ word2arr(i),[0,0,0,0,1]])
## print b
B.2 Tools 150
## print arr2data(b)
par = [];
# generate hex with parity
for i in src:
# print i, "%x"%( int(i,16) / 0x10000)
par.append(encode(int(i ,16)))
# par.append ((0x10 ,(int(i ,16)/0 x10000),int(i ,16)%0 x10000 ))
cb = 0;
cp = 0;
cu = 0;
init = 0;
init_u = 0;
init_p = 0;
b = ""
p = ""
p0 = 0;
u = ""
for (uppr ,par ,lwr) in par:
# print " %x"%par ,par <<((cp%2)*2) , p0
#1024x5 contents
u = hex(uppr )[2:]. zfill (2) + u
cu+=1
if cu >= 32:
l = "INITU_%s"%(hex(init_u )[2:]. zfill (2))
init_val[l] = u
# print l, u
cu = 0;
u = "";
init_u += 1;
# parity contents
if (cp %2)==0:
p0 = par
else :
p0 = (par <<2)+p0
if cp%2 != 0:
p = hex(p0 )[2:]. zfill (1) + p
# print hex(p0 )[2:]. zfill (1)
p0 = 0;
cp+=1
if cp >= 128:
l = "INITP_%s"%(hex(init_p )[2:]. zfill (2))
init_val[l] = p
#parity bits of upper bram
# l = "INITPU_%s"%( hex(init_p )[2:]. zfill (2))
# init_val[l] = "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
init_p +=1
cp = 0
p0 = 0
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p = ""
# 1024 x18 contents
b = hex(lwr )[2:]. zfill (4) + b
cb+=1
if cb >= 16:
l = "INIT_%s"%(hex(init )[2:]. zfill (2))
init_val[l] = b
#print l,b
# bram.append ("INIT_%s => X\"%s\",\n"%( hex(init )[2:]. zfill (2),b))
cb = 0;
b = "";
init += 1;
return init_val
#------------------------------
#print He
repl = main()
repl["timestamp"] = time.asctime ()
out = open("out.vhd",'w')
hdl = open("ROM_form.vhd",'r').read()
template = hdl[hdl.find("{begin template}")+17:]
for s in repl.iterkeys ():
template = string.replace(template ,"{"+s.upper ()+"}",repl[s])
out.write(template)
out.close ()
B.2.3 EDIF-level flip-flop insertion
tmrff.py
#!/usr/bin/python
#
# Replaces flips flops with tmr flip flops
# 1) Insert TMR_FF library into EDF file
# 2) Replace known ff references with tmr instances
# 3) Update VIRTEX
# 4) Update UNILIB with other components in TMF_FF library
#
# Usage: python tmrff.py <input.edf > <output.edf >
#
# uses virtex.py and unilib.py
#
# Author: Johannes van der Horst
# jvdh@sun.ac.za
# 2006 -05 -27
import sys
B.2 Tools 152
import re
from virtex import virtex_dict
from unilib import unilib_dict
# regexp strings
re_LB = re.compile("\(",re.MULTILINE)
re_RB = re.compile("\)",re.MULTILINE)
def matchingParenthesis(str , start ):
str += "()" # something to keep the iteraters happy
n = 1;
lbiter = re_LB.finditer(str[start :]);
rbiter = re_RB.finditer(str[start :]);
rb = rbiter.next()
lb = lbiter.next()
while n!=0:
if (lb.start () < rb.start ()) :
n += 1
lb = lbiter.next()
else:
rb = rbiter.next()
n -= 1
return start+lb.start ()
def splitLibs(src):
#library virtex
start = re.compile("\( library virtex",re.IGNORECASE+re.MULTILINE ). search(src).start ()
virtex_lib = src[start:matchingParenthesis(src ,start +1)]
#initial code
initial = src[:start -1]
#library unilib
start = re.compile("\( library unilib",re.IGNORECASE+re.MULTILINE ). search(src).start ()
end = matchingParenthesis(src ,start +1)
unilib_lib = src[start:end]
work = src[end:]
return initial , virtex_lib ,unilib_lib , work
# ------------- main -------------
src = open(sys.argv [1]). read()
tmrff_lib = open("tmr_ff.edf").read()
# 1) split src into inividual libraries
head , virtex_lib , unilib_lib , work = splitLibs(src)
# 2) replace references to known flip flops with new ones
for comp in unilib_dict:
old = "(viewRef PRIM (cellRef "+comp+" (libraryRef UNILIB )))"
new = "(viewRef implement (cellRef TMR_"+comp+" (libraryRef TMR_FF )))"
work = work.replace(old ,new)
# 3) update virtex_lib , if needed
new_virtex = virtex_lib [:len(virtex_lib )-4];
for comp in virtex_dict:
if (virtex_lib.find(comp) == -1):
new_virtex += virtex_dict[comp]
new_virtex += ')'
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# 4) update unilib , if needed
new_unilib = unilib_lib [:len(unilib_lib )-4];
for comp in unilib_dict:
if (unilib_lib.find("cell "+comp+" ") == -1):
new_unilib += unilib_dict[comp]
new_unilib += ')'
f = open(sys.argv[2],"w")
f.write(head + new_virtex + new_unilib +tmrff_lib + work);
B.2.4 Readback
progalgxc3s.cpp
// Extract from progalgxc3s.cpp
#include "progalgxc3s.h"
const byte ProgAlgXC3S :: JPROGRAM =0x0b;
const byte ProgAlgXC3S :: CFG_IN =0x05;
const byte ProgAlgXC3S :: JSHUTDOWN =0x0d;
const byte ProgAlgXC3S :: JSTART =0x0c;
const byte ProgAlgXC3S :: BYPASS =0x3f;
const byte ProgAlgXC3S ::HIGHZ =0x0a;
const byte ProgAlgXC3S :: CFG_OUT =0x04;
const byte ProgAlgXC3S :: EXTEST =0x00;
const byte ProgAlgXC3S :: SAMPLE =0x01;
/**
* Read configuration memory and write to rb_data
*
* Johannes van der Horst
* 2006 -08 -21
*/
int ProgAlgXC3S :: readback(BitFile &file)
{
long len = 1044736+64;
unsigned char tdo[len];
jtag ->shiftIR (& JSHUTDOWN );
io ->cycleTCK (12);
jtag ->shiftIR (& CFG_IN );
byte init [64];
jtag ->longToByteArray (0xffffffff ,&init [0]); //dummy
jtag ->longToByteArray (0x66aa9955 ,&init [4]); //sync
jtag ->longToByteArray (0x8004000c ,&init [8]); // FAR
jtag ->longToByteArray (0xffffffff ,&init [12]); // lots
jtag ->longToByteArray (0x8006800c ,&init [16]); //FLR
jtag ->longToByteArray (0x2c000000 ,&init [20]); //FLR (0x34 for xc3s200)
jtag ->longToByteArray (0x8001000c ,&init [24]); //CMD
jtag ->longToByteArray (0x20000000 ,&init [28]); //read config data
jtag ->longToByteArray (0x00060014 ,&init [32]); //FDRO read
jtag ->longToByteArray (0xac000012 ,&init [36]); // word count (one frame)
jtag ->longToByteArray (0x00000000 ,&init [40]);
jtag ->longToByteArray (0x00000000 ,&init [44]);
jtag ->shiftDR(init ,0,384,32, false); // Align to 32 bits.
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jtag ->shiftIR (& CFG_OUT );
byte hdr [4];
byte padding [1696/8];
jtag ->shiftDR(0,padding ,1696/8 , false);
io ->tapTestLogicReset ();
io ->setTapState(IOBase :: RUN_TEST_IDLE );
jtag ->shiftIR (& CFG_IN );
byte hdr2 [60];
jtag ->shiftIR (& CFG_IN );
jtag ->longToByteArray (0xffffffff ,&hdr2 [0]); //dummy
jtag ->longToByteArray (0x66aa9955 ,&hdr2 [4]); //sync
jtag ->longToByteArray (0x8006800c ,&hdr2 [8]); //FLR
jtag ->longToByteArray (0x2c000000 ,&hdr2 [12]); // 0x34 for xc3s200
jtag ->longToByteArray (0x8001000c ,&hdr2 [16]); // CMD
jtag ->longToByteArray (0xe0000000 ,&hdr2 [20]); // clear CRC
jtag ->longToByteArray (0x8001000c ,&hdr2 [24]); // CMD
jtag ->longToByteArray (0x20000000 ,&hdr2 [28]); // read config data
jtag ->longToByteArray (0x8004000c ,&hdr2 [32]); // FAR
jtag ->longToByteArray (0x00000000 ,&hdr2 [36]); // 0
jtag ->longToByteArray (0x00060014 ,&hdr2 [40]); // FDRO read
jtag ->longToByteArray (0x11fe0012 ,&hdr2 [44]); //
jtag ->longToByteArray (0x00000000 ,&hdr2 [48]); // flush
jtag ->shiftDR(hdr2 ,0 ,480 ,32);
// read data
jtag ->shiftIR (& CFG_OUT );
jtag ->shiftDR(0,tdo ,len ,false);
// store tdo
char* fname = "rb_data";
FILE *fptr=fopen(fname ,"wb");
if(fptr ==0){
fprintf(stderr ,"Cannot open file");
return 0;
}
// write to file (ignore first few bytes until the testing is done)
for(int i=8; i<len /8; i++){
byte b=file.bitRevTable[tdo[i]]; // Reverse bit order
fwrite (&b,1,1,fptr);
}
fclose(fptr);
// end readback and restart the device
byte tail [32];
jtag ->shiftIR (& CFG_IN );
jtag ->longToByteArray (0xffffffff ,&tail [0]); // dummy
jtag ->longToByteArray (0x66aa9955 ,&tail [4]); // sync
jtag ->longToByteArray (0x8001000c ,&tail [8]); // CMD
jtag ->longToByteArray (0xe0000000 ,&tail [12]); // clear crc
jtag ->longToByteArray (0x00000000 ,&tail [16]); // flush
jtag ->longToByteArray (0x00000000 ,&tail [20]); // flush
jtag ->longToByteArray (0x00000000 ,&tail [24]); // flush
jtag ->longToByteArray (0x00000000 ,&tail [28]); // flush
jtag ->shiftDR(tail ,0 ,192 ,32);
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jtag ->shiftIR (& JSTART );
io ->cycleTCK (12);
jtag ->shiftIR (& BYPASS );
fprintf(stderr ,"done\n\n");
}
B.2.5 Verification
verify.py
#!/usr/bin/python
#
# Verifies readback data against ISE output files , count number of mismatching bits.
#
# The extension of the input file is stripped and replaced with .msk for
# the mask file and .rbb for the readback verification file. An optional offset value can
# be given to correct alignment of different files
#
# Usage:
# python verify.py readback.data [offset]
#
# Author: Johannes van der Horst
# 2006 -08 -04
#
import sys
import time
def verify(argv):
if (len(argv )==1):
print "python verify.py readback.data rbb msk [offset ]\n"
else:
print "verifying ..."
try:
file = argv [1]
basename = (file.split("."))[0]
offset = 0
# if (len(argv )>2):
# offset = (int)(argv [4])
# config frame length (bytes)
fl = 212 # for XC3S200
#reference data (generated by ISE)
#ref = open(basename +". rbb",'r ').read()
ref = open(argv[2],'r').read()
#strip header (search for \x7F\x88 - only valid with CRC disabled ?)
hdr = ref.find("\x7F\x88")+2
# print hdr ,fl ,hdr+fl
# rbb data starts from
rbb = ref[hdr+fl:]
# print "%d"%( ord(rbb [0]))
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data_in = open(file ,'r').read ()[fl -offset :]
# print len(data_in)
f = open("data_in",'w')
f.write(data_in)
f.close ()
# msk = open(basename +". msk",'r ').read()
msk = open(argv[3],'r').read()
msk = msk[msk.find("\x7F\x88")+2:]
f = open("msk",'w')
f.write(msk)
f.close ()
#print len(msk)
#print len(rbb)
#print "\n\n"
for o in range (0,1):
count = 0;
i = 8;
p = [];
for c in data_in [:len(data_in )-8]:
m = msk[i+o]
ch = ((ord(c)) ^ ord(rbb[i])) & ~ord(m)
if ch!=0 :
# where in byte did this happen?
for sh in range (0,8):
if (ch >> sh) & 0x01 == 1:
p.append (((i -1)*8+sh ,ord(rbb[i]),(ord(c)),ord(m)));
count +=1
i+=1;
return (count , p)
except IOError:
print "IOError"
return (-1,-1)
verify(sys.argv)
Appendix C
Hardware schematics
Figure C.1: Top level schematic of configuration controller
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Figure C.2: Microcontroller portion of configuration controller
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Figure C.3: CPLD and flash of configuration controller
160
Figure C.4: Schematics for local transceiver.
161
Figure C.5: Schematics for remote transceiver.
Appendix D
Enclosed CD
A CD with the source code is included with this document.
It provides the source files for the configuration controller, PicoBlaze designs, as well
as the control software developed for simulation and radiation testing.
The Protel schematics for the developed hardware are also included.
It also contains additional photos documenting the hardware and radiation testing
setup.
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